1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, C.J.---These appeals through leave of the Court have arisen out of a Customs matter. Leave to appeal was granted as follows:-- ""These two petitions namely Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.437 of 1982 and Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.441 of 1982 have been filed by Deputy Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs and Assistant Collector, and both are directed against judgments of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 7th March, 1982, passed in two writ petitions. Since the same questions of law and fact are involved, these petitions are being taken up and disposed of together.
2. Briefly the facts are that the petitioners in the two petitions raided the premises of the two sets of respondents and seized certain articles under the Customs Act. However, the petitioners had no warrants for search. Consequently their action was challenged in the two writ petitions filed by the respondents which were allowed. Hence the present petitions for leave to appeal.
3. The High Court allowed the writ petitions on the ground that the raid had been conducted without search-warrants and that under sections 162 and 163 of the Customs Act search-warrants from a Magistrate were necessary before a search could be conducted for goods liable to be confiscated.
4. Since there were neither search-warrants in these cases nor justification for their absence, the action of the petitioners was held illegal and without lawful authority. Learned counsel for the petitioners in both the petitions states before us that the entire proceedings against the respondents had been dropped on account of the order of the High Court, despite the fact that a part of the relief claimed in the prayer of the petitioners was not granted by the High Court. It was further submitted that the question as to whether or not the articles which had been seized from the premises of the respondents and which were liable to be confiscated would lose their evidenciary value as recoveries only because of the absence of search-warrants, also require examination. We grant leave in both the petitions in order to examine the questions raised by the learned counsel."
5. It has been contended by the learned Deputy Attorney-General that section 162 of the Customs Act, 1969, relied upon by the High Court would be attracted only if the articles in question "are secreted in any place". He further argued that they were not kept in secret and instead being ordinary tyres were lying open where they were visible. In any case according to him, even if 5.162 would have been applicable, it was a question of fact; whether, the officer concerned did treat it as an exceptional case covered by section 163 or not. If it was covered by section 163, the search- warrants would not be necessary. The said provision created an exception; namely, that although the articles are concealed or kept in any place yet there is a danger that they may be removed before a search can be effected under section 162, then the official concerned may make the search under certain conditions without the warrant. The precise argument is that if the proceedings would have commenced only then the questions relatable to sections 162 and 163 of the Customs Act, 1969, would have been decided on the basis of the material brought on record.
6. Thus the interference by the High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction was premature.
7. In so far as the strict legal position is concerned, the interference, as in the present case, would at the stage involved in the circumstances of this case, and the issuance of Writ, was not justified.
8. However, as narrated in the leave grant order, the proceedings against the respondents had been dropped on account of the order of the High Court. The legal position having been corrected, we do not think, it is necessary to allow this appeal so as to revive the proceedings already dropped. The Deputy Attorney-General stated that he will himself go into the details of the case and unless it is absolutely unavoidable, it is likely, that the proceedings may not be revived.
9. In the light of what has been stated above these appeals stand disposed of. There shall be no order as costs.