' This is an appeal against the order of the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No,VII at Sukkur, dated 15-4-1986, whereby the grievance petition for the respondent was allowed.
2. The respondent was admittedly employed as Palledar by the appellants. He was prosecuted before the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption and placed under suspension on 31-1-1979. He however, was acquitted by the learned Special Judge, Anti-Corruption on 10-4-1983, whereafter he made applications on different dates for reinstatement in service. He was sent copy of letter, dated 20-3- 1985, which indicated that his case was being considered. However he received no order of reinstatement, therefore, he served grievance notice upon the appellant on 29-4-1985 and thereafter filed grievance petition on 19-5-1986. The appellant resisted the grievance petition on the ground that the respondent after show cause had been discharged from service vide order, dated 19-11-1981.
3. I have heard Mr. Kadir Bux Memon, Advocate for the appellant and Mr. Nizamuddin Baloch, Advocate for the respondent and have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
4. Mr. Kadir Bux Memon raised objection that because the appellants have adopted the Sindh Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 vide Notification, dated 6-4-1981, therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction. He further intimated this Tribunal that one Asghar AR had filed grievance petition before the learned Labour Court which was allowed by this Tribunal, dismissing the grievance petition holding that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction. He further states that the said Asghar Ali challenged the decision of this Tribunal in Constitution Petition No,D- 114 of 1984 which was decided by the learned Division Bench of Sindh High Court at Sukkur on 19-3- 1985, holding that the Labour Court had jurisdiction and the order of Labour Court was restored. He further informed that the appellants have filed petition for leave to Appeal, bearing No,299-K of 1985 in the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan which had admitted the appeal in order to consider the question whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain the grievance application under the provisions of section 25-A of the I.R.0., 1969 in view of the fact that the appellants had adopted the Sindh Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. Their Lordships have also ordered that the operation of the impugned order of the High Court shall be held in abeyance till the appeal is decided. This order was passed by their Lordships on 15-5-1986. Mr. Kadir Bux Memon informs that the appeal has not yet been decided. Mr. Nizamuddin Baloch informs the Tribunal that in the case of Asghar Ali the question at issue was whether Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 were applicable. As the facts of that case are not before this Tribunal except the order passed by the Hon`ble Supreme Court of Pakistan it cannot be said at this stage as to what exactly was the question at issue.
5. Admittedly the appellant is Statutory Body and had adopted Statutory Rules of Service as such in view of the proviso to section 1 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 the provisions of the said Ordinance would not be applicable to the employees of the appellants. Mr. Nizamuddin contends that the appellants is not run by the Sindh Government but is run by the Board of Directors as held by the learned High Court in the judgment which is impugned before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. However, there is no evidence on record in this case that it is being run by the Board of Directors.
6. Even if it is held that Standing Orders Ordinance is not applicable to the employees of the appellants still unless there is any provision in the statute under which the Sindh Agricultural Supplies Organization was established to the effect that the employees of SASO are civil servants within the meaning of Civil Servants Act, 1973, the respondent could invoke the jurisdiction of Labour Court under section 25-A of IRO, 1969 if he is able to show that he is workman as defined in the IRO.
Mr. Kadir Bux Memon admits, that there is no specific notification of provision of law declaring the employees of SASO to be civil servants except Notification No, SASO/ADMN/8-243/79, dated 6th April, 1981 which is reproduced as under:- ' No,SASO/ADMN/8-243/79--In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of section 19 of the SASO Act, 1973 SASO is pleased to direct that the Sindh Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline)
Rules, 1973 shall mutatis mutandis apply to the servants of the SASO as if the reference to the term- -
(i) "Civil Servant" were the reference to "servant of the SASO".
(ii) "Chief Minister" were the reference to "SASO".
(iii) "Chief Secretary" were the reference to "Chairman".
(iv) "Government" were the reference to "Board".
' Under this Notification the word "civil servant" used in Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline)
Rules, 1973 would be deemed to refer to servants of SASO. However word 'civil servant' has not been defined in the Sindh Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, therefore, it cannot be said that a servant of the appellants would be deemed to be civil servant within the meaning of Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973.
7. Mr. Kadir Bux Memon further submits that the matter be stayed till decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Hon`ble Supreme Court of Pakistan had not overruled the decision of the Hon'ble High Court but had kept in abeyance. Even if the decision of the Hon`ble High Court is not considered for the purpose of decision of this appeal, still I respectfully disagree with the previous decision of my learned predecessor in the case of Asghar Ali, that because Standing Orders Ordinance was not applicable to the employees of SASO, therefore, the Labour Court did not have jurisdiction. Under section 25-A of IRO, 1969 the workman can invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court for enforcement of any right, guaranteed to him by any law and not only rights guaranteed by the Standing Orders Ordinance, provided the petitioner falls within the definition of workman as defined under the I.R.O. Under the I.R.O., 1969 all the employees are defined as workmen who are not employers and who do not hold any post of administrative or managerial nature or whose duty is not of supervisory nature and are drawing the salary of Rs, 1,000 per month.
None of these exceptions are applicable to the case of the respondent and, therefore, he would be a workman within the meaning of I.R.O., 1969. Respondent was out of job since 1979 and even this appeal is pending since 1986. Any further delay would defeat end of justice. Therefore I do not consider it proper and just to stay proceedings of this appeal any further as every case is to be decided on the facts and merits of that individual case.
8. The next objection of Mr. Kadir Bux Memon is that the grievance petition was time-barred.
Admittedly the show-cause notice as well as the discharge order have not been produced in the Labour Court. It is alleged that same were sent to the respondent by Registered Post on his last known address. This fact has been denied by the respondent and the appellants have failed to produce any A/D receipt or even copies of the show-cause notice or discharge order. Admittedly no enquiry was held before the alleged order of discharge. The cause of action would arise to the respondent from the date he would come to know of the order of discharge. Admittedly even the letter, dated 20-3-1985 indicates that application for reinstatement of the applicant was under consideration. By this letter the District Agricultural Supply Officer had sent copy of the judgment of the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption to the Deputy Director, Agricultural SASO and copy was forwarded to the respondent. Even by this letter he was not informed, that he was discharged from service. There is nothing on record to show that on what charges the respondent was discharged from service. If he was discharged on the same charges, on which he was prosecuted the discharge order was passed without enquiry but the charges have been disproved in the Court of Law. In view of the fact that the appellants have not been able to prove the date, from which the limitation would run against the respondent, the objection that the grievance notice or the grievance petition was time- barred is not tenable. As pointed above the discharge order, if any, was passed without enquiry, without notice being served upon the respondent and was, therefore, not tenable.
9. For the aforesaid reasons I see no merits in this appeal which is, accordingly, dismissed.