' Muhammad Asghar respondent No,3 brought a petition under Section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, for eviction of Ghulam Din petitioner from a house bearing No,2/307 (an erstwhile evacuee property) on the ground of default in payment of rent to him despite his having been issued P.T.D. Therefor by the Settlement Department. It was his own case of the applicant, set up in para. 2 of the eviction petition that House No,2/309 bad been auction- purchased by the respondent Ghulam Din but House No,2/307 was occupied by him on account of its lying vacant until then. He also went on to state that the respondent was not in possession of House No,2/307 either on 2812-1958 or before that date and hence notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (C & R) Act was not necessary to be served on him. The respondent contested the plea for eviction on the ground that he had auction-purchased the house in dispute from Settlement Department. Two preliminary issues relating to the question of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant and the effect of non-service of notice under Section 30 of the Act of 1958 were set down to be tried and, by some order dated 15-9-1975 (not available herein), both the issues were decided against the respondent and in the year 1981 learned Controller recorded an order that in view thereof further investigation was not necessary and on 28-1-1981 he passed the order of eviction against Ghulam Din whose appeal before the appellate authority was heard by an Additional District Judge and dismissed on 9-10-1984 by affirming the conclusion that his assertion about his possession since before the year 1958 was unfounded and no notice was necessary to be served on him. He has invoked constitutional jurisdiction of this Court through this petition.
2. Any lengthy arguments have not been addressed during the hearing and learned counsel for the writ-petitioner has invited attention to the definition of word 'possession' appearing in Section 2(6) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 as meaning, "possession obtained in pursuance of an order passed on or before the 20th day of December 1958 by a Rehabilitation Authority or any other officer authorised" and has argued that when this definition is read into section 30 thereof the position which clearly emerges is that statutory tenancy can come into existence between the transferee and only such an above-described person in possession for being regulated under subsection (4) in accordance with the law for the time being in force after the expiry of period of protection but not as regards the transferee and a person who is in mere occupation and is not in possession in accordance with the above definition. Since it was not the case of the applicant desirous of seeking eviction of the writ-petitioner that there existed contractual tenancy between them, therefore, the Rent Controller exercising limited jurisdiction under the Ordinance of 1959 did not have the power under the circumstances hereof to order eviction of the petitioner.
3. In the presence of the afore quoted pleadings of respondent No,3 in para. 2 of the eviction petition, his learned counsel has not found it possible to refute the above contention which is well- founded and must prevail.
4. Clearly enough, according to the case set up, neither did the writ petitioner happen to be a tenant of respondent No,3 either by contract or by operation of law nor was he liable to be evicted by the Rent Controller (respondent No,2) under section 30(4) of the Act of 1958 and much less so on account of undisputed non-payment of rent for the reason of the admitted position that notice thereunder was never served on him. Actually, respondent No,2 did not have the necessary jurisdiction vested in him for evicting the writ-petitioner whose appeal has been unlawfully dismissed.
5. In result of the foregoing, writ petition is accepted and orders dated 28-1-1981 and 9-10-1984 passed respectively by the herein respondents Nos.2 and 1 are declared to have been passed without lawful authority and are declared to be of no legal effect. No order as to costs hereof.