' This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, calls in question an order dated 9th of January, 1987, whereby the Arbitration Council Ward No,37, Gulberg, Lahore held the Talaq pronounced by the petitioner to be ineffective and filed the proceedings.
2. Mst. Sumbleen Awan, respondent No,2 was married to Ahmed Nadeem petitioner on 24th July, 1982. Unfortunately the marriage could not prosper and the petitioner divorced respondent No,2 on 27th October, 1986. A copy of the divorce deed executed in this behalf was despatched by the petitioner both to respondent No,2 as also the Chairman Arbitration Council Ward No,37 which was received by respondent No,2 on 4th of November, 1986 and by the Chairman on 8th November, 1986. During the course of proceedings an objection was raised that the petitioner was not in Pakistan when the divorce deed was allegedly executed. However, on the production of the copy of passport this objection was found to be without any force. But the Chairman on 9th January, 1987 proceeded .To hold that as no notice, as required by section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1%1 had seen served upon him or the wife, the Talaq pronounced by the petitioner could not become effective. He, therefore, consigned the proceedings. .Hence this petition.
3. Mr. Tahir Ahmad Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that respondent No,1 has acted without lawful authority in holding that the proceedings before him were not competent in the absence of a specific notice under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The contention of the learned counsel is that the divorce deed could itself be regarded as sufficient notice in terms of section 7 of the Ordinance.
' Mr. Hidayat Ullah, Advocate representing respondent No,2, on the other hand, submitted that section 7 of the Ordinance requires in emphatic terms that a notice in writing must be sent by the husband to the Chairman and wife and it is only after 90 days of the receipt of such notice that the talaq could become effective. The other argument of the learned counsel is that as the Chairman did not hold any further proceedings after 9th January, 1987, by which time the period of 90 days had not expired, the divorce did not become effective. The learned counsel also emphasised that as impugned order had been passed unanimously by all the three members of Arbitration Council including the representative of the petitioner, he was estopped from agitating the matter any further. The learned counsel pointed out that the petitioner has remarried during the pendency of this petition and is not entitled to any relief.
4. Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 on which reliance has been placed reads as under:- "S.7---(1) Any man who wishes to divorce his wife shall, as soon as may be after the pronouncement of Talaq in any form whatsoever, give the Chairman a notice in writing of his having done so, and shall supply a copy thereof to the wife.
5.
(2) Whoever, contravenes the provisions of subsection (1) shall be punishable with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
(3) Save as provided in subsection (5) talaq unless revoked earlier, expressly or otherwise, shall not be effective until the expiration of ninety days from the day on which notice under subsection (1) is delivered to the Chairman.
(4) Within thirty days of the receipt of notice under subsection (1), the Chairman shall constitute an Arbitration Council for the purpose of bringing about a reconciliation between the parties, and the Arbitration Council shall take all steps necessary to bring about such reconciliation.
(5) If the wife be pregnant at the time talaq is pronounced, talaq shall not be effective until the period mentioned in subsection (3) or the pregnancy, whichever be later, ends.
(6) Nothing shall debar a wife whose marriage has been terminated by talaq effective under this section from re-marrying the same husband, without an intervening marriage with a third person, unless such termination is for the thire time so effective."
Although it is correct that section 7 requires that notices in writing be sent to the Chairman and the wife by the husband informing them that he has divorced his wife but not particular form of notice has been prescribed by either the Ordinace or in the rules framed thereunder. The object of notice contemplated by section 7 is to communicate to the wife and Chairman of the Local Council concerned the fact that the husband has dissolved the marriage so that proceedings for reconciliation can be undertaken. Consequently, even if a document may stricto senso not be in the form of a notice, but if it otherwise contains the requisite information, it would constitute sufficient compliance of section 7.
5. According to the Aiyar's Judicial Dictionary 9th Edition 'notice' means "the making something known to a person of which he was or might be ignorant. It is either statutory or actual or constructive." In Ballentine's Law Dictionary 3rd Edition the following definition of 'notice' appears at page 865:-- "Notice. In common parlance, information, intelligence or knowledge. In Law actual notice, constructive notice, express notice or implied notice. Whatever is sufficient to put a person upon enquiry of all the facts to which that enquiry will lead when prosecuted with reasonable diligence and in good faith.
It is also useful to make reference to Black's Law Dictionary 5th Edition at page 957 where the meaning of the word notice has been thus stated:-- "Notice. Information; the result of observation, whether by the senses or the mind; knowledge of the existence of a fact or state of affairs; the means of knowledge. Intelligence whatever means communicated."
In another sense "notice" means information, an advice or a written warning in more or less formal shape, intended to apprise a person of some proceedings in which his interests are involved or informing him of some fact which it is his right to know and duty of the notifying party to communicate."
' 5-A. Although, there appears to be no decided case on the interpretation of this aspect of section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 but reference may usefully be made to other laws which also require giving of notice in writing in order to convey certain information. One of such laws is section 43 of the Partnership Act which provides that a partnership at will may be dissolved by giving a notice in writing by one partner to otheRs, In Raja Muhammad Afzal Khan v. Ch. Manzoor Elahi and 6 others (PLD 1975 Lahore 1276) a Division Bench of this Court held that a receipt of a deed of dissolution by the partners constitutes sufficient notice within the meaning of law. The ratio of this precedent is fully applicable to the present case also. The same rule was laid down in Mr. BA.
Sheikh v. The Custodian, Evacuee Property, West Pakistan, and others (PLD 1960 Supreme Court 330) and by the Privy Council in Sathappa Chetty and others v. S.N. Subrahmanyan Chetty and others (AIR 1927 Privy Council 70).
6. Similarly section 13-A of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 provides that if the ownership of building in possession of the tenant has been transferred by way of sale, gift or inheritance or in any other manner from one person to another the new owner shall send an intimation of such transfer in writing by registered post to the tenant and the tenant shall not be deemed to have defaulted in the payment of rent if the rent is paid within 30 days from the date of receipt of such intimation. Although, this section requires that the intimation must be given by a registered notice sent through registered post acknowledgement due yet the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Syed Azhar Imam Rizvi v. Mst. Salam Yousaf v. Mehraj-ud-Din and others (1986 SCMR 751) held that the knowledge gained through receipt of a copy of the ejectment petition, was a sufficient notice and constituted substantial compliance of this provision.
7. In the present case there is no dispute that the deed of dissolution of marriage was received by the wife on 4th of November, 1986 and by the Chairman on 8th of November, 1986. This document clearly conveyed that the petitioner had divorced his wife and severed all his connections by pronouncing talaq on 27th October, 1986. There can be no reason as to why this deed could not itself be regarded as a notice under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The Arbitration Council was clearly in error in insisting upon the technical compliance with the provision when undoubtedly it stood substantially complied with.
8. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that divorce has not become effective as a period of 90 days had not expired when the proceedings were held to be incompetent and filed by the Chairman, suffice it to say that under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 the divorce ipso facto becomes effective on the expiry of 90 days on the date when the notice is received by the Chairman. As already observed, admittedly, the talaqnama was received by the Chairman on 8th November, 1986 and as such talaq became effective on 8th February, 1987 by efflux of time. Neither section 7 nor any other provision of the Ordinance requires any certificate by the Arbitration Council that the talaq has become effective. It was so held by this Court in Mst. Maqbool Jan v. Arshad Hassan and another (PLD 1975 Lahore 147). Consequently, even though the proceedings may have been filed by the Chairman prior to expiry of 90 days, it did not have effect of arresting the time which had started to run. The law took its own course and the talaq pronounced became effective on 8th February, 1987.
9. Reverting to the next argument, although the order holding the proceedings as incompetent was unanimous and even the arbitrator of the petitioner was party to it, but under no principle can the petitioner be prevented from challenging the order only because his own representative had consented to the order. No principle or authority has been cited in support of this proposition.
' As a result of the above this petition is accepted, the impugned order is declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
No order as to costs.