DECISION ' These 2 appeals are directed against the order of learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No,III at Karachi, dated 22-74984. The appeals were initially disposed of by this Tribunal, vide orders, dated 24-3-1988, but, the decision was set aside by the Hon'ble High Court in the exercise of Writ Jurisdiction and the appeals were remanded back to this Tribunal for disposal afresh. As the points of fact and law involved in both appeals are same and both of them were disposed of by the learned Labour Court by single order, I will also dispose of both these appeals by this single decision.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellants were admittedly employed as workmen by the respondents who terminated their services on 3-11-1983 on the ground, that they had given out on contract the entire work of Cloth Inspection of the Mills in the interests of efficiency and better organization. The appellants being aggrieved with this order, served grievance notices upon the respondents and filed applications before the learned Labour Court.
3. I have heard Mr. Shafique Qureshi, the learned Advocate for the appellants and Mr. Ali Amjad, learned Advocate for the respondents and have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
4. The facts of the case are not disputed. Both the appellants in their cross-examination before the learned Labour Court have admitted that the work that they used to do had been given by the company on contract basis to a Contractor. The mere fact that the witness of the respondents did not know the name of the Contractor would not necessarily show that the work had not been given on contract in view of the admissions of the appellants themselves.
5. Mr. Shafique Qureshi, learned Advocate for the appellants had argued that by giving out the work on contract the rights of the workmen guaranteed under the West Pakistan Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, have been breached which are protected under section 4 of the said Ordinance. He was not able to point out any provision in the Ordinance forbidding the employer from giving out his work on contract nor could he point out any provision of the law under which it was obligatory upon the employer to compel the Contractor to engage the previous workers. He has cited certain case-law, which are all distinguishable as they do not touch the points involved in this case viz., forbidden the giving out the work on contract or making obligatory upon the employer to compel the Contractor to engage the previous workers. In the cross-examination Sadat Beg, Personnel Manager of the respondents, has stated that the Contractor did not contribute towards old-age benefit or social security or group insurance of the workman. It is argued that in such a case the original employer would have to pay the Social Security contribution and therefore, he would continue to be employer of the workmen, even though he had given out the work on contract. Reliance is placed on the-case of Sindh Employees'
Social Security Institution v. Consolidated Sugar Mills Limited reported in 1989 SCMR 888. Their Lordships have discussed the definition of word 'employer' in the Social Security Ordinance and have observed as under:- "The definition of 'employer' has two extremely relevant features for understanding its meaning and scope. Firstly in the case of works and undertakings on behalf of the State, the contractor or the licensee carrying on the work has been made the employer. Secondly, in every other case that is in which State's interest is not in that manner directly involved 'the owner of the industry, business, undertaking or establishment in which an employer works' has been made the employer. On these two features, without for the present examining the concept of employee, the respondent being the owner would be the employer."
' It would be clear that even according to this definition the employer has two meanings and in the works and undertakings on behalf of the State, the contractor or the licensee carrying on the work has been made the employer. Their Lordships have not considered the definition of employer under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which means a person who employs workers in Industrial Establishment under a contract of employment On the same analogy for, the workman working in the establishment of the respondents after giving it out on contract, the employer would be the Contractor and not the original employer as the Contractor would be employing the workers and would pay them. In the case of Messrs Emesco Industries Ltd. v. S.Irfan Ahmed, reported in 1983 PLC 981, this Tribunal after discussing extensive case-law came to the conclusion that termination of services of workers simpliciter on account of re-organization including giving of contract of work to independent contractor was permissible provided such action was taken bona fide and not as a cloak to get rid of workers or to crush genuine union activities provided termination of services is not for reasons of misconduct and explicitly states reasons and in case of permanent worker either gives one month's notice or one month's pay in lieu of notice.
6. It may be pertinent to reproduce the letter of termination which reads as under:- "The management has decided to lease out/give out on the contract the entire work of cloth inspection of the Mills in the interests of efficiency and better organization.
' In view of the aforesaid reorganization and the decision in connection with the same, your services have become redundant and are no longer required from 4-11-1983 which are therefore terminated from the aforesaid date. You shall be entitled to all your legal dues including one month's notice pay and gratuity, as permissible under the law which may be collected from the office during the working hours. Yours faithfully, for Star Textile Mills Limited (Sd.) Personnel Manager. "
7. The evidence on record clearly shows that the work that the appellant was doing had been given out on contract by the respondents, which amounts reorganization of their work and the termination orders of the appellants are strictly in accordance with the Standing Order 12(3). It is termination simpliciter. There is no evidence of victimization. As such, there is no substance in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed.