' Respondent Mst. Syeda Tayaba Ishtiaq had sought the ejectment of the appellant/tenant from three demised shops, which are actually one tenement, in which the appellant is carrying on Bakery business. The rent is Rs, 70 per month per shop of Rs,210 per month for the entire tenament.
The only ground on which the ejectment was sought is the personal requirement of the sons of the respondent. The appellant in his written statement had denied the bona fides of the requirement of the sons of the respondent and after recording the evidence, adduced by the parties before him, learned Rent Controller vide impugned judgment dated 12-8-1987 granted the ejectment application and ordered the appellant/tenant to vacate the demised premises. Aggrieved from his eviction, the appellant has come in appeal. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard and record perused.
2. It is para. 4 of the ejectment application in which the respondent has pleaded her personal requirement in the following words:- "4. That the applicant is a widow and has no substantial accommodation anywhere else in Pakistan and the area of the plot is only 70 sq. Yards and has 4 sons, 2 of them have to be got married and hence the place of the rental premises is required for her personal bona fide use and hence this application."
3. Similarly in para. 6 of his affidavit-in-evidence, the attorney of the respondent (Syed Mohammad Sadiq) stated as follows:- "6. That I say that the applicant is in great hardships for his growing children and the measurement of the plot is very small and it is a fit case for ejectment on bona fide grounds and hence this affidavit, which my be treated as a part of the main rent application."
4. It is evident from the averments made by the respondent in the ejectment application as well as in the affidavit-in-evidence that only general claim has been made as to the requirement of the sons and no particulars whatsoever have been given as to such requirements. In para. 4 of the ejectment application, the respondent states that the total area of the plot is 70 sq. Yards and that she has 4 sons and marriage of two of them is under contemplation. However, neither the names of the sons have been given nor their ages have been shown. Now, it is well-established law that it is not necessary for a landlord to give details of his personal requirements in the ejectment application and he can defer this and can give it later on in his evidence. In this view of the matter, the vagueness of para. 4 of the ejectment application may be ignored. However, as would appear from para. 6 of affidavit-in-evidence of the attorney of the respondent, the respondent has not given any details whatsoever even in the evidence. A vague statement is made in para. 6 of the affidavit-in-evidence that the respondent has "growing children" and, therefore, it is a fit case for ejectment on bona fide ground. I must say that I have never seen a more vague Memo of Ejectment Application or a more vague affidavit-in-evidence. A mere ipsi dixits or a vague assertion of the landlord is not sufficient to establish his bona fides as to his personal requirements.
It was incumbent upon the landlady to give the details of the accommodation in her possession, as well as the details of her children and their requirements. The averments made in affidavit-in- evidence by P.W.2 Syed Karrar Hussain are also equally vague. He only stated that the respondent had no "substantial accommodation anywhere in Pakistan". Such a vague statement is hardly of any help to the landlady. A perusal of the judgment of the learned Rent Controller shows that he has totally ignored the averments of the landlady in her ejectment application and the averments made by her attorney in the affidavit-in-evidence and after ignoring all this, learned Rent Controller, in the first instance, takes note of the "contention of the learned counsel for the opponent". Contention of the learned counsel for the opponent/appellant/tenant can be taken into account after first taking into consideration the case set up by the landlady. The case of the landlady should stand or fall on its own merits and not on the weakness of the case of the opposite-party. There may be no force in the "main contentions" of the learned counsel for the opponent/appellant/tenant, but this would be of no help to the landlady if she has not set up a plausible case in her ejectment applicant and has not been able to bring sufficient reliable evidence to prove it. Learned Rent Controller, instead of saying anything as to the merits of the case of the landlady, has proceeded to demolish the defence set up by the appellant and after so demolishing it, in his own eyes, he has simply proceded to grant the ejectment application. This approach was not correct and cannot he sustained. I would, therefore, set aside the findings of the learned Rent Controller on the issue of personal requirements of the respondent/landlady.
5. It appears from the record, and it was also argued by learned counsel of the appellant that respondent Syeda Tayaba Ishtiaq was in fact not the landlady and it was Syed Mohammad Sadiq P.W. 1, who was in fact the landlord of the appellant. There is no force in this contention of the learned counsel of the appellant. Syed Mohammad Sadiq has categorically denied this position and stated that he was neither the owner of the demised premises nor landlord of the appellant. I am satisfied that the appellant had unnecessarily raised such an objection in his written statement.
6. I also note that the rent was last increased in July 1978 when it was fixed at Rs 210 per month. The respondent is entitled to enhancement of rent at the rate of 10 per cent every third year. Even if the respondent had not formarlly asked the appellant to increase the rent or did not file any application in Court for enhancement of the rent, it was still the duty of the appellant to make sure that he had enhanced the rent in accordance with the law and it appears that the main bone of contention between the parties is the rate of rent. The appellant is well-advised to amicably settle this issue with the respondent.
7. In view of what has been stated above, this appeal is accepted and the impuged order of ejectment is set aside with the result that the ejectment application stands dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
' These are the reasons for the short order announced on the conclusion of the hearing.