MALIK MUHAMMAD QAYYUM, J.- This judgment shall dispose of S.A.O. Nos. 90 and 91 of 1991, which are directed against a common judgment of the Additional District Judge, Lahore, dated 13th of April, 1991, whereby he set aside the order of the Rent Controller, Lahore, dated 18th of February, 1990.
2. Chaudhry Muhammad Faruq appellant is in possession of a shop and godown situate in Montgomery Road, Lahore, as a tenant under (Mst). Surrayya Naheed, respondent herein. His ejectment from these premises was sought by the respondent by filing an application under section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, on the sole ground that the same were required by the respondent bona fide and in good faith for the use and occupation of her son Ayaz Asif, who was stated to be jobless. It was also stated in the application that there was no other shop in possession of the respondent. This claim of the respondent was disputed by the appellant by filing a written reply to the said application, which led to the framing of the following issues:-
(1) Whether the petitioner requires the premises in good faith for the use of the petitioner and her son? OPP
(2) Whether the petition is malafide and has not been made in good faith? OPR
(3) Relief.
3. In support of her case, the land lady produced her son Ayaz Asif as P.W.1, Muhammad Zubair, P.W.2 and her attorney and son in law Muhammad Saleem as P.W.3. In rebuttal, the appellant examined Muhammad Tahir R.W.1, Muhammad Alamgir R.W.2, Muhammad Saleem R.W.3, Mushtaq Ahmad R.W.4, Amjad Hussain R.W.5 and he himself appeared as R.W.6.
4. The Rent Controller by his order dated 18th of February, 1990, found that the respondent had failed to prove that the premises were required bona fide and in good faith by her for the use of her son. As a result of this finding, the ejectment petition was dismissed. On appeal, however, the Additional District Judge took a different view and proceeded to direct the eviction of the appellant holding that the respondent had succeeded in proving the need in good faith for her son Ayaz Asif.
5. Before the appeal could be argued on merits, the learned counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection that no second appeal is competent in the present case as the ejectment petition out of which the present appeal has arisen was filed before coming into force of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance (No.13 of 1990) where by the right of second appeal was conferred. This objection is well taken and finds full support from the decision of this Court in Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq vs I.A. Khan (1991 M LD 1205).
6. Even on merits, the appellant has no case. The learned counsel contended that the son for whose use the premises were required was already carrying on the business of cement agency and, therefore, it could not be said that the shop in question was required by the land lady for his use and in any case, the so- called need was neither bona fide nor in good faith. It was emphasized that the Rent Controller was correct in holding that in the circumstances, the land lady had failed to prove her case and the learned Additional District Judge has acted illegally in reversing these findings.
7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, I do not find any merit in these contentions of the learned counsel. The main stay of the case of the appellant, as argued by the learned counsel, is that Ayaz Asif for whose use the property sought to be got evicted was already carrying on business of a cement agency. It is, however, to be noticed that in the ejectment petition filed by the respondent, there is a positive assertion in para 2 (i) that Ayaz Asif, the son of the respondent, was jobless. In the written statement, although the assertion as regards the need of the son was disputed but it was never asserted that he was in possession of another shop but, on the other hand, the case of the appellant was that the said son was still a student and had no experience of any business. Ayaz Asif, the son of the respondent appeared as P.W.1 and categorically stated that he was not doing anything after his graduation in December, 1987 and despite his best efforts, he could not obtain any employment and further that he wanted to carry on his business in the shop in question. In the cross examination, no question was put to the said witness as regards the assertion that he was already carrying on business of a cement agency, that being so, the Additional District Judge was justified in reversing the finding of the Rent Controller on this issue. Thus, the judgment of the Additional District Judge is unexceptionable.
8. From a perusal of the order of the Rent Controller, it is apparent that while non-suiting the respondent, he had gone by considerations which have no relevance in law. One of the factors considered by the Rent Controller was that the son of the respondent had no experience of business while otherwise the tenant would suffer inconvenience in case of eviction. To say the least, this approach on the part of the Rent Controller is clearly contrary to the law declared by the superior Courts.
For the reasons aforesaid, no case for interference having been made out, both the appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs. The appellant is allowed four months the to vacate the premises.