1. ANWARUL HAQ, J.-This petition for special leave to appeal seeks to call in question an order made by a Division Bench of the Peshawar High Court on the 2nd of October 1973, whereby a constitution petition instituted by the petitioner Noor Muhammad in respect of the termination of his services as Mechanical Superintendent under the Municipal Committee, Peshawar, was dismissed.
2. The facts alleged in the writ petition were that the petitioner was appointed as Mechanical Superintendent by the Municipal Committee of Peshawar on the 14th of April 1961, that his services were terminated by the Chairman of the Municipal Committee, pursuant to the orders of the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, dated the 21st of September 1966 when the petitioner's appeal against the orders of the Chairman was rejected; and that his review petition was also dismissed by the Commissioner, by being treated as an appeal, by his order dated the 11th of December 19670 Thereafter, the petitioner moved the Provincial Government which set aside the orders of the Commissioner on the 7th of March 1970, observing that the petitioner continued to be a Municipal employee and should be allowed to rejoin duty.
3. However, in the meantime, the Municipal Committee, Peshawar, had recruited respondent No. 3, Amanullah, in the petitioner's vacancy with effect from 13-3-67. This official was suspended on 25- 9-1969 on account of certain allegations of corruption. His services were terminated by the Chairman of the Municipal Committee in the light of the order made by the Provincial Government on 7-3-1970 re-instating the petitioner. Aggrieved by this order of the Chairman of the Municipal Committee dated the 6th of May 1971, the respondent Amanullah preferred an appeal to the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, who accepted the same by his order dated the 29th of December 1971. The Commissioner observed that the order of the Provincial Government dated the 7th of March 1970, directing the re-instatement of the petitioner, was an order without jurisdiction, as the Provincial Government had no power to set aside an appellate order made by the Divisional Commissioner as the controlling authority of the Municipal Committee concerned. As a result, the learned Commissioner held that the vacancy against which respondent Amanullah had been employed by the Municipal Committee, continued to exist, and his services could not be terminated on that account, although he could be proceeded against on the allegations made against him.
4. It was contended before the High Court that the Provincial Government could set aside the appellate order of the Divisional Commissioner as it enjoyed the power of general supervision and control over the Municipal Committee in accordance with the provisions contained in section 110 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance 1960, read with section 73 of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959. This contention was, however, repelled by the learned Judges on the ground that this general power could not, be construed as including the special power of interfering with an appellate order made by the controlling authority in the exercise of specific statutory powers conferred on him by the Municipal Administration Ordinance and the rules framed thereunder m respect of the terms and conditions of service of Municipal servants.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated the same contention before us, and has placed reliance on the observations of this Court appearing in A.I Muhammad v. Muhammad Ramzan (1969 SCMR 46). This case was also cited before the learned Judges in the High Court, but was rightly distinguished for the reason that in that case the Provincial Government was the controlling authority for the Municipal Committee concerned, and exercised the relevant powers under Article 75 of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, as distinct from Article 73 which is invoked in the present A case. Whereas Article 73 of the Order, which has to be read with section 11(), of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, provides that the Government shall exercise general supervision and control over the Municipal Com--mittee, Article 75, read with section 111 of the Ordinance, contemplates that if in the opinion of the controlling authority any thing done or intended to be done is not in conformity with law, or is to any way against public interest, the controlling authority may, by order, quash the proceedings, suspend the execution of any order made by the Municipal Committee, or require the Municipal Committee, to take such action as may be specified. It will be seen, therefore, that the powers conferred on the controlling authority are more extensive and more specific than those enjoyed by the Provincial Government under Article 73 of the Basic Democracies Order, read with section 110 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance. Accordingly, we agree with the High Court that the general power of superintendence and control available to the Provincial Govern--ment in this case did not extend to the setting aside of the appellate order made by the Divisional Commissioner as the controlling authority of the Peshawar Municipal Committee. Such being the case, no fault could be found with the order made by the Divisional Commissioner on the 29th of December 1971.
6. Faced with this difficulty, the learned counsel for the petitioner en--deavoured to put before us certain facts which had not been urged in the writ petition presented in the High Court. He submitted that, in the first instance, the order of termination of the petitioner's services, as passed by the Chairman of the Municipal Committee, had been set aside in appeal by the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar district, by his order dated the 31st of May 1963, and the Divisional Commissioner had no jurisdiction to set aside this appellate order of the Deputy Commissioner.
7. The learned counsel referred to another order made by the Deputy Commissioner on the 7th of October 1964 which was also set aside by the Divisional Commissioner on 21-9-1966. Sh.
8. Muhammad Shafi contended that this order of the Com--missioner was without jurisdiction, with the result that all subsequent proceedings taken against the petitioner stood vitiated on that ground.
9. We have already stated that these facts were not urged in the writ petition, nor was the order dated the 21st of September 1966 brought under challenge before the High Court. The only order challenged in the writ petition was the one pas ,ed by the Divisional Commissioner on 29-12-1971. In these circumstances, it is not possible for us to permit these new points to be raised in this petition.
10. The learned counsel lastly sought to raise still another new point, namely, that thepetitioner had acquired a vested right of presenting a revision petition before the Provincial Government under rule 16 of the 1939 Rules governing the terms and conditions of his service, for the reason that these rules were applicable at the time disciplinary action was initiated against the petitioner. This point was not urged at any stage before the departmental authorities dealing with the petitioner's case nor was it raised in the writ petition. It is not even mentioned in the petition for leave to appeal. In these circumstances, it is not possible for us to allow this new ground to be urged before us for the first time. Even otherwise, it is difficult to accept the contention that any vested right to present a revision could have accrued to the petitioner, as revision has always been regarded as a discretionary remedy, as distinguished from the right of appeal, It seems to us, therefore, that the petitioner's case was rightly decided in accordance with the provisions of the Municipal Servants Rules, 1963.
11. For the foregoing reasons, we see no merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed.