' This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is directed against an interim order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Jhang on 14th December, 1987 which was confirmed in, revision by the learned Addl. District Judge, Jhang, on 13th April, 1989, whereby respondents were directed to produce by way of secondary evidence photostat of an agreement to sell dated 9th of April, 1980 allegedly executed by Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din respondent. No,3.
2. The dispute between the parties arises out of a suit for specific performance of agreements to sell dated 20th of September, 1981 and 27th of February 1982 filed by the petitioner against respondents No,3 to 5 which is still pending in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Jhang. According to the petitioner respondent No,3 was the owner of the shop in dispute and had agreed to sell the same to him but subsequently he alienated in favour of respondents Nos.4 and 5. During the course of evidence, an application was filed by respondents Nos.3 and 4, for permission to produce as secondary evidence photostat of agreement to sell and allegedly executed in favour of these respondents by respondent No,3. The application was resisted by the petitioner but was allowed by the trial Court as also the revisional Court.
3. I have heard Mr. Masood Mirza, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. No one has entered appearance for the respondents.
4. The application for permission to produce secondary evidence has been allowed by the two Courts below in the exercise of discretion primarily on the ground that in the registered sale-deed executed between respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5, a reference has been made to the agreement to sell copy of which was sought to be produced by way of secondary evidence and as such, it could not be said that the agreement has been subsequently fabricated. It is not denied by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that in the sale-deed which was produced as Ex.D.1, the agreement for sale fmds specific mention. That being so, the view taken by the two Courts below cannot be said to be arbitrary or capricious so as to warrant interference in the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. The petitioner may, if so advised, challenge the impugned order at the time of filing appeal, against the final decree if it goes against him. It is also to be seen that it is still to be decided by the Court as to what weight, is to be attached to this agreement and it is open to the petitioner to show to the Courts that no such agreement was executed and the document has been forged or fabricated.
' The petition has no force. It is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.