' The petitioner through this Constitutional petition has prayed for declaration that the order dated 23-7-1990 is without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
2. The relevant facts are that the petitioner started his career as Junior Engineer in WAPDA. He was working as Deputy Director (Transport) in the WAPDA in the year 1989 when the respondent invited applications for the post of Director (Procurement and Stores). The petitioner applied through proper channel and was ultimately selected. The decision was conveyed by the respondent to the General Manager (Administration) WAPDA vide letter dated 29-8-1989 with the request that services of the petitioner be placed at the disposal of the respondent on deputation for a period of 3 years. The WAPDA agreed and notified the terms and conditions of deputation. The same were accepted by the respondent. The petitioner ultimately joined the respondent on 1-10-1989. The grievance of the petitioner is that the respondent to his entire surprise vide impugned order directed repatriation of the petitioner to his parent department i,e, WAPDA, which resisted this move and notified its decision by the letter dated 28-7-1990. The respondent in spite of this strong protest by WAPDA, did not allow the petitioner to continue on duty, therefore, he was constrained to file this petition.
' The petition was admitted to hearing and notice was issued to the respondent, who has entered appearance through Advocate and contested the petition.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the petition, argued that the respondent had no right, authority or jurisdiction' to terminate the deputation and in no case, could do it unilaterally.
It is added that subsequently, the respondent levelled allegations of misconduct. There was all the more a reason to decide the merit of the allegations and then order repatriation. The WAPDA has rightly advised the respondent to proceed in accordance with law. It is added that the respondent was under legal obligation to take up the matter of repatriation with the lending organisation i,e, WAPDA. The result of illegal action of the respondent is that the petitioner has been thrown on the road.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that it is the discretion of the borrowing department (the respondent) to terminate the deputation any moment it likes. It is added that the respondent is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the petitioner in reply argued that the respondent is an autonomous body under the Transport Department, Government of Punjab, which according to the Articles of Association has complete control over its administrative and financial matters. It is added that according to the deputation policy of the Government of the Punjab dated 18-4-1978 the borrowing agency can repatriate a deputationist before the expiry of the deputation only with the consent of the parent Department.
This is binding on the respondent. The learned counsel in support of his arguments has referred to the cases of Muhammad Malik v. Secretary to Government of Punjab, Local Government and Rural Department (1984 PLC (C.S.) 764, K.H.Phadnis v. State of Maharashtra 1971 (2) SLR 345 (S.C. Of India), C. Thiraviam Pillai v. The State of Kerala and others 1976 (2) SLR 395 (Kerala), Shambu Nath Lal Srivastava v. State of U.P. And others 1984 (2) SLR 396 (Allahabad D.B.) and Debesh Chandra Das v. Union of India and others AIR 1970 SC 77.
5. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, gone through the record, precedents and relevant provisions of law. Before proceeding with the merits I would first take up the preliminary objection as to whether writ can be issued to the respondent under Article 199. It is made clear that the respondent has not filed the written statement and this objection was raised half-heartedly in one sentence. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the respondent is a 'person' within the meaning of Article 199 and therefore, amenable to writ jurisdiction. It is added that before 27-1-1977 PRTB was plying its vehicles on urban as well as inter city routes when on this date PUTC was incorporated for provision of transport within urban areas. The PRTB was ultimately dissolved on 9-5-1985 and its assets and liabilities were transferred to the respondent. Thereafter on 16-5-1985 PUTC was changed into the respondent. It is added that the respondent is a Government Department/Agency and in this behalf he has referred to following facts:--
(i) It is shown as an autonomous body under the Transport Department, Government of Punjab and in this behalf he has referred to Rules of Business and PLD 1974 Note 9 at page 39 where the PRTB was held a Government Department.
(ii) According to compendium of laws issued by the Transport Department, the respondent is owned as a Punjab Government Agency,
(iii) Its Chairman and Directors of the Board are appointed by the Government:
(iv) The Punjab Government has complete administrative and financial control over the affairs of PRTC and,
(v) It is clear from its working, its Memorandum and Articles of Association, service rules that it is a Government organisation.
' It is submitted that the respondent, for all practical purposes, is a Government Department in the guise of a Corporation, therefore, amenable to Constitutional jurisdiction. In this behalf learned counsel has referred to the case of Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib AIR 1981 SC 487. In this case Society was registered under Societies Registration Act but it was controlled and governed by the Government. It was held that it is an agency/instrumentality of State and liable to be proceeded against in Constitutional jurisdiction. While in the case of Salah-ud-Din v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd. PLD 1975 SC 244, offices of M.D. And Director of a Public Limited Company were held amenable to writ jurisdiction. In the case of Humayun Khan v. Ghee Corporation PLD 1984 Lah. 35, writ was issued to quash illegal order of Ghee Corporation, a similar autonomous body. The arguments of the learned counsel are sufficient to overrule the preliminary objection on behalf of the respondent. It may be added here that the respondent is clearly amenable to Constitutional jurisdiction in view of paragraph 5 of Article 199, which reads as under:- ' In this article, unless the context otherwise, requires: "Person" includes any body politic or corporate, any authority of or under the control of the Federal Government or of a Provincial Government, and any Court or Tribunal, other than the Supreme Court, a High Court or a Court or Tribunal established under a law relating to the Armed Forces of Pakistan; and "Prescribed law officer" means--
(a) in relation to an application affecting the Federal Government or an authority of or under the control of the Federal Government, the Attorney-General, and
(b) in any other case, the Advocate-General for the Province in which the application is made."
' I have looked for the interpretation of term "body politic or corporate" but could not lay my hands to any decided case except the case of Salah-ud-Din.
6. Now coming to the merits. The matter is all the more simple. The service of the petitioner was lent by WAPDA to the respondent for 3 years without any reservation for premature termination of the deputation period. The terms and conditions were settled between the borrowing and lending authorities. Therefore, the respondent is bound by the agreed arrangement. The learned counsel for the respondent has failed to refer to any law or rules, according to which, deputation period of the petitioner can unilaterally be curtailed. In the absence of any provision the question of repatriation can be decided only by mutual consent of the two authorities. There is no other way out because if the lending authority wants to recall and the borrowing authority is not willing the employee will be on tfie horns of a dilemma. Similarly, as in the present case, the lending authority is not prepared to receive the petitioner, he is being thrown on road. This is not the purpose of law.
The respondent has proceeded in a most irresponsible and illegal manner. The respondent, if wanted to repatriate the petitioner, should have taken up the matter with the WAPDA and mutually decided the issue. It seems that the respondent has made it a matter of prestige. The parties got more than one adjournment to amicably settle the matter. The respondent, through letter dated 5- 9-1990, showed its willingness to withdraw the impugned order dated 23-7-1990 subject to the condition that the petitioner should first withdraw this writ petition. This was in reply to the letter of the petitioner where he clarified that he is willing to withdraw the writ petition subject to the withdrawal of the impugned order as well as memo. Dated 13-8-1990 and settling his dues and matter of earned leave. It is clear from the letter of the respondent that it was not prepared to withdraw the letter dated 13-8-1990 and the move for settlement failed. The petitioner was rightly pressing for the withdrawal of the memo. Dated 13-8-1990 because it might have reflections on his future career. The same having been issued without complying with the legal formalities and in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice, therefore, his anxiety was fully justified.
7. The upshot of the above discussion is that this petition is allowed with costs. The writ is issued and the impugned order dated 23-7-1990 is declared illegal and without lawful authority.
' The result is that the petitioner will be deemed to be serving with the respondent and entitled to all privileges, benefits etc. In accordance with his terms f deputation. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.