' The petition is addressed against the order of learned Sub-Judge, Dadyal, passed on January 1, 1991 whereby pre-emptor-respondent was granted extension of time to deposit one-fifth of the purchase price of the property in dispute.
2. Shahidur Rehman, plaintiff-respondent brought a suit for possession by pre-emption in respect of land measuring 2 kanals out of 20 kanals 17 marlas, situate in village Bhalote, Tehsil Dadyal, on payment of Rs.4,00,000 (four lac) as its price. This suit was instituted on 6th October, 1990. On 6th December, 1990, the pre-emptor was ordered to deposit one-fifth of the value of the suit property before the next date of hearing. The next date of hearing was fixed as 6th January 1991. On 6th January, an application was moved on behalf of the pre-emptor for extension of time. It was stated in the application that the pre-emptor could not make the deposit in compliance with the direction of the Court, on account of death of his maternal-uncle. The Court felt persuaded by the cause shown by the pre-emptor and extended time to enable the pre-emptor to deposit the one-fifth price of the land. This order is the subject of the present petition.
3. The main objection of the petitioners is that the Court had no jurisdiction to extend the period as the time under which the amount was to be deposited, had already lapsed. Moreover, according to the petitioners, there was no sufficient ground to grant extension.
4. Section 21 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act postulates that in every suit for pre-emption, the Court shall at, or at any time before, the time of settlement of issues, require the plaintiff to deposit in the Court such sum as in the opinion of the Court, is equal to one-fifth of the probable value of the property as security, to the satisfaction of the Court for payment of the value of the property which the Court may ultimately fix in its order. Subsection (4) further contemplates that if the plaintiff fails within the time fixed by the Court or within such further time as the Court may fix to make deposit or furnish security under subsection (1) or (2), his plaint shall be rejected or appeal be dismissed, as the case may be. It is evident from the provisions of sub-section (4) that the Court which primarily asked the plaintiff to make deposit or furnish security as directed by it, was empowered to extend the time for compliance of its direction. Therefore, it was wrong to suggest that the Court was not empowered to grant extension. However, the exceptions to the aforesaid rule are that the request must be made within time fixed by the Court and that the extension should be granted by the Court in exercise of its judicial discretion.
5. In the present case, as stated earlier, the request for grant of extension of time was made within time as the plaintiff was within his right to make deposit upto 6th January when the request for extension was made. Therefore, the first exception to the aforesaid rule was available in the present case.
6. The other exception relates to reasonable grounds to exercise judicial discretion. The pre-emptor specifically stated in his application that the order of the Court could not be complied with on account of death of his maternal-uncle. Keeping in view the social conditions of society to which the parties belong, it is equally acceptable that on account of death of a close relative of a party, it is least expected from such party to attend other business during the days of mourning. This is so as the relations of the deceased have to attend all the visitors who come for condolence. Hence, it was wrong to suggest that there was no sufficient ground for the grant of extension of time. In such situation, the learned Sub-Judge rightly exercised his judicial discretion in the case. The aforesaid view finds support from Malik Hadayat Ullah's case PLD 1972 SC 69. In that case, the pre-emptor was called upon to deposit one-fifth of the pre-emption money on January 6 as in the present case. Prior to that date, the pre-emptor applied for permission to furnish security instead of making cash deposit. The application was adjourned for 6th January to which the case was already fixed for hearing. On that day, the application for furnishing security was dismissed. However, the Court extended the period for making cash deposit upto 6th February. The extension was made suo motu. This order was challenged in revision before the High Court. The objection was sustained and the order of the trial Court was reversed. In appeal before the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Hamoodur Rehman, an eminent learned Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan reversed the finding of the High Court and restored the order of the trial Court in the following manner: "The Court was fully competent suo motu to extend the time when it had by its own act made it practically impossible for the appellants to comply with its original order by adjourning the application for furnishing security to the 6th of January, 1968. From the language of subsections (4) and (5)(b) of section 22 it is apparent that the rejection of the plaint or the dismissal of the suit will be ordered if the plaintiff fails to make the deposit within the "time fixed by the Court" or "within such further time as the Court may allow to make the deposit or furnish the security". This clearly contemplates that the Court has the power to extend the time.
' This is no doubt a discretionary power, which like all other judicial discretions, must be exercised upon sound judicial principles, but it can, by no stretch of imagination, be said that the Court has no jurisdiction to extend the time at all. The Punjab Pre-emption Act does not prescribe any procedure for obtaining such extension of time but upon general principles a Court has normally to be moved by an application of some kiild, either oral or written. This does not, however, mean that the Court has no jurisdiction, in the absence of any such application, to grant a discretionary relief where the justice of the case so requires. In the absence of any provision in the Statute or in the rules made under the Statute expressly providing that the Court shall act on the application of a party it cannot be said that such an application is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power. The power does not become nugatory, if no application is made for invoking that power, If the Court could under subsection (4) of section 22 extend time, then it could do so either on the application, written or oral, of a party or even suo motu where the justice of the cause so demanded."
7. In present case, the learned Sub-Judge rightly exercised his discretion in allowing extension of time in the case to make cash deposit. There is no force in C the petition. It is, therefore, dismissed with costs.