' This civil revision under section 115, C.P.C. Is directed against the judgment and decree dated 5-3- 1989 of the District Judge, D.I.Khan maintaining the judgment and decree dated 14-7-1988 of the Civil Judge, D.I.Khan.
2. Ghulam Siddique, plaintiff/respondent No.1 herein instituted a suit for declaration in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, D.I.Khan against Kalu and Salim Abbas, defendants-petitioners herein, and against Ghulam Sabir, Muhammad Aslam, Mst. Ghulam Fatima and Mst. Aisha, defendants/respondents 2 to 5 herein, to the effect that he was the owner in possession of the suit house fully described in the heading of the plaint with which the defendants/petitioners and defendants-respondents 2 to 5 had no concern whatsoever and that the sale deed dated 29-6- 1983 by defendants-respondents 2 and 3 in favour of defendants-petitioners herein was void, illegal and ineffective on his rights. Additionally, the plaintiff-respondent No.1 herein sought the relief for possession and permanent injunction and in the alternative a prayer was made for possession of the suit house by pre-emption on payment of Rs.3,000.
3. According to the averments in the plaint, the suit house was owned by one Eidoo on whose death his widow Mst. Allah Wasai occupied the house as owner and in that capacity by an oral agreement deed sold it to Ghulam Siddique petitioner/respondent No.1 herein for Rs.1,000 and delivered its possession to him and then in support thereof executed an agreement deed on 2-7- 1983. Ghulam Siddique permitted her to stay in the house till her lifetime vide the aforesaid deed.
Later on when he came to know that three sisters of Eidoo i.e. Mst. Zinat, Mst: Fatima and Mst. Aisha were also his heirs, the plaintiff/respondent No.1 purchased their share in the suit house as well through Mst. Zinat who executed another sale-deed dated 6-12-1983. In this way Ghulam Siddique became full owner of the suit house. Mst. Zinat died after some time. About two months before the institution of the suit defendants/petitioners herein took forcible possession of the house. The matter was reported to the Chairman, Union Council Paroa, before whom defendants/petitioners herein claimed the ownership of the house on the basis of sale deed dated 29-6-1983 and on the death of Mst. Zinat who had also complained to Martial Law authorities, the proceedings were dropped. The defendants/petitioners were asked to deliver possession of the house but they refused necessitating in institution of the suit against them.
4. Defendants/petitioners and defendant/respondent No.2 herein resisted the suit. In their joint written statement they said that they had purchased the house from Ghulam Shabbir, defendant/respondent No.2 herein for Rs.40,000 vide sale-deed dated 27-2-1983 and 29-6-1983.
The ownership of Mst. Allah Wasai and Mst. Zinat and also that of Eidoo was denied. Their contention was that Ghulam Shabbir defendant/respondent No.2 was the owner of the house who had sold it to them. Number of additional pleas were also raised. Pleadings of the parties were reduced to following issues:-
(1) Whether the plaintiff has a cause of action?
(2) Whether the suit house is less than two kanals and hence is exempt from pre-emption?
(3) Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his own conduct to bring the present suit?
(4) Whether the suit is competent in its present form?
(5) Whether the plaintiff has waived his right of pre-emption?
(6) Whether the plaintiff has got any locus standi?
(7) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration that he is exclusive owner of the suit house and defendants have nothing to do with the same and agreement to sell deeds dated 29-6-1983 from the defendants 1 and 2 in favour of the defendants 3 and 4 are against law, illegal, mala fide, void and ineffective against his rights?
(8) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession as well as permanent injunction against the defendants as prayed for?
(9) Whether in alternative the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the suit house through pre- emption on payment of Rs.3,000 or whatever is fixed by the Court?
(10) Whether a sum of Rs.40,000 has been fixed in good faith or paid actually as sale consideration of the entire suit house by the defendants in equal shares?
(11) Relief.
5. The Trial Court recorded the evidence produced by the plaintiff/ respondent No.1 herein and closed the evidence of defendants/petitioners under Order 17, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, vide order dated 4-4-1987. This order was challenged in revision before the learned Additional District Judge who vide order dated 21-5-1989 in Civil Revision No.13 of 1987 dismissed the revision and maintained the order. The trial Court in the light of evidence on record discussed the issues. On issue No.1 it was held that Ghulam Siddique had a cause of action to bring the suit. Issue No.2 was not pressed by the parties and was left undiscussed.Issues Nos.3,5 and 6 were decided against the defendants/petitioners as no evidence was produced in support thereof. The suit was held competent. Issue No.4 was decided in the affirmative. On issue No.7 it was held that Ghulam Siddique was the owner of the suit house while Kalu and Salim defendants/petitioners herein were not and the deeds executed by them were illegal, mala fide. Void and ineffective. Issue No.8 was decided in favour of Ghulam Siddique plaintiff/respondent No.1. Issues Nos.9, 10 and 11 were held as redundant and no discussion was made. Consequently, the suit was decreed vide judgment dated 14-9-1990.
6. Kalu etc. Defendants/petitioners herein preferred an appeal in the Court of District Judge, D.I.Khan impugning the judgment and decree dated 14-9-1980 of the Trial Court. The learned District Judge vide judgment dated 5-3-1989 after appraising evidence produced by Ghulam Siddque upheld the judgment and decree of the lower Court and dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants/petitioners.
7. Feeling aggrieved from the judgments of the lower Courts, they have now come in revision to this Court.
8. Mr.Zahid Yusuf, Advocate for the defendants/petitioners argued that the lower Courts committed illegality in placing reliance on the un-registered sale-deeds dated 2-7-1983 and 6-12-1983 produced in evidence by plaintiff-respondent No.1 to prove his ownership of the suit house requiring interference by this Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.
9. Mr.Muhammad Khan, Advocate for plaintiff/respondent No.1 in reply said that the concurrent findings of facts by the two Courts below call for no interference in revision. Reliance was placed on 1981 CLC 1752.
10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the impugned judgments of the lower Courts and record as well. The two Courts are unanimous in their views that the plaintiff-respondent No.1 had succeeded in establishing his ownership to the house by producing evidence as required by law. The evidence of the defendants/petitioners was closed under Order 17, Rule 3, C.P.C. The dispute could be resolved only on the basis of evidence produced.
It has been resolved by the Courts below and the findings are on facts which being concurrent cannot be challenged in revision except when the decision is based on no evidence, or on inadmissible evidence, or is so perverse that grave injustice has resulted therefrom. It has been so held by the august Supreme Court in Kanwal Nain v. Fateh Khan. PLD 1983 SC 53. The rule laid down reads as under:- "Clearly the decision of the learned Single Judge, impugned in the appeal turns on the determination of a question of fact. As pointed out by this Court in Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan PLD 1970 SC 139, revisional powers under section 115, Civil Procedure Code are primarily intended for correcting errors made by subordinate Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction. Also ordinarily erroneous decisions of fact are not revisable, except in cases where the decision is based on no evidence or inadmissible evidence or is so perverse that grave injustice would result therefrom. In this regard I am tempted to cite here the illuminating observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Venkatagiri H.R.E. Board Madras AIR 1949 PC 156 which has been followed by this Court in Umar Dad Khan v. Tila Muhammad Khan PLD 1970 SC 288:- ' In Mohunt Bhagwan Ramanuj v. Khetter Moni Dassi 1 C W N 617 High Court of Calcutta expressed the opinion that subsection (c) of section 115, Civil P.C., was intended to authorise the High Courts to interfere and correct gross and palpable errors of subordinate Courts as to prevent gross injustice in non-appealable cases. This passage was dissented from by the Calcutta High Court in Enat.
Mondul v. Baloram Dey (3 CWN 581), but was cited with approval by Lord Williams in Gulabchand v.
Kabiruddin (58 Cal. 11 = AIR 1931 Cal. 27). Their Lordships can see no justification for any such view;it would indeed be difficult to formulate any standard by which the degree of error of subordinate Courts could be measured. Section 115 applies only to cases in which no appeal lies, and where the Legislature provided no right of appeal, the manifest intention is that the order of the trial Court, right or wrong, shall be final. The section empowers the High Court to satisfy itself upon three matters (a) That the order of the subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction: (b) that the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction and; (c) that in exercising jurisdiction that Court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, that is by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied upon those three matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs, however profoundly from the conclusions of the subordinate Court upon questions of fact or law. No such matters arose in this case, and the order of the High Court upon the petition was without justification.
The above enunciation of the scope of the revisional powers vesting in the High Court clearly shows that, no interference was called for in this case and in upsetting the conclusion of the Courts below on the question of fact by means of a re-examination of the evidence in revision the High Court unfortunately overstepped the limits of its jurisdiction.'"
' Keeping in view the above rule, it is to be seen as to whether by decreeing the suit the two Courts below have committed any error to be corrected by this Court. In support of his claim, that he purchased the house, plaintiff/respondent No.1 produced unregistered sale deeds dated 2-7-1983 and 6-12-1983 Ex./P.W.1/1 and Ex./P.W.1/3. The documents were proved by the marginal witnesses Juma Khan (P.W.2), Malik Ghulam Hussain (P.W.3) and also by Mst. Aisha (P.W.6). The trial Court on the basis of this evidence decreed the suit. The Appellate Court maintained the decree. No mistake thus appears to have been committed by the Courts. The only mistake pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that documents being unregistered were not admissible in evidence. It appears that learned counsel was not aware of the amendment in section 49 of the Registration Act. By Ordinance XLV of 1962 (Registration Amendment Ordinance, 1962) the proviso to section 49 has been omitted. The effect of this amendment has been considered in many reported cases. In the case of Moosa v. Mohammad Yaqoob PLD 1966 Karachi (W.P) 376, it has been held that the documents though unregistered can be used in evidence for collateral purposes and section 49 of the Registration Act 1908 which provided that no document requiring registration could be used in evidence unless registered has now been replaced by new section 49 by the Registration Amendment Ordinance, 1962. The findings are that the formal effect of non-registration that the documents could not be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property is no longer the law of this country. The case cited above was relied in re: Pakistan-Employees Co- Operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Mst. Anwar Sultana and others PLD 1969 Karachi 474. The High Court in dealing with the amended section 49 of the Registration Act observed as under:-- "The question of admissibility or otherwise of a document is indeed nothing more than a mere matter of procedure, and must be governed by the law obtaining in this behalf for the time being, there being no vested right in procedure. Clauses (a) and (b) of the unamended section 49 of the Registration Act may indeed be regarded as being in the nature of substantive provisions but no such sanctity is attached to clause (c) thereof which merely laid down that no document required by section 17 or by provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to be registered shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it had been registered. As in the amended section 49, this clause does not find any place, it is clear that the prohibition contained therein is no longer operative."
' Subsequently in Muhammad Hussain v. Ghulam Ali PLD 1970 Karachi 285, the aforementioned. Two cases were referred and the argument that with the omission of the proviso there was no room for examining the contents of an unregistered documents even for a collateral purpose was repelled.
We have also the pronouncement of the august Supreme Court on the subject in the case of Messrs Rahman Cotton Factory v. Messrs Nichimen Co. Ltd., Karachi PLD 1976 Supreme Court It I, held that:- "An instrument requiring compulsory registration under section 17 of the Registration Act but not so registered is not a dead letter. Vide clause (a) of section 49 ibid, it does not "operate to create, declare, assign any right, title or interest,....In any immovable property". It is well settled that such instrument can be received in evidence for a collateral purpose."
The cases cited above apply on all fours to the present case. I Plaintiff/respondent No. 1 herein in support of his claim to the suit house produced unregistered documents which were rightly accepted by the Court below, and no exception could be taken to the acceptance of these documents.
11. For the foregoing reasons this revision petition being devoid of any merit is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.