1. Gul Zarin Kiani, J.-Plaintiffs in the pre-emption suit before the trial Court are petitioners here. Their suit was dismissed on 26.11.1988 by the trial Court and appeal on 17.1.1989 by Additional District Judge, Attock.
2. On 17.3.1986, one Ghulam Rubbani sold some land to respondent Haji Safarash, at the sale price of Rs.3,22,200/-. Petitioners claimed pre-emption in resect of this sale and asserted their superior right on the ground of being co- sharers and owners of contiguous land. Vendee resisted the suit.
2. The trial Court, though held the petitioners as co-sharers, yet non-suited them because they had not performed the requisite 'talabs' to sustain pre-emption. In appeal, the lower appellate Court agreed with the trial Court. These decisions have been impugned in revision by the petitioners.
3. Reliance is placed on their behalf on the case of Ahmad versus Abdul Aziz-P.L.D 1989 S.C 771 to contend that 'talabs' were not required in the pre-emption suit by a co-sharer. There is no doubt that this decision helps the petitioners and supports their contention. Nonetheless, success is not the fate of the petitioners because revision petition filed by them was barred by laches and there was no valid explanation to condone the delay. Appeal was dismissed on 17.1.1989. Petitioners applied for certified copies of the judgment and decree given in appeal on 23.1.1989. Certified copies were prepared by the copying agency and were ready for delivery on 4.2.1989 but the certified copies were actually received on 6.2.1989. After having received the certified copies, petitioners filed the revision petition on 20.4.1990 with an unexplained delay of one year, two months and eighteen days. In Manager, Jammu & Kashmir, State Property in Pakistan versus Khuda Yar and another-?.L.D 1975 S.C 678, it was ruled that there was no limitation prescribed by Limitation Act nor by any Rule in High Court Rules and Orders (Lahore) for filing of petitions under section 115 C.P.C, and High Court could entertain the petition even beyond normal unprescribed period of 90 days if satisfied as regards delay in filing the petition. Although, the legislature had not provided any period of limitation within which the applications in revision could be filed, yet, in absence of exceptional circumstances, it had been the uniform practice of various High Courts in the Sub- Continent to entertain the revision petitions if filed within 90 days from the date of the order sought to be revised. Revision petitions could be entertained and accepted even beyond such period if the Court were to be satisfied about the reasons for such delay. It is also open to the Court in revision to take into consideration the conduct of the petitioner applying for revision before exercising its discretion in his favour because the Court should not come to the rescue of a person who had slept upon his rights without reasonable excuse or justification and allowing the equities to be created in favour of his adversary. Reliance may be placed upon cases of Kesho Prasad Singh versus Mohoendra Prasad and others- A.I.R 1933 Patna 582, G.I.P. Railway and another versus Kunj Behari Lai Sharma- -A.I.R 1926 Allahabad 228, Kailash & Bros, versus Durga Prashad and others- A.I.R 1933 Lahore 175. In the present case, no valid ground is given for inordinate and extraordinary delay in filing the revision application beyond the unprescribed period of 90 days except for a shift in views of the Supreme Court on 'talabs' in pre-emption matters. This was hardly a sufficient cause for the petitioners to rely upon for explaining the delayed filing of the application in revision. A litigant applying for revision must show diligence and come to the Court promptly and without any avoidable delay. Lack of diligence, or indolence or carelessness may disentitle him to get' a remedy which he is not entitled to claim as a matter of right in revisional jurisdiction. Remissness of the petitioners waiting for a little over year in applying for revision reflected adversely upon their conduct. On the date, impugned Judgments were announced, they had the clear support from the judgments of the Supreme Court. Later shift, if I may say so with respects, may not be a sufficient cause to reopen the earlier concluded controversies by Courts in accordance with the law then prevailing. If the petitioners were not satisfied with the judgments given against them, it was open to them to agitate their correctness in appeal or revision as the case may be in time. Any delay beyond the normal period may be indicative of their being satisfied with the result and a desire to bring to an end the on going litigation. Furthermore, a vendee has also a say in the matter. He cannot be kept in perpetual suspense about the fate of his title to the land purchased by him, and, prevented from dealing with it with an unending fear of pre-emption hanging upon him. After all, there must come a time for him to feel secure about his title and say unto himself that now it was his land which he could deal with as his own. When proper regard is had to the nature of litigation and the unexplained delay of a little over 14 months. I feel satisfied that carelessness of the petitioners in applying late for revision ought not to be excused to put the vendee's title in jeopardy which by lapse of time may have become indefeasible. In the circumstances, it shall neither be fair nor just to disturb and disappoint the vendee. As the revision petition is failing on the point of laches, it shall be unnecessary to touch the point whether the pre-emption suit when filed in the trial Court was barred by limitation. In Malik Said Kamal's case- -P.L.D 1986 S.C 360, further elaborated in case of Mst. Sofia Begum-P.L.D 1989 S.C 314 (relevant page 3290, it was observed:- "(iii) the period of limitation within which the suits were filed under old law contravened substantively the basic Islamic Law of Shufa;
(iv) thus the institution of the suits at particular time within the permissible statutory period of limitation, having itself been hit, there could not be any occasion for continuing such like suits;"
4. In view of what has been observed above, revision petition merits summary dismissal on score of laches alone. It is, accordingly, dismissed.