DECISION ' This is an appeal against the order of learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No. IV, Karachi, dated 27-3-1990, whereby he dismissed the grievance applications filed by the five appellants. The appellants filed a 'joint appeal' bearing No. 110 of 1990 but subsequently as a matter of abundant precaution each of them filed separate appeal. All the six appeals are disposed of by this single decision.
2. The brief facts of the case appear to be that the appellants claim to be Weighing Labour/Helpers employed by the respondents since several years, but the respondents refused to treat them as 'permanent workmen' and to give them benefits as such. After serving grievance notice upon the respondent on 28-8-1989 all the appellants filed separate grievance petitions praying that they should be regularised as permanent workmen and be given all the benefits admissible to the permanent workmen. The respondents resisted the application on the grounds that no grieyance notice was served upon the respondents and that the appellants were not their employees.
3. I have heard Mr. Muhammad Mahmood Mubbassir, learned representative for the appellants and Mr. Muhammad Tasnim, learned Advocate for the respondents and have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
4. It is not disputed that the appellants had sent a notice by registered post to the respondent but the same was sent without any acknowledgement due receipt. The learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court held that the notices had not been served upon respondent on the ground that the respondent had denied receipt of the notices and also that no postman had been examined by the appellants to prove the service.
5. Under section 27 of the General Clauses Act if a document is sent on proper address by registered post pre-paying the postal charges, it would be deemed to be a proper service and it will deemed to have reached the addressee. In the instant case notice was sent by registered post on proper address. The !A postal receipt shows that the charges were pre-paid. There is no requirement of law, that it should be sent with acknowledgement due receipt. Presumption therefore would be in the favour of appellants that the notice had been received by the respondents. No doubt it is rebuttable presumption but even the General Manager of the respondent has not come in the witness-box to deny the receipt of the grievance notice. In the case of Bashir Ahmed v. Mumtaz Khan PLD 1965 Lah. 126, it was held that notice proved to be correctly addressed and posted is presumed to have been received by the addressee and examination of postal peon was not necessary. His Lordship while discussing section 27 of the General Clauses Act came to the conclusion that in the absence of evidence in rebuttal, the fact is proved and no other evidence is necessary to prove it. The addressee may, however, prove, with onus lying on him, that it never reached him. If he denies its receipt, or there is evidence in rebuttal, even then the Court may not accept it as being sufficient to rebut the strong presumption. In view of the above IA discussion I held that grievance notice had been properly served upon the respondent.
6. The next question that requires consideration is whether the appellants were employees of the respondents. Admittedly they do not hold any appointment letter. However appellants have produced Exhs. A/1 to A/6 which pertain to period of 1984 and 1985 and which show the appointment of appellant Mansoor Ahmed from time to time on temporary basis On daily wages for less than ninety days each time. Exh. A/7 is application of Mansoor Ahmed, which was forwarded under Exh. A/8, for appointment to the post of Weighing Labour. In this application he has shown that he had been working as Weighing Labour for the last four years. If Exhs. A/7 and A/8 are read together, it would be seen that they are dated 21-4-1987. Exh. A/7(a) is letter forwarding application of Muhammad Rizwan for appointment as Weighing Labour where he is shown to be working since 1985. This letter is also dated 17-5-1987. Exh. A/9 appears to be last page of application of appellant Ali Akbar which was forwarded for appointment and is dated 21/4 but no year is shown therein. The forwarding letter A/10 bears date 15-6-1987 under which applitation was forwarded for appointment as Weighing Labour wherein he is shown to be working since 1985, Exhs.
A/11, A/12, A/13, A/14, A/15, A/16, A/17, A/18 and A/19 are the `Attendance Sheets' for certain ninth in the years 1985 and 1986, in which names of the appellants also appear. Mr. Nisar Ahmad, witness for the respondents, has stated that sometime the Attendance Registers of the Contractors were also signed by them. However all this documentary evidence leaves no room for doubt, that the appellants were continuously in service of the respondents at least upto 1986 or beginning of 1987.
The fact that they moved applications for appointment as Weighing Labour in 1987 which fact is apparent from Exhs. A/7 to A/10 would clearly show, that at least in 1987 they were not in the employment of the respondents and, therefore, they applied for appointment. There is no evidence that any appointment letter was issued to them. Rather they admit that they don't possess any appointment order.
7. There is some ambiguity that requires consideration. In the grievance application the appellants claim that they were appointed as 'helpers' by the respondents but in the grievance notice they have clearly mentioned that they were working in the post which was designated as Weighing Labour/helper. Thus, it can safely be assumed that the posts of helper and Weighing Labour are the same. The applications of appellants in 1987 for appointment as Weighing I Labour would clearly show that prior to those applications, they had ceased to C hold any appointment with the respondents.
8. This conclusion is further strengthened by the admitted position that the appellants have no appointment order and that they were not members of the Union. There is no bar on temporary or daily wage workers to be members of the Union, because under section 3(a) of the I.R.O. Workers without distinction whatsoever had right to form Trade Union. The definition of worker as defined under the I.R.O. Also does not exclude the daily wage workers or temporary workers. In view of this documentary evidence and circumstantial evidence the oral evidence of the appellants that they continued to be in the employment of the respondents or the evidence of one witness Syed Muhammad Hussain Pasha does not have much force.
9. I may also refer to certain other documents produced by the appellants in support of their case.
A/20 is an application to the respondents signed by number of persons including the present appellants for being made permanent. This document is dated 21-9-1989 viz. One month after the grievance notice was served therefore this document does not prove that the appellants were in service of the respondents. Exh. A/21 is a letter authorising Mr. Rizwan to receive certain material from store. It does not bear any date or year. I have already held that in the years 1985 and 1986 the appellants were in service of the respondent therefore this letter could be of that period. Neither Rizwan has come in the witness-box to explain when this letter was issued to him nor any such question was put to Nisar Ahmed who issued the letter and who was examined by the respondents.
Exhs. A/22 and A/23 are Store Requisitions, dated 14-1-1989 and 13-1-1989 respectively but they do not show in whose favour they were issued nor any such evidence has come on record.
10. There is yet another aspect which also requires mention. It was alleged by the respondents that the appellants were in fact employees of M/s. Punjab Trading Agency. From the evidence of R.W.
Nisar Ahmed it appears, that M/s. Punjab Trading Agency were 'Handling Agents' of the respondents in the year 1988-89. The appellants denied to be the employees of the said Trading Agency. I have already held that the appellants were employees of the respondent at least upto 1986 or beignning of 1987. There is no evidence that they continued to be employees of the respondent thereafter. The rights that might have accrued to the appellants in 1986 or beginning of 1987 could not be enforced through grievance notice and grievance petition in the year 1989 as they would become time-barred. M/s. Punjab Trading Agency is not a party to these proceedings and therefore it cannot be held whether or not the appellants were employees of M/s. Punjab Trading Agency. Even otherwise the relevant question is whether the appellants were employees of the respondents within three months prior to the service of grievance notice which I have already found in negative.
11. In view of the above discussion I find no merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed.