AMJAD KHAN, J.- A suit brought by the appellant for a decree of possession of land being passed against the vendee Muhammad Yaqoob respondent No.1 in exercise of his right of preemption as a cosharer in the land in suit and also being an owner of the estate was contested by denying the alleged right and pleading, among others, that the land in suit is in fact an urban immovable property whereof further transfers in small pieces had made to other who were also impleaded as defendants. Trial of the suit proceeded upon specifies issues and on the basis of evidence, trial court deccreed the suit by its judgment dated 27.4.1985 for the findings in favour of the plaintiff returned on various issues.2. Appeal there against maintained by the defendants was heard by a learned Additional District Judge before whom contest was restricted to issues No.36 and 9 which respectively related to cause of action,superior right of preemption and nature of the suit-property.
He re-appraised the evidence existing on the record and came to the conclusion that further purchase had been made by the added defendants Nos 2 to 8 before the institution of the suit wherefore the plaintiff could not succeed to the extent of 3 Kanals 1 Marla of the land but since the suit-land happened to be an urban immovable property, therefore, it could not be preempted under Section 15 of the Act. In result, he accepted the appeal by his judgment dated 21.9.1985 and setting-aside the trial Court's decree, ordered the suit of the plaintiff to be dismissed.
3. This second appeal of the plaintiff, admitted to regular hearing for examining the effect of re- transfer upon the right of the plaintiff, has since been rendered abortive by the latest judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Mst. Aziz Begum etc, (since reported as PLD SC 899) wherein it has been reaffirmed that the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 had become unworkable as a whole from 31.7.1986 Obviously, neither can a new pre-emption decree be thereunder passed in favour of the appellant after the said date nor may the one passed by the trial Court be capable of being revived subsequent to that date due to the Act itself having since lost efficacy.
4. In the above view of the law, this appeal has no prospect left for its acceptance and is accordingly dismissed with the costs all along left to be borne by the parties themselves.