DECISION JUSTICE (RTD) AHMED ALI U QURESHI J:- This is a revision application against the order, dated 8.7.1989, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Sind Labour Court No.IV at Karachi, whereby the appeal filed by the applicants under Section 8(7) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, was dismissed.
2. It appears that the K.M.C. Sanitary & General Employees Union applied to the Registrar, Trade Union on 4.2.1988, for effecting the change in office-bearers as a result of the alleged decision taken in the general body meeting allegedly held on 8.1.1988; which change was duly registered by the Registrar. This application for change was made by the respondent No.6, as the General Secretary of the union. He also was the General Secretary of the union even prior to the change in the office-bearers. The Union, through its Joint Secretary, S.M. Ishaq filed an appeal before the learned Labour Court under sub-section (7) of Section 8 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, disputing the fact that any meeting of the general body was held and, therefore, made a prayer in an application that the Labour Court may set aside the change received by the Registrar, Trade Unions on 4.2.1988, as being of no legal consequences.
3. I have heard Mr. Latif Saghar, the learned Advocate for the applicants and Mr.M.M. Jeelani, the learned Advocate for the respondents and have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
4. To appreciate the respective arguments of the parties it is necessary to re-produce sub-section
(7) of Section 8 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which reads as under:- "In case there is a dispute in relation to the change of officers of a trade union, or any trade union is aggrieved by the refusal of the Registrar under sub-section (5) any officer or member of the trade union may apply or appeal to the Labour Court, who shall within seven days of receipt of the application or appeal, as the case may be, pass an order cither directing the Registrar to register the change or alteration in the Constitution or in the officers of the trade union or may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct the Registrar to hold fresh elections of the union under his supervision."
In many publications word 'apply' which is under-lined by me in the sub-section reproduced above has been omitted, but, in fact the sub-section reads as reproduced above.
5. On the bare reading of this sub-section, it would be seen that the Labour Court has power to interfere only in to cases; namely, (1) when there is a dispute with regard to the change of office- bearers or (2) where Registrar refuses to register the change in office-bearers or alteration in the Constitution under sub-section (5) of section 8. In case or refusal by the Registrar to effect the change in the office-bearers or alteration in the Constitution under subjection (5), the Labour Court can direct the Registrar to effect the change in the office-bearers or alteration in the Constitution.
In the case of a dispute in relation to change the office-bearers, if the Labour Court is satisfied that there is a genuine dispute, it can for the reasons, to be recorded, order the Registrar to hold fresh elections. This sub-section does not give the powers to the Labour Court to cancel the change in the office-bearers registered by the Registrar. Furthermore, it will be found that to words are used, namely, 'apply' or 'appeal'. Similarly lateron words 'application' or 'appeal' are used. In my humble opinion, an application would be in respect of the dispute with regard to the change in the office- bearers whereas appeal would be against the order of Registrar refusing to register the change.
The Law does not require the Registrar to intimate the registration of change in the officer bearers.
In the case of Asmat Javed, President of P.I.A.C. Employees Union (Regd). Karachi versus Rafiq Ahmed and Another, reported in 1979 P.L.C. 96, the learned National Industrial Relations Commission has held that appeal to the Labour Court was admissible only against refusal of Registrar to register change in officers as intimated by the Union, but, no appeal, however, lies against Registrar's decision to register such a change. Similar view has been held by the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal in the case of Ch. Dost Muhammad and Others versus Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah, reported in 1980 P.L.C. 908.
6. On a plain reading of sub-section (7), it will be seen that application or appeal has to be filed only either by officer or by a member of the trade Union. In the case of Muhammad Shafi versus employees union, Hysons Sugar Mills, Khanpur and Another, reported in P.L.J. 1979-Tr.C.(Labour)
245; it was held by the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal that appeal by union and not by office-bears was not envisaged by section 8(7). The appeal was accepted by the Labour Court, but, in revision it was dismissed by Labour Appellate Tribunal.
7. In the present case, the appeal was filed by the union through its joint Secretary and not by the Joint Secretary in his capacity as office-bearer of the union or in his capacity as member of the union. As such, it has been rightly rejected by the learned Labour Court.
8. Mr.Ch. Latif Saghar, the learned Advocate for the applicant contends, that this appeal should be treated as application with regard to dispute of the change of the office-bearers and the Labour Court should have, after recording evidence, ordered the holding of fresh elections. However, as pointed above, even that application has to be filed by the officer or member of the union and not by the union itself and further more there is no such prayer in the application for holding fresh elections. This contention of Mr. Latif Saghar, therefore, has got no force. Even, otherwise, the elections allegedly held on 8.1.1988 were for 2 years and Mr.M.M. Jeelani, the learned Advocate for the respondent states that fresh elections would be held in January, 1991. The applicant, if he so desires, may requisition the session of the General Body for holding fresh elections. I find no reason to interfere with the impugned order in the exercise of the suo moto revisional jurisdiction of this Tribunal and, therefore, would dismiss the revision application.