1. ' The Appellant filed Rent Case No,485/83, renumbered as 1628/85 against the Respondent for eviction from Shop No,3, situated on Plot No,2/14-A, P.E.C.H.S., Karachi, on the grounds of non payment of rent with effect from November, 1978, and requirement of the shop for bona fide use of his son. The Respondent in his written statement controverted both the grounds. The Rent Controller by his judgment dated 26-3-1988, dismissed the application for ejectment and the said order has been assailed in this appeal.
2. ' It is contended by the learned Counsel of the Appellant that the Respondent had paid the rent for the month of October, 1978, on 17-10-1978, and thereafter, the rent was allegedly, sent by money orders which have been produced by him in Court. According to the learned Counsel, the said money order coupons are forged documents. The Respondent thereafter deposited rent in Court in Miscellaneous Rent Case No, 335/79, but no intimation of such deposit was ever received by the Appellant and as such the Respondent cannot be exonerated from the consequences of the default.
3. ' It is next urged that the rent having been deposited later than the 10th of the month, next following the month, for which it was due, as provided under Section 10 (1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, the Respondent is to be treated as defaulter. He lastly contended that the Appellant had never refused or avoided to accept rent from the Respondent and, therefore, the deposit of rent was not warranted under Section 10 (3) of the Ordinance.
4. ' On the ground of requirement of the shop for the son of the Appellant, the learned Advocate of the Appellant feebly contended that the Appellant has four sons and the shop is required for one of them, without pointing out the name of the son.
5. ' The default in payment of rent was alleged from the month of November 1978. The case of the Respondent is that he had paid the rent for the month of November 1978, by cheque, but however, the Appellant did not issue him Rent Receipt for the said payment. He therefore, sent rent for the month of December, 1978, by money order. In the money order, it has been mentioned by the Respondent that the receipt for rent paid by cheque has not been issued to him. The said money order was refused by the Appellant. The Respondent thereafter sent two months' rent by money order which was also refused. Under these circumstances, the Respondent filed the aforesaid Miscellaneous Rent Case and started depositing rent in Court. The Respondent deposited two months' rent on 22-1-1979.
6. ' It is contended that unless the Appellant is informed by way of notice about the deposit of rent under section 10 (3) of the Ordinance, it cannot be treated as valid tender of rent. The learned Advocate did not elaborate the proposition advanced by him. It is not necessary to deal with the said proposition in this case in view of the fact that in cross-examination the Appellant disclosed that he did not demand the rent from the Respondent after November, 1978, as he had come to know that the rent was being deposited in Court. In so far as the second contention is concerned, it overlooks the provisions of Section 15 (2) (ii) which provides that if there be no agreement of tenancy, the tenant will be liable to eviction in case the rent is not paid within 60 days after it has become due for payment. The rent for the month of November, 1978 became due on 1-12-1978 A and it was deposited on 22-1-1979 that is to say within 60 days from the date it became due for payment. It is also noted that the Appellant in his affidavit-in-evidence has not denied the receipt of rent for the month of November, 1978 by cheque, although the said plea was specifically raised by the Respondent in his written statement. I am, therefore, of the view that the rent for the month of November, 1978 stood duly paid to the Appellant and rent was due from the month of December, 1978.
7. The third submission of the learned Counsel is also of no substance in the facts and circumstances of the case. The very fact that the Appellant in spite of receipt of rent for the month of November, 1978 had refused to issue Receipt to the Respondent, was enough a cause for the Respondent to approach the Court for deposit of rent in Court under section 10 (3). Additionally, it may be mentioned that the Respondent had earlier sent two money orders which were refused by the Appellant. Though such Money Orders have been denied by the Appellant in his affidavit-in- evidence but in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am inclined to believe the version of the Respondent which has been accepted by the Rent Controller also.
8. The other ground urged with regard to requirement of the shop for the son of the Appellant, it is urged by the learned counsel of the Respondent that the Appellant has not mentioned the name of the son for whose need the shop is required, either in the application or in the affidavit-in- evidence. Similarly, the Appellant has not stated as to what business is proposed to be carried on in the C said shop. The Respondent in his written statement had specificaly pleaded that the Appellant owns six or seven shops which are in possession of different tenants and he has filed Rent cases against all the tenants on the ground that the shops are required for the use of his sons.
9. This fact has not been denied by the Appellant in his affidavit-in-evidence. The Appellant has admitted in his cross-examination that two or three rent cases have been decided in his favour.
10. The learned Counsel of the Appellant informed that the possession of one of the shops has been delivered to the Appellant in execution proceedings. The Appellant has made a bald statement, shorn of all the necessary ingredients which could establish bona fides of the requirement. The learned Rent Controller has, therefore, rightly refused to grant eviction on the mere is dixit of the Appellant.
11. ' The above are the reasons for short order dated 5-5-1991, whereby the appeal was dismissed.