ABDUL SHAKURUL SALAM, J.---On the request of the petitioner-company for compulsory acquisition of land for setting up a Ployester Staple Fibre Plant, the Land Acquisition Collector (Industries) Lahore referred the case to the Collector, Sheikhupura who issued a Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act published in Punjab Gazette on 22-8-1978/23-12-1978 covering land measuring 196 Kanals 7 Marlas owned by the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Notification under Ss.17 and 6 was issued on 9-7-1978 and Gazetted on 10-7-1979. The learned Acquisition Collector (Industries) Lahore announced his award on 4-8-1979. The land-owners respondents filed an application before the Collector for making a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. It was so made to the Senior Civil Judge, Sheikhupura. Petitioner appeared before the learned Senior Civil Judge, and raised objections against enhancement of the compensation. After recording the evidence of the parties, the learned Senior Civil Judge awarded enhanced compensation to the respondents vide judgment and decree dated 21-2-1985. The petitioner Company filed R.F.A. No. 90 of 1985. In view of the judgment of this Court in Pir Khan through his Legal Heirs v. Military Estate Officer, Abbottabad and others (PLD 1987 SC 485), the appeal was found to be incompetent. The contention that amendments made in sections 20 and 20-A, whereby a Company for whose benefit the land is sought to be acquired has been granted a right to lodge cross-objections to the reference and would therefore have a right of appeal against it, had not been brought to the notice of the learned Supreme Court, the learned Division Bench repelled with the observations that "their Lordships of the Supreme Court were aware about the right of local authority and company in proceedings before the Court to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation which fact has been duly noted in the judgment, as such, it could not be argued that the said judgment was distinguishable on this account. Apart from this the reasons for which it has been held that such company had no right to challenge the award are that reference under section 18 on its behalf was barred and that under subsection (2) of section 50 the award of the Collector as substituted by the learned trial Court on reference is final which cannot be challenged except by a party which has been expressly conferred the right of appeal and no such right expressly having been granted by the Statute to such company, therefore, it could not maintain the appeal. Admittedly the provisions of sections 18 and 50(2) have not been amended so far, therefore, the ratio of the reported case is applicable to the case of the appellant with full force." The other contention raised that "the Government executed the sale-deed transferring the land to the company on 8-10-1979 and whatever rights the Government possessed including the right to file appeal against the award of the Court stood transferred to the appellant as such the appellant having stepped into the shoes of the Government could maintain the appeal, was rejected with the observations that: "We are afraid the argument is wholly misconceived. Execution of sale-deed by Government is just a formal and administrative act which is intended to transfer ownership rights in the land to the appellant which was acquired for its benefit and nothing else. The right of the Government to file appeal against the award was not a right attached to the land, as such, therefore, such a right cannot be claimed to have been transferred to the appellant with the execution of the sale deed in its favour. It has been categorically held on the interpretation of relevant provisions of law by the Supreme Court that appeal against the award could only be filed by such party on whom right of appeal was - expressly conferred by the Statute and such a right has been held to have not been conferred on the company by Statute itself, therefore, the same could not be claimed by the appellant through administrative act of the Government of execution of sale-deed." Finally, the appeal was dismissed being not maintainable. This is vide judgment and decree dated 8-5-1988. The petitioner seeks leave to appeal.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated the submission that amendments in sections 20 and 20-A of the Act by Land Acquisition (West Pakistan Amendment) Ordinance, 1969 entitle a company to lodge cross objections before a Court to which a reference, is made under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. It should therefore have a right to file an appeal against the decision on reference.
3. To the credit of the learned counsel it may be stated that he cited cases subsequent to Pir Khan's case relied upon by the learned Judges of the High Court to the same effect. One is Behram Khan v.
Military Estate Officer (1988 SCMR 1160). The precise contention with reference to more provisions of the amending law came up for decision in the second case Pak. Steel Mills Corpn., Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner (1989 SCMR 812): Question of law formulated for decision was; "Whether a company for whose benefit some land has been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is competent to file an appeal against the judgment passed by the referee Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act?" It was observed that the learned counsel who appeared for the companies attempted to argue that the judgment of this Court in the first case of Pir Khan required reconsideration and pressed for review on the ground that "a right of appeal can be spelt out in favour of a Company or a local Authority if sections 18 and 50 (2), which were considered in Pir Khan's case are read along with the provisions of sections 9 (5), 11, 20, 22-A and section 26 of the Act." Learned Judges held that "the provisions which, according to the learned counsel, escaped consideration while delivering the earlier judgment have, on perusal been found to have no real relevance to the question falling for decision." The judgments of the High Court based on Pir Khan's case were upheld and the petitions for leave to appeal filed by the companies were dismissed.
Thus, it is well-settled law now that no appeal is competent on behalf of a company for whose benefit land is acquired.
4. A word may be added that under the doctrine of eminent domain, the State acquires citizen's property. It does so for a public purpose. Land Acquisition Act allows acquisition for a company if it feels that the utilization of the acquired land by a company would be for the benefit of the citizens.
Whether the State does so for its own purposes i.e. Public, or, for a company, on acquisition the land vests in the State. The relationship or transaction is between the citizens and the State. No third party has any right. Even if it is permitted that a company for whose benefit the property is sought to be acquired may appear in a reference for determination of the compensation payable to the citizen, that does not mean that it is also conferred a right to appeal against the decision on reference. It is trite law that right of appeal is a creation of Statute. If it does not confer, none has it.
Invasive provisions over the rights of citizens have to be construed strictly. This is axiomatic.
5. It is to be kept in view and not overlooked that under the Land Acquisition Act, a citizen is being deprived of his land which in most cases may be the only means of his livelihood keeping him busy in tilling it and living on it, having no education or other trade. And this too without any fault of his.
Compensation is paid on determination by an officer of the acquiring Authority with a hope of its being equitably done on reference by a Court. As soon as that is determined, he is entitled to be paid and left alone. If he were to dragged in litigation by a company, who has got his land acquired for setting up a business to which he is no match in power, resources or otherwise, by sophistry or ingenuity, the citizen having lost his property may have no means to carry on the litigation and find himself at the dead end. No interpretation of law can be just which puts a citizen in such like quandary. When people are deprived of their rights, dragged into unnecessary litigation and driven to the wall, they are likely to lose heart resulting in withdrawal or aggression neither of which is conducive to either administration of justice or sustenance of the State. The petitioner company should be content to take the respondents' land for setting up its business for making money and not try to deprive them further of the compensation allowed to them by a competent Court.
6. In view of the precedents and principles, the petitioner company had no right to challenge the compensation given to the deprived owners of their lands by the competent Court. The learned High Court has rightly and for sound reasons dismissed their appeal being incompetent. There is no merit whatsoever in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed.