2. As I observed earlier, the respondents admit that they had not sent any notice to the appellant on the death of their brother. Further Mr. Hanafi admitted before me that the respondents were the sole legal heirs of their deceased brother. I would now examine section 13-A of the --said Ordinance in the context of these admissions.
3. Section 13-A reads as follows :- "Where the ownership of a building in the possession of a tenant or rented land has been transferred by way of sale, gift, inheritance or in any other manner, whatsoever from one person to another, the new owner shall send an intimation of such transfer in writing by registered post, to the tenant of such building or rented land,. And the tenant shall not be deemed to have defaulted in the pay--ment of rent for the purposes of clause (i) of subsection (2) of section 13, if the rent due is paid within thirty days from the date when the intimation should in the normal course have reached him."
The section covers transfers inter vivos as well as transfers by succession. Further in view of section 12 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, .The singular would include the plural wherever necessary and this is important. The result is that on any transfer whatsoever of property, and I shall use this term to refer both to buildings and rented land, the transferee is under an obligation to "send an intimation of such transfer in writing by registered post to the tenant". The object of this provision would appear to be to reduce, if not eliminate the difficulties of the tenant in finding out to whom he is to attorn in the event of a change in ownership of the property. Then, the second part of the section creates a statutory presumption in favour of a tenant who pays rent in, the prescribed manner. Thus,- section is relevant only to an eviction application in which there is a dispute about the payment of rent. Secondly, and this is very important, the section neither states nor implies that an eviction application can be dismissed, or allowed as the case be if its provisions have not been complied with, and the only result A. Of non-compliance with the provisions of this section would be that the eviction case would be governed by section 13 instead of section 13-A supplemented by this section. Therefore, I agree with the learned District Judge that the Rent Controller erred in dismissing the eviction application of the respondents. But the learned District Judge further held that the appellant was not entitled to notice under this section, and it is this finding which requires examination.
4. Now, in holding that the appellant was not entitled to the statutory notice prescribed under this section, the learned District Judge merely observed : "In the present case, there is no change of ownership. It is admitted position that the applicants and their deceased brother Muhammad Rafiq, are the co-owner and the co-landlord. The applicants and their deceased brother had let out the premises to the respondent No. 1. The applicants were the landlord of the respondent No. 1 even before the death of Muhammad Rafiq. Apart from this, it is the con--tention of the applicants and not contreverted by the respondents that the applicants are the surviving heirs of deceased Muhammad Rafiq and on this score also, no notice under section 13-A is required". Thus according to the learned District Judge, despite the death of Muhammad Rafiq, there was no change in the ownership of the plot leased to the appellant because the respondents and the deceased had been its co-owners and because the respondents were the legal heirs of the deceased. With respect, the observations do not bear analysis. The concept of a change in the ownership of property is wide and because death is a stark fact the most obvious instance of a change in ownership occurs when one of several owners dies. The death of Muhammad Rafiq had at least reduced the number of owners of the plot leased to the appellant, there--fore I am not able to understand the observation of the learned District Judge.
5. Mr. Azizullah Memon attempted to defend these observations by reference to the object of the section. According to learned counsel the object of the section was to enable the tenant to know to whom he had to pay rent, but according to learned counsel such information was required only when the demised premises changed hands completely, and not when an interest in the demised premises was transferred. And as in the instant case, the title of the plot in dispute had not changed hands completely, the submission was that beneficial provisions of the section were attracted. The submission really means that the obligation to give notice arises only when, for instance, a building is sold, but not when an interest in it is sold. Now if the intention of the Legislature had been as submitted by Mr. Azizullah Memon to limit the benefit of the section only to the transfer of a building or rented land it should have easily enacted accordingly. It has not and, on the contrary, it has imposed the obligation of notice whenever "the ownership of a building . . . .
Has been transferred by sale, gift, inheritance or in any other manner whatsoever". The words "in any other manner whatsoever', are significant and govern the entire section. I shall presently revert to them, but I would first stress that the concept of a change in the ownership of property is much wider than that of the sale of a property. In my humble opinion, the words "where the ownership . . . .
Has been transferred," are wide enough to embrace all changes whatsoever in the title to property, therefore they include the transfer of a share in property, whether to a stranger or to the co-owners of that property.
6. Additionally, the obligation of giving a notice has been imposed on change of ownership by transfer, therefore the question also is of the meaning of the word "transfer", and as it has neither been defined in section 13-A nor in the said Ordinance, it follows that it should have the same meaning as in section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. A transfer under section 5 of this Act includes a transfer of an interest in immovable property, so that it necessarily includes the transfer by a co-owner of his share in immovable property, whether the transfer be to a stranger or the other co-owners. And as the word "transfer" in section 13-- as the same meaning it follows that the words "where the ownership of a building . . . Has been transferred . . . ." are wide enough to include the transfer of any interest in that building and not merely a submitted by Mr. Azizullah Memon, the transfer of the building. This is also clear from the obligation of giving a notice of transfers by inheritance. This is because, for example a building owned by a person passes on his death to his heirs who acquire shares in it and in turn on the death of any heir it would pass to the heirs of that deceased. The obligation of giving a notice in the event of transfers by inheritance, therefore necessarily implies that a notice is required when there is a change in the ownership of an interest in a building. That is obvious, and it is also obvious that property owned by a person passed on his legal heirs, therefore I cannot understand the reason given by the learned District Judge for his view that section 13-A was not attracted because "the applicants are the surviving heirs of deceased Muhammad Rafiq", who-else could have inherited the share of Muhammad Rafiq except his legal heirs ? And if the section was not attracted "on this score" as stated by the learned District Judge, the section would not be applicable at all to transfers by inheritance, but that would be contrary to the express language of the section. But the only other reason given by the learned District Judge was that the respondents and the deceased were co-owners of the plot leased to the appellant. Now, in the events that had happened the only question for consideration before the Court was whether the respondents had inherited the property of their deceased brother and as undoubtedly they had inherited their deceased brother's share, the circumstance that they and the deceased had been co-owners was com--pletely irrelevant, because it could not alter the fact that the estate of their deceased brother including the demised premises had devolved on them by inheritance. In any view of the matter, the appellant was therefore entitled to notice under the section.
7. I would now again consider Mr. Azizullah Memon's submission about the object of the section. A tenant is entitled to the protection of the said Ordinance only as long as he is ready and willing to pay rent. However, when there is a change in the title to property, as I observed earlier, a tenant may find it difficult to ascertain to whom he is to attorn. And as the consequences of a failure to pay rent are very drastic the Legislature in its wisdom has imposed this obligation of a notice under section 13-A. The object underlying this beneficial provision is clearly to enable the tenant to know to whom he is to attorn and the section being a remedial provision should be construed liberally.
But according to Mr. Azizullah Memon, the section was attracted only when there was a complete change in the title of the demised premises, because it was only in such situations that a tenant could experience difficulty in finding out to whom he was to attorn. I am not able to accept the argument. It may be difficult for a tenant to find out to whom he is to attorn in the event, for instance, of the transfer of a building by sale or otherwise. But it may also be difficult for a tenant +o find out to whom he is to attorn in the event of a transfer of an interest in the building leased to him, and this means that the object of the section would be frustrated if it is not applicable to such situations. Therefore the wider construction of the section has to be preferred, as it is more in consonance with the object of the section than the narrower construction proposed by Mr. Azizullah Memon. And that an eviction application can be filed by one of several owners only fortifies me in my opinion. In any event, the language of the section is clear and I hold that it is attracted whenever there is any change in the title of a building or rented land.
8. In the result, I agree with the learned District Judge that the Rent Controller's order dismissing the eviction application of the respondents was illegal. However, the view of the learned District Judge that the appellant was not entitled to notice under section 13-A is also erroneous and is set aside.
Therefore, the eviction application of the respondent will now be heard and decided by the Rent Controller in accordance with the said Ordinance as the appeal is partially allowed, I make no order as to costs.