' The petitioner claims to have purchased Madina Rice Mills in September, 1973, who was a consumer of seasonal tariff of the respondents and the petitioner allegedly started with wool waste trading, applied for change of tariff in 1973 on regular basis so as to be under Tariff B-2 as an industrial consumer and for its change the petitioner deposited Rs,1,200 against the approval for their name and change through a bank receipt dated 21-11-1973. It is alleged that a separate light meter was also installed at the premises of the petitioner by the respondents. The case of the respondents, however, is that the petitioner did not apply for change of tariff in 1973 on regular basis so as to be in tariff B-2 as an industrial consumer, rather the petitioner applied for the change of name of the premises from Mr. Muhammad Siddique to M/s Farooq Waste Company (Pvt) Ltd, G.T. Road, Muridke. The change of name as applied for by the petitioner was sanctioned after depositing Rs,1,200 against the approval for change of name.
2. The controversy in this case relates to refund of the amount of Rs,1,16,691. The Superintending Engineer (Electricity) Operation Circle, Sheikhupura, was the competent authority to sanction the refund which he approved vide Letter No,2676-78, dated 18-2-1988 by treating the connection as non-seasonal with effect from 21-11-1973. Subsequently, the Chairman WAPDA reviewed the case and through Letter No, M & S/AD/(REV) 05008/647, dated 12-3-1989 advised the office to debit Rs,1,16,691 against the petitioner Consumer's Account on the ground that the same was based on erroneous assumption.
3. It is not necessary to go into the merits of the case. Suffice it to say that the Superintending Engineer (Electricity) WAPDA was competent to refund the disputed amount to the petitioner which he did. The order passed by him having been acted upon, the same was not open to review on the principle of locus poenitentiae as explained by the Supreme Court in Pakistan v. Muhammad Himayatullah Farrukh (PLD 1969 SC 407). Furthermore, the Chairman WAPDA had no jurisdiction to review the order even if the same was assumed to be erroneous without providing an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. Here the impugned order was passed ex parte without hearing the petitioner. Clearly it is a nullity in the eye of law.
' In view of the above, the impugned order dated 6-4-1989 is hereby declared as without lawful authority and having no legal effect. The Writ Petition is accepted with no order as to costs.