1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, C.J.--This appeal through leave of the Court is directed against the dismissal of appellant's Regular Second Appeal by the High Court. Leave to appeal was granted as follows----- "Abdul Majeed filed a suit for possession through pre-emption in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Multan. It was contested. Issues framed. On 4-2-1978 the suit was dismissed.
2. On appeal, the District Judge upset the judgment of the trial Court and decreed the suit. This led to the filing of a regular second appeal. That was dismissed by judgment dated 3-5-1989.
3. Altaf Hussain now seeks leave to appeal against the aforesaid judgment of the Lahore High Court Multan Bench.
4. The dispute pertains to House No.339, Ward No.8-M, Gujjar Khadda, Mauza Taraf Ismail.
5. Learned counsel contended, inter alia, that the evidence led by the respondent-plaintiff was not sufficient to prove the essential ingredients of the custom. Hence the first Appellate Court and the High Court erred in law in upsetting the finding of the trial Court pertaining to issue No.7, which was, "Whether the custom of pre-emption prevailed in the locality wherein the disputed house is situated?
6. The matter needs examination. Leave is accordingly granted".
7. The only question to be decided is whether, in this pre-emption matter relating to an urban property, the custom of pre-emption prevailed in the locality wherein the suit property is located?
8. The two higher Courts i.e. The District Court and the High Court have held in favour of the respondent/plaintiff/pre-emptor that the suit property was located in a Mohallah which is included in Taraf Saddu Hasam wherein admittedly the custom of pre-emption did prevail. According to the appellant the property and the Mohallah concerned is situate in Taraf Ismail where no custom of pre-emption prevailed.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant has raised all the arguments regarding the appreciation of evidence. It is not a case either of misreading or non-reading thereof.
10. However, we in order to further satisfy ourselves have gone through the relevant parts of the evidence relied upon or referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant. On the one hand there is very strong evidence in the form of a Municipal certificate prepared by the Patwari concerned and authenticated by a responsible Municipal Officer together with other supporting evidence which has been relied upon by the District Judge and the High Court in rendering concurrent findings of fact in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. While on the other hand there is, prima facie, strong evidence in favour of the appellant in the testimony of the vendor (father of the appellant) who in his last answer to the question in examination-in-chief answered in the affirmative that the suit property is situate in Taraf Ismail. This admission undoubtedly was with a view to see that the opponent of his son/pre-emptor must succeed. However, in so far as this statement is concerned it gives no benefit to the appellant as in cross-examination the father/vendor was compelled to admit that he notwithstanding being father had nursed an element of ill-will against his own son.
11. His testimony, therefore, on the question in issue has (rightly) not been given much importance.
12. While holding that there is no justification for this Court to set aside the concurrent findings of fact rendered against the appellant by the two higher Courts as 'compared to the trial Court we consider it necessary to observe that it is not always necessary that a son when filing a suit for pre- emption would be doing either to collusion with the father/vendor or for the benefit of a person other than the pre-emptor, and further that it depends upon the circumstances of each case. As a result we dismiss this appeal with no order as to costs.