ABDUL QADEER CHAUDHRY, J: --Leave to appeal has been sought against the judgment of the High Court dated 31-1-1990 whereby the Constitution, petitions of the petitioners were dismissed. This order would dispose of all these petitions as common question of fact and law are involved in them.
2. The facts, in brief, are that in the year 1986, the respondents 1 to 3 brought separate applications for the ejectment of the petitioners in the Court of the Rent Controller, Sheikhupura, on the grounds of default in the payment of rent with effect from 1-10-1981, re-construction of the premises and personal bona fide use. The application was contested by the petitioners. As many as seven issues were framed by the learned Rent Controller. The parties examined their witnesses in respect of their respective pleas. All the issues were decided by the Rent Controller against the petitioners. The petitioners challenged the order of eviction in appeals before the Additional District Judge which were dismissed. Thereafter, they failed to get any redress from the High Court. The petitioners have now come up to this Court.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that "the rent had been tendered to the landlord by the petitioners but on his refusal, the same was deposited in the Court. The Courts below have misread the evidence. On the facts of the case it is clear that no default had been committed by the petitioners." This contention has no force. The petitioners have not denied that the respondent No.1 is their landlord. The petitioners according to their own showing remitted the rent through money order in the name of Iftikhar Ahmad who has neither let out the premises to the petitioners nor was authorised by the landlord to collect the rent on his behalf. The learned counsel stated that lftikhar Ahmad is the son of the landlord but this Act has not been established. Even otherwise, it is immaterial as the admitted position is that Iftikhar Ahmad is not the landlord, Therefore, remitting the rent to him does not absolve the petitioners of their liability. The petitioners started depositing rent in Court with effect from May 1981 to February 1988 in favour of Muhammad Hussain son of Imam Din. The rent was deposited in the name of wrong person. Admittedly, Mohammad Hussain son of Wali Dad is the landlord. The petitioners have themselves given the father's name of Muhammad Hussain as Wali Dad. The deposit of rent in the name of wrong person does not amount to tendering the rent in favour of the landlord. The learned High Court has taken into consideration that in spite of the order passed by the Rent Controller under section 13(6) whereby the petitioners were directed to deposit the rent but in spite of such direction the petitioners deposited the rent in the name of Muhammad Hussain son of Imam Din. This is another violation of the order of tile Rent Controller. The landlord could not receive the rent deposited in favour of a wrong person. The petitioners with full knowledge of these facts have committed default, therefore, the finding of the Courts below on the question of default is not open to any exception. In Ghulam Mustafa v. Waqar Ahmad PLD 1980 SC 9, it has been observed that deposit of rent by the tenant in the name of other person instead of landlord, such deposit of rent is not in conformity with Rent Controller's order.
Similar view was taken in A.S.K. Samad v. A. Hussain (1983 CLC 2211).
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted that as no objection was raised by the landlord about the deposit of rent in favour of the wrong person, therefore, the petitioners could not be penalised for non-compliance of the order of the Rent Controller under section 13(6) due to the flux of time. This contention has also no force. This Court has observed in Allah Ditta v. Jamila Begum (1982 SCMR 642) that "inordinate delay of about two years between alleged default in payment of rent and request for striking off tenant's defence does not amount to waiver of landlord's right to seek striking off tenant's defence".
5. The learned counsel also challenged the findings of the Rent Controller on the point of re- construction. He submitted that the plan was approved of a different site. The Courts have accepted the contention of the respondent that he had got approved the plan for raising of construction on the disputed plot. Even otherwise, whether the respondent has got sanctioned a plan in respect of some other property, is a question of fact. It does not require re-examination.
6. The next contention of the learned counsel is that the respondent would raise the construction on the highway. The petitioners have no concern with it. Additionally, the petitioners had not taken this ground before the High Court. In this petition also the petitioners have not taken this ground, which requires investigation and inquiry. All these petitions have no force. Leave to appeal is refused and the petitions are dismissed.