' The petitioner through this Constitutional petition has prayed for a declaration that the impugned order of respondent No,2 dated 4-6-1990 is null and void.
2. The relevant facts are that respondent No,1 filed an ejectment petition against the petitioner and in the Court of respondent No,2. The petitioner appeared and submitted reply. It raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction because there is no paragraph as to jurisdiction in the ejectment petition. The learned Rent Controller, however, in the impugned order held that he has jurisdiction and proceeded to pass order under section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 (hereinafter to be referred as Act of 1963) and framed issues. Now the petitioner has challenged this order.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the petition argued that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction as there was no paragraph to this effect in the ejectment petition: It is added that since the petition was drafted keeping in view the provisions of Order VII, C.P.C., pertaining to the plaint, therefore, the para as to the jurisdiction was material and its absence rendered the petition incompetent. The next submission is that the learned Rent Controller in the one breath observed that the petitioner has objected to the jurisdiction and in the next breath he held that he has jurisdiction. It is submitted that the Rent Controller should have recorded clear findings with reference to basis.
4. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner, gone through the paper book and relevant provisions of Act of 1963 as well as C.P.C. The admitted position on record is that the petitioner is a tenant of respondent No,1 and property is situated within the Cantonment limits. The learned counsel for the petitioner frankly and candidly conceded, I must say that rightly too that the Rent Controller has the jurisdiction. A It was, however, added that the objection of the petitioner is that the absence of a para to this, effect is fatal and Rent Controller cannot assume jurisdiction. I am afraid that the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be given effect for the simple reason that no form of the ejectment petition is prescribed in the Act of 1963.
5. It is a matter of great regret that the petition was presented through an Advocate but the formal para as to the jurisdiction was not incorporated in the ejectment petition. This is not all. Even in face of the objection by the petitioner as to the form of the ejectment petition neither the learned Rent Controller cared to get it rectified nor the learned counsel representing the landlady bothered to get the petition amended. It is in fact this type of careless attitude which gives rise to side issues and results in complications and delay in the adjudication of the matters.
6. It is true that although no specific form of ejectment petition is prescribed either under Act of 1963 or Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 yet when the petitions are presented especially by the Advocates they should ensure that paras as to cause of action, jurisdiction and court-fee are incorporated. In case of default the duty is casted on Rent Controller to enforce compliance. This should be made subject to heavy costs. This will help to achieve the desired result. The same remarks apply to the case in hand.
7. This Constitutional petition is liable to be dismissed because the objection of the petitioner was in fact to the form of the ejectment petition ,which is not fatal. Even otherwise the Rent Controller is not supposed to stay his hands the moment there is objection as to his jurisdiction or relationship of landlord and tenant is denied. It is the duty of the learned Rent Controller to find out the grounds on which such objections are based. Since in this case objection was only to the form and otherwise jurisdiction was lacking, therefore, there is nothing wrong with the order. This is not all.
The petitioner himself made the payment of rent in Court through pay order thereby it conceded the jurisdiction, therefore, it is estopped by its own conduct.
8. There is yet another legal hurdle in the way of the petitioner. It is settled legal position that Constitutional petition is not competent against an interim order under Rent Restriction Ordinance.
In this behalf, reference can be made to the cases of Inayat Ullah v. Malik Muhammad Rashid and another 1988 CLC 44, Rashid Ahmad v. Soofi Muhammad and another PLD 1976 Lah. 1450 and Muhammad Saeed v Mst. Saratul Fatima and another PLD 1978 Lahore 1459. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:- "The scheme of such a categorization, the limits and the rationale thereof have been fully considered in Mian Manzar Bashir v. MA. Asghar PLD 1978 SC 185. It, therefore, follows that what the Legislature held to be an interlocutory order not by itself fit to be appealable, should not by such a device be held fit enough to attract the more important, and at a higher level, the constitutional jurisdiction. Any contention, or practice to the contrary, would defeat and reflect the legislative intent, which has been disapproved in Mumtaz Hussain Bhutto, v. Chief Administrator Auquf etc. 1976 SCMR 450."
' This view was followed by Karachi High Court in the cases of Syed Intesar All v. Ahmad Din Khan and others (1983 CLC 998) and Muhammad Siddique Qazi v. Muhammad Ibrahim Khokhar and another 1987 MLD 265. While this Court in W.P. No, 3734/90 held as under: "It is not the function of the High Court exercising constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with the interim and discretionary orders of the Courts below because the aggrieved party can agitate all these points including refusal to summon witnesses etc. In appeal against the final order.
The provisions of Act, 1963 are para materia to that of Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, therefore, the legal position as to competency of E writ petitions against interim orders passed under Rent Act, 1963 will remain the same.