' This judgment shall also dispose of Settlement Appeal No,19 of 1970 as both these arise from the same order dated the 28th of April, 1970, of the learned Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Sargodha Division at Lyallpur, whereby he dismissed the appellant-Board's petition under section 4(3) read with section 30(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, holding that since the property in question was transferred to the respondent in 1960, the relevant order, in fact, presented fait accomplication of the matter as could not be subsequently re-opened by a revision in 1970. He further took the view that the power to call in question the transfer of the property was vested in the appellant-Board in the yeaer 1964 when section 4(3) of the above Act was enacted and that the same being not retrospective in effect could not have been posssibly utilized by the appellant-Board to claim a right to get the property as a part of the evacuee trust. Consequently he dismissed the revision petition.
2. Malik Muhammad Azam Rasul, Advocate for the appellant-Board contended that at no time, limitation for seeking the relief was prescribed against the Board and that the mere fact that the transfer made in 1960 was being challenged in 1970 would not preclude the Board from examining its validity. He stressed that the reason for not prescribing a period to confine the powers of the appellant-Board was obvious as it was the duty of every citizen including the Courts, as enunciated in Master Chiragh Din v. Abdul Hakim etc. (PLD 1974 Lah. 370), to protect the property from going into wrong hands. Counsel's contention was that the learned Chief Settlement Commissioner should have decided whether or not the property formed part of an evacuee trust and that he could not side-track this issue by holding that its transfer made in 1960 in favour of the respondent served as fait accompli.
3. He equally assailed applicability of the laches to the present case as held by the learned Chief Settlement Commissioner stating that absence of any prescribed limitation; indicated that the Board could ask for the relief any time. According to him, since the Board is to act for the community at large, there was no idea of confining its authority to a specific period for claiming such nature of the property.
4. The last ground employed by the learned Chief Settlement Commissioner to dismiss the petition was that the respondent and another party had been litigating about the property up to the High Court and that if the Board were really sanguine about their contention, they should have rather made an application to the High Court for being joined as a party. Malik Muhammad Azam Rasul took exception to this argument on the plane that any litigation between the respondent and another private party had no effect against the interest of the Board the Chairman whereof, in fact, under the latest dispensation, was himself the competent forum to decide about the validity or otherwise of the transfer of such property. His view was that relegating the Chairman to that position was not in consonance with the provisions of sections 8 and 10 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, whereunder he alone could decide the matter in the exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction. This is how he suggested that the case required remand, this time to the Chairman of the Evacuee Trust Property Board for deciding the issue in the exercise of authority conferred upon him by the aforesaid provisions.
5. At the outset, Mr. M.R. Chughtai, Advocate for the respondent drew attention that the appeal was time-barred. The impugned order was announced on the 28th of April, 1970. The application for obtaining certified copy thereof was made the same day whereas it was delivered on the 8th of May, 1970. The appeal was, however, filed on the 8th of June, 1970, that is after expiry of thirty days.
In fact, the said period expired on the 7th of June, 1970, and the appeal could have been filed latest on that day, but it was filed a day later, that is on the 8th of June, 1970, and was late by a day. It was a common case that delay suffered in filing the present appeal could not be condoned as section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable. It was so held in Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property, West Pakistan, Lahore v. Muhammad Din etc. (PLD 1971 Lah. 217). The appeal is time-barred.
6. There were other grounds which Mr.Chughtai was very keen to press but I do not think we need determine those points because the appeal fails on this preliminary objection.
7. Counsel for the appellant-Board canvassed as a last resort that since there was no decision on merits either by the Chief Settlement Commissioner or by this Court, it was still open to the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board to exercise his own authority conferred on him by section 8 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975.
8. Since the appeal was barred by time, I was under an obligation to dismiss it under section 3 of the Limitation Act on this simple ground without touching upon the merits of the case. The question whether the Chairman of the appellant- Board will have authority or not to re-open the matter essentially relates to the merits of the case which I cannot, as aforesaid, go into. I would, therefore, hesitate to pass any remarks in that behalf.
9. The appeal is dismissed.