DECISION I propose to dispose of these two appeals, which are directed against the two awards of the learned Presiding Officer, Sind Labour Court No. IV, Karachi, by a common order as similar question of law arises in both the appeals. The appellants are S. R. T. C. Staff and Workers' Union (herein-- after called the Union). It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court was barred in view of the provisions contained in the West Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 19:8 (hereinafter called the Act of 1958). The learned Labour Court came to the following conclusion :-- " . . . . . . I am of the opinion that jurisdiction of this Court is barred in respect of employment covered by the said Act of 1958."
2. It would be useful to reproduce the finding of the learned Labour Court leading to the conclusion, already reproduced above; It runs as under It has been argued by learned representative for respondent that rules regarding, condition of services of R. T. C. Employees have been framed and they are in existence. The mode and method for settling dispute under this Act, together with the rules that have been framed or may be framed under section 6 is different and inconsistent from the mode or method prescribed in the Industrial Relations Ordinance. They could not be extended at the same time to any employment.
Consequently a Labour Court was divested of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of an industrial dispute. Reliance placed on the observa--tion in judgment of Sind & Baluchistan High Court in Industrial Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 18 of 1968 dated 9-1-73."
3. From an analysis of the finding of the learned Labour Court, it would appear in the first place that the rules under section 6 of the Act of 1958 bad been framed and in the second place that the decision given by the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, in the case of Manzoor Ali Rizvi in Civil Appeal No. 18 of 1968, decided on 9th January 1973, which is reported in 1973 PLC 94, supports the conclusion of the learned Labour Court. Before I deal with the merit of the point decided by the learned Presiding Officer, it would be necessary, to state the principle which the Court has to bear in mind while considering the question that it had jurisdiction to deal with the application filed before it.
4. The principle deduceable from the decisions of the superior Courts is that the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts of judicature is not to be taken away by putting a construction upon an Act of the Legislature which does not clearly say that it was the intention of the Legislature to deprive such Courts of their Jurisdiction. When the language is doubtful the Courts will lean against ouster of the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts, except in those cases which are clearly and specifically enacted by the Legislature. Statute affecting jurisdiction of civil Courts are to be construed as far as possible in such a way so as to avoid the effect of transferring the determination of rights and liabilities from the ordinary civil Courts to Executive Officers.
5. The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance), extends to the whole of Pakistan. Subsection (3) of section 1 of the Ordinance lays down that "It shall not apply to any person employed in the police or any of the Defence Services of Pakistan and any services or installations connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan including an ordinance factory maintained by the Central Government or to any person employed in the administration of the State other than those employed as workmen by the Railways, Posts, Telegraph and telephone department."
6. Under the above provision of the Ordinance, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not ousted in respect of the employees of the Road Transport Corporation. It has, however, to be seen whether the jurisdiction of the Labour Court has been taken away by the Act of 1958. It has been conceded by Mr. Habiburrehman, the learned Advocate for the respondent, that the Act of 1958 does not specifically take away the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. He, however, contended that the rules framed under the Road Transport Workers Ordinance, 1961 (hereinafter called the Ordinance of 1961), should be taken to be rules framed under the Act of 1958. Under section 10 of the Ordinance of 1961 the Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Toad Transport Workers Ordinance. The Government has framed rules, which are known as "West Pakistan Road Transport Workers Rules, 1962". The learned Advocate for the respondent contended that these rules relate to the termination of service of persons employed by the Road Transport Corporation. He submitted that there being rules relating to the terms and conditions of service of the workers of the Transport Corporation the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is barred so as to apply the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 or any other provision of the Ordinance. There is no force in this contention. The admitted position is that no rules had been framed under section 6 of the Act of 1958, In this connection, it would be necessary to briefly examine the provisions of the Act of 1958. The Act consists of 10 sections. Section 1 makes the Act applicable to the whole of the Province of West Pakistan. Section 2 defines employment and essential service. Section 3 lays down that the Act shall apply to all employment under the Government or any agency set up by it or a local authority or any service relating to transport or civil defence. Under section 4 of the Act the Government or an officer authorised in this behalf by the Government may, by general or special order, direct that any person or persons engaged in any employment or class of employment to which this Act applies shall not depart out of such area or areas and for such period not exceeding three months as may be specified in such order. Section 5 of the Act deals with offences. It lays down that any person engaged in any empolyment or class of employment to which this Act applies who disobeys any lawful order given in the course of such employment, or attempts to persuade any person to disobey any such orders, or without reasonable excuse abandons such employment or absents himself from work, or departs from any area specified in an order under subsection (1; of section 4 without the consent of the Government or the authority making that order and any employer of a person engaged in an employment or class of employment to which this Act applies, who without reasonable excuse discontinues the employment of such persons, or by closing an establishment in which such person is engaged, causes the discontinuance of his employment, or discontinues or causes the discontinuance of an essential service, is guilty of an offence under this Act, Under section 6, the Government may make rules regulating or empowered specified authorities to regulate the wages and other conditions of service at or of any class of persons engaged in any employment or class of employment to which this Act applies. Under subsection (2) of section 6, it i5 only when any such rules have been made or when directions regulating wages or conditions of service have been given by the authority empowered by such rules to give them, any person failing to comply therewith is guilty of an offence under this Act. Under section 7 of the Act any person found guilty of an offence under this Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to one year and shall also be liable to a fine. Under section 8 of the Act, a person who has done anything in good faith under the Act cannot be prosecuted. Under section 9, the laws imposing liability to national service are saved. Section 10 repeals the previous laws relating to Essential Services Maintenance.
7. A resume- of the various provisions of the Act of 1958, would revea--l that its main object is two- fold, namely, (1) to restrict the movement of persons to whom the Act applies, and (2) to punish the persons to whom the Act' applies, if they disobey the lawful orders given in the course of their employment. On the face of it, the object of the Act of 1958 does not, in any way, come in conflict with the Ordinance. The object of the Ordinance is to consolidate the law relating to the formation of Trade Unions, the regulation of relations between employers and workmen and avoidance and settlement of any difference or disputes arising between them. The object of the Ordinance and that of the Act of 1958 are quite different. If, the rules had been framed under section 6 of the Act of 1958, in respect of wages any conditions of service to whom the Act applied, question may have arisen as to whether in the absence of any specific ouster of jurisdiction of the Labour Courts under the Act of 1958, the jurisdiction of Labour Courts was barred. I am clearly of the -view that the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts is not barred under the Act of 1958.
8. The decision of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan in the case of Manzoor Ali Rizvi, relied upon by the learned Labour Court, has no application whatsoever, to the circumstances of the present case. In that case, Dorab Patel, J., was considering the provisions of the Pakistan, Essential Services (Maintenance) Act of 1952 (hereinafter called the Act of 1952). In that case, the Government, which had power under section 3 of the Act of 1952 to apply the provisions of the Act to any employment or class of employment, did so by a notification in the official Gazette in respect of National Bank of Pakistan. It may be mentioned that under the Act of 1958, the Provincial Government bad no such power to apply the provisions of the Act of 1958 to any employment or class of employment. This aspect of the case, however, is not important for the consideration of the present question. Dorab Patel, J., came to the conclusion specially in view of section 7-A of the Act of 1952, that the Labour Court could not entertain an application under section 31 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959.
9. Section 7-A of the Act of 1952, reads as under: "The provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding to the contrary contained in the Trade Unions Act, 1926, or the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, or any other Law."
10. Dorab Patel. J., observed as under: "As the Central Government has discretion to vary the powers delegated to the Central Labour Commissioner, I would only point out here that this notification expressly empowers the Central Labour Commis--sioner to increase the wages or allowances of any person in respect of whom a dispute exists with his employers and to specify conditions on which the employment of any person may be terminated.
4. Thus, it will be seen that the said Act, together with the rules that have been framed or may be framed under section 6, constitute a method for settling industrial disputes which is very different from the method prescribed in the Ordinance."
11. In the present case, as I have already said, no rules had been framed under section 6 of the Act of 1958 and no authority had been empowered to regulate the wages and other conditions of service to whom the Act of 1958 applied, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was not barred.
12 The contention that the Ordinance is the Central Act, while the Act of 1958 is the Provincial one and, therefore, the Central Act must have precedence over the Provincial Act, does not require consideration in this case, as there is no conflict between the two.
13.For the reasons given above, the appeals are allowed. The awards of the learned Labour Court are set aside. The learned Labour Court to dispose of the applications before him in accordance with law.