' Three parties being one son and two daughters of Umar Din, one of them Mst. Barkat Bibi (respondent No,1) filed a declaratory suit against her brother; the petitioner herein, and the other sister Mst. Sardaran Bibi, for claiming her 1/4th share of inheritance in the lands left by the father, upon a gift allegedly made in favour of the petitioner being set aside as void and ineffective against her, right. Defendants contested the suit on the basis of a joint written statement wherein while admitting relationship of the plaintiff they denied her right of inheritance, presumably on account of gift made in favour of the petitioner. They also raised a number of technical objections against the maintainability of the suit which was set down to be tried on eight issues inclusive of that of the relief. Parties led their evidence wherein copy of mutation relating to gift was produced but registered gift deed whereon it was purported to be based, was not produced. After due consideration of evidence of the parties, learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that gift in favour of the son had resulted from his dominating the will of Umar Din for the reason of his being the only son and both the daughters were married, living with their husbands and in his advanced age Umer Din was residing with his son. He also held that essentials of a gift under Muhammadan Law had not been proved and even authenticity of gift was doubtful. In result, he decreed the suit by the judgment dated 17-2-1988 upon repelling all the technical objections relating to maintainability of the suit.
2. Appeal thereagainst filed by the petitioner came up for hearing before a learned Additional District Judge who reconsidered the evidence existing on the record and affirmed the trial Court's conclusion about Umar Din being under the influence of his only son with whom he was admitted to be then living. Technical objections raised with reference to an earlier suit filed by the plaintiff- respondent in the year 1975, during the lifetime of the father who died on 18-3-1985, were repelled with the observations that the previous suit filed by her was not tried but was withdrawn and during the lifetime of the father she did not even have any cause of action to challenge the gift made by the father, as had been held in Mst. Hamida Begum v. Mst. Murad Begum and others (PLD 1975 SC 624) and it was concluded that the suit filed on 18-2-1986, within one year of the death of the father, could not be held time-barred. He also took particular notice of the fact that two married sisters of the petitioner were deprived of their right of inheritance on account of Umar Din being under the influence of his only son, the petitioner but the assertion about gift had become doubtful on account of the best evidence relating thereto, in the form of a registered deed, having been withheld despite admission on the point made in the evidence adduced by the defendants. In result, by his judgment dated 29-4-1991 he dismissed the appeal by affirming the trial Court's decree. Defendant No,1 has now come up to this Court on revision.
3. Two Courts below have concurrently decided the question of fact relating to influence of the petitioner over his father and this finding has not been shown to have resulted from any jurisdictional error of the nature of misreading or non-reading of some material evidence and thereby genuineness and validity of the alleged gift gets materially impaired in addition to its not having been proved in accordance with law. Moreover, undeniable object of Umar Din in making of the alleged gift being to benefit the son at the cost of married daughters; it would not be possible to interfere in favour of the petitioner in the exercise of discretionary power of revision on account of substantially just decision between the parties having been concurrently made by the two Courts below. This aspect of the matter may be found considered at length in Messrs Ghulam Farid Muhammad Latif v. Central Bank of India (PLD 1954 Lah. 575), at page 591.
' Then, it is worthy of being mentioned that view, at one time held, as reported in Sardar Ahmad Khan v. Mst. Zamroot Jan (PLD 1950 Pesh. 45), was thus:-- "It is the policy of the Muslim jurists to prevent any interference with the course of devolution of property amongst the testator's heirs as laid down in the Holy Quran.The gift in order to be effective should be a genuine transaction and not merely a plan to achieve some ulterior object. It is true that the necessary effect of almost all the gifts will be disinheritance of one or the other of the heirs of the donors, but then it should be the effect and not the real object of the gift. If the real object of the gift is disinheritance of an heir, it will be bad in law."
4. When confronted with the foregoing, learneu counsel has elected to support the revision petition on the technical pleas relating to limitation and withdrawal of the earlier suit. These pleas have been adequately dealt with by learned appellate Judge to be rightly repelled on the ground that during the lifetime of her father the plaintiff did not have any right to challenge the gift purportedly made by him and, therefore, cause of action for her accrued only upon the death of the father taken place on 18-3-1985 and the suit filed on 18-2-1986 happened to, by all standards, be within time. Since the cause of action for the present suit is the right of inheritance accrued upon the death of the father, therefore, nothing turns upon the institutions and withdrawal of the previous suit during the lifetime of the father and the objections raised with references. Section 11 of the C.P.C. And the provisions of Rule 1(3) of Order XXIII and Rule 2 of Order II thereof are clearly not sustainable. Equally without merit is the petitioner's objection based on Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act inasmuch as the plaintiff is a real sister of the defendants and a co-sharer as such, with them. By virtue of law laid down in Saadullah Khan and 6 others v. Piayo Khan and 14 others (PLD 1970 Pesh. 150) she has a right to claim herself to be in possession through other co-sharers and was, therefore, not in need of having sued out for possession. Foregoing contentions are, hence repelled as being without substance.
5. There is no other point urged for consideration.
6. Result of the foregoing is that decree concurrently passed by the two Courts below in favour of the plaintiff is unexceptionable and no basis exists for interference therewith. Revision petition is devoid of force and is, therefore, summarily dismissed.