1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, C.J.---Leave to appeal has been sought against the dismissal by the Federal Service Tribunal of petitioner's appeal against compulsory retirement purported to be under section 17 (1-A), of the Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958.
2. The facts and allegations as mentioned in the petition itself are that the petitioner was working as Line Superintendent: when he was caught red handed while accepting illegal gratification at the instance of Lower Division Clerk of his own Department. The raid was conducted and supervised by a Magistrate. The learned' counsel clearly and candidly stated that there was no allegation of bias, interestedness or any other infirmity in so far as the conduct of the Magistrate is concerned.
3. Notwithstanding the same instead of straightaway simple prosecution for an obvious offence the Chairman Area Electricity Board WAPDA by his order dated 1h-6-19S8 appointed an inquiry committee "to probe into circumstances of allegedly accepting illegal gratification by the petitioner". However, as a result of the proceedings of this Committee a show-cause notice containing the allegation of bribe/misconduct was issued to the petitioner. He submitted a reply to the said show-cause notice and also submitted with it, as asserted, affidavits of five employees of WAPDA and two private persons who, according to him, were present at the raid proceedings.
4. These affidavits procured by the petitioner, according to the petitioner, were enough to avoid the proceedings in the criminal case against him. He obviously succeeded in duping not only the WAPDA authorities, who otherwise are very vigilant in some fields, but also it appears another very effective Government agency; namely, F.IA. This latter aspect of the case is not clear from the petition but the learned counsel explained that some wise but also mighty officer in the Department of F.IA. Helped the petitioner in getting away in so far, as the criminal prosecution is concerned. Learned counsel stated that the permission, if at all it was necessary to prosecute him was, withheld. He also stated that the consent to prosecute the petitioner was not forthcoming because of the opinion of the F.I.A.
5. If all this is true it has surprised us if not shocked at the attitude of the concerned higher authorities in saving the petitioner in so far as the question of prosecution for a very heinous alleged offence is concerned. When questioned: as to whether the learned counsel was aware of reason for this departure from the normal course, he it appears, was instructed only to state that the "F.I-A. Did not permit the prosecution"; and for the further reason, as the learned counsel thought, that the affidavits procured by the petitioner would have perhaps contradicted the Magistrate's evidence. If' this starts happening in every case of bribery, sought to be established through a raid evidence--- particularly conducted by Magistrates, the position of the Magistrates shall be highly jeopardised.
6. In such a case a normal rustic citizen would be right in thinking that perhaps the Magistrate was a dishonest person, therefore, the petitioner was not allowed to be prosecuted. Condemning a Magistrate in such an indirect manner cannot be approved in any system of law what to talk of Pakistani laws which are claimed to be under the protective cover of Islamic content of our Constitutional set up. This approach to the case on the criminal side, we are not sure whether, came to the notice of the Chairman WAPDA, the District Magistrate who, permitted and authorised his Magistrate to lend support in the cause of justice to supervise a bribe raid case and/or the higher authorities in the administration. A probe into this aspect of the. Matter regardless of departmental proceedings is highly called for. A copy of this order shall be sent to the Chairman WAPDA, to the District Magistrate and the Magistrate concerned.
7. If as a result of this exercise it is discovered that it was necessary to prosecute the petitioner for the alleged offence of receiving bribe, the excuse that the case got channelised in other proceedings including departmental, therefore, this exercise of prosecution has become delayed, would be against the law laid down by this Court to the effect that unless specified by the governing law itself there is no limitation for prosecution of criminal cases.
8. Reverting to the question raised before the Tribunal and repeated before this Court, in so far as the departmental proceedings are concerned, learned counsel argued that although on face the proceedings appeared to be under section 17 (1-A) of the WAPDA Act and thus they were without stigma, in reality they carried a very serious stigma against what he thought good name of the petitioner. Therefore, he argued that instead of passing the order under section 17 (1-A), it should have been a full-fledged inquiry under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules. In alternative learned counsel also argued that although the departmental proceedings against the petitioner commenced as if they were under Efficiency and Discipline Rules yet subsequently they were changed to those under section 17 (1-A), which is not permissible in law.
9. Learned counsel seems right that the proceedings were commenced against the petitioner as if it was intended to proceed according to normal rules. But subsequently something, as if invisible, had happened on the criminal side. Thereafter, the learned counsel is right, some diversions were made towards somewhat strange procedure, in rather peculiar circumstances of this case. It was also perhaps for this reason that the end product of the entire exercise was no more than compulsory retirement.
10. However, the prima facie acceptance of the learned counsel's argument that perhaps in the beginning it was intended to be a full-fledged inquiry under Efficiency and Discipline Rules, later on it was diverted to an action under section 17 (1-A), will not make any difference because this change, as held in Ehsan Elahi v. WAPDA (1988 SCM R 1247), does not go to the root of the matter in so far as the question involving substantial justice is concerned. And thus the proceedings would not be vitiated on account of this reason. See also C.P.-84 of 1991, decided today.
11. Learned counsel when faced with this obvious difficult situation contended that the petitioner having been deprived of a beneficial procedure under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, has suffered prejudice on account of the action under section 17 (1-A). We do not agree with him on this point either: whether under section 17 (1-A), or under the WAPDA Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1978 or even under the general Efficiency and Discipline Rules, the recent trend in administrative justice is for shorter inquiries and avoidance of such delays which served neither the employer nor the employee. In all these systems of Disciplinary Rules shorter inquiries and procedures in that behalf has clearly been provided. Even if it is taken to be a case under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules it would be covered by the provision of the shorter inquiries. The learned counsel candidly accepted this proposition. Accordingly, the last argument also of learned counsel is of no assistance to the petitioner.
12. In the light of the foregoing discussion and with earlier remarks and directions we find no force in this petition and the same, accordingly, is dismissed.