' SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.---These three review petitions arise out of a consolidated judgment dated 19- 6-1990 disposing of a number of appeals dealing with a question of law namely, whether the principle of sinker applies in cases where the divisibility of sale is evidenced by separate shares of the vendees but not the price thereof.
2. In Civil Review Petition No,80/1990, the share of each vendee was specified by mentioning the area purchased by each, the consideration for the whole remaining intact. Mr.Q.M.Saleem, Senior Advocate, the learned counsel representing the petitioners, seeks on the Arength of section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act, a proportionate division of the amount of consideration and in this manner, make the sale in favour of the so-called strangers divisible, distinct and capable of being excluded for the purposes of pre-emptive claim.
3. In Civil Review Petition No,81/1990,. Maulvi Sirajul Haq, Senior Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioners, relies not only on the separation of shares but also the fact that payment of the two groups of vendees was made by different persons representing each group though whatever the amount was paid by each group was not mentioned. He also wants to infer, without reference to the law that it must be proportionate to the share purchased by each. In this manner, he also seeks the same relief as is being sought by Mr.Q.M.Saleem, Advocate.
4. In Civil Review Petition No,99/1990, Mr.Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioners, draws our attention to his plea, which, according to him, remained unattended, that by protection of a part of the property from the pre-emptive claim, the status of the vendee gets improved ipso facto thereby destroying the entire pre-emptive claim of the suitor.
5. So far as Civil Review Petitions Nos.80 and 81 of 1990 are concerned, the law consistently laid down by this Court in approval of the practice cif the Courts in Punjab has been that unless the separate amount determined at the time of sale in respect of each separate share is available, the sale is not considered divisible for the purposes of avoiding pre-emptive claim. Nothing is to be left to an inference, to an assumption or to general principles of Transfer of Property Act, and this was pointed out in Tota Rani and others v. Kundan and others AIR 1928 Lahore 784 at page 785, in the following words:-- "Our attention has been invited to a large number of rulings bearing upon the vexed question of whether the mere specification in the sale-deed of the shares of the vendees in the property sold is sufficient to make the transaction a divisible one, or whether it is necessary that there should be a specification of not only the shares to be taken by the vendees, but also of the amounts to be respectively paid by them. The Allahabad High Court has taken the view that a specification of the share of each vendee in the property sold makes the transaction a divisible one, but this rule has not been adopted by the Punjab Chief Court."
6. This view received recognition of the Supreme Court in Abdullah and 3 others v. Abdul Karim and others PLD 1986 SC 140 in the following words:--- "Learned counsel appearing for the appellants in the High Court accepted the proposition that the sale would be divisible only if:--
(1) the shares of the different vendees were specified and.
(2) the different vendees had contributed proportionately towards the sale price."
7. It was clearly laid down as the law of the land in Muhammad Khan v. Abdul Khaliq Khan PLD 1981 SC 153 in the following words:--- "...To find out whether such a sale is divisible, the Court is to sec two things viz. (i) whether the share of each vendee is specified, and (ii) whether the proportion of price contributed or paid by each vendee is indicated separately. If any of these two ingredients is lacking, then the sale remains one joint indivisible sale ......"
S. Again, in the case of Wazir Muhammad etc. v. Abdul Aziz and another 1982 SCM R 189 the same law was repeated in the following words:- "The superiority of the plaintiffs' claim is disputed on the assumption that the sale was divisible, distinct and could be protected in the case of one of the vendees. This is said on the ground that out of 29 shares of Suleman sold 13 were to be shared equally by Wazir Muhammad and Nazir while 16 were of Ghulam Rasool, the sale consideration being 50,000. Such a sale was not divisible. The finding of fact concurrently recorded by all the Courts does not require interference."
' Similar was the recognition in Mangta v. Lab Din and others 1982 SCM R 282 and Muhammad Ismail and others v. Karamat Ali PLD 1989 SC 474. Hence, no case is made out on this ground in these two Review Petitions (C.R.Ps.No,80 and 81 of 1990).
9. In the third review petition (Civil Review Petition 99/1990), improvement in status of the vendee is claimed by the very sale which is the subject-matter of pre-emption claim succeeding partly. This legal point has also been answered and the answer has been followed without exception. For example in Ahmad Khan v. Sattar Din PLD 1981 SC 148 the answer on the question of contiguity was given as hereunder:- ' At is clear that the right vesting in the pre-emptor to claim a certain portion of the property on the ground of vicinage cannot be defeated retrospectively by the judgment of the Court to the effect that the right did not extend to certain other portion of the property, which could thus be allowed to remain with the vendee. The High Court seems to be right in taking the view that the decision of the Court in such a case leaving a part of the property with the vendee on the ground that the pre- emptor's right did not extend to it, should not be allowed to operate retrospectively so as to defeat the right of pre-emption existing on the date of the institution of the suit as well as at the time of the sale."
' In the case of Gulzada v. Muhammad Usman through legal heirs and 6 others PLD 1990 SC 465), this proposition was affirmed. Hence, in view of the law laid down, there is no merit in this Civil Review Petition (C.R.P.No, 99/1990) as well.
10. All the three Review petitions are hereby dismissed.