' RAZA AHMAD KHAN, J-- These four appeals are directed against the orders, whereby the learned Senior Civil Judge, Dir at Tirnargara, returned the plaints under Order 7 Rule 10 C.P.C. To the plaintiffs, the respective appellants herein, for want of jurisdiction with reference to paragraph 3(1) of the Martial Law Regulation No,123 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulation). Since a common question of law relating to the interpretation of certain provisions of the Regulation is involved in all these appeals, we propose to dispose them of by this single judgment.
2. In order to resolve the controversy regarding ownership of land in the two States of Dir and Swat, in so far as;personal property of the Rulers and that of respective States was concerned, the Dir and Swat Land Disputes Inquiry Commission was set up by the Provincial Government vide its Notification No,66 SO(SPL)/HD/70 dated 8th October, 1970. Report of the Commission was published as per Notification No,10/16-SOTA-II/72 dated 15th September, 1972; whereby certain Forests including Forest of Gurrai and Narkun were declared as personal property of Nawab Sir Shah Jehan Khan, Ex-Ruler of the former State. Of Dir, predecessor-in-interest of Mohammad Shah Khan Khisro defendant-respondent herein. Later, as a matter of policy all the Forests situated in the State of Dir and Swat were declared by the Government as State property and were notified as such as per Notification No,10/16-SOTA-II/62-1520 dated 15th October, 1972 subject, however, to the payment of 15% as royalty to the local right holders. This share in the royalty was later enhanced to 60% vide a subsequent Notification No,SOFT (FAD) V405/77 dated 14th March, 1977,
3. It was on the basis of this declared royalty that the plaintiff-appellants, claiming as local right- holders, filed suits against their respective defendants, the respondents herein on the point of their shares.
4. It appears that the rights and interest of respondent Nawab Mohammad Shah Khan Khisro in the Forest of Dir, as found by the Commission, were questioned earlier too vide a writ petition. No,806 of 1979 whereby the following two reliefs were sought:--
(i) That the finding of the Dir-Swat Land Disputes Enquiry Commission incorporated in Notification No,10/16-SOTA-II/72-1522, dated 15th September, 1972 at serial No,156 declaring the land situated in Narkun District Dir to be the private property of the Ex-Nawab of Dir is without lawful authority and of no legal effect and that the same be declared the property of the petitioners; and
(ii) Respondent No,1 (Government of NWFP) and respondent No,2
7. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently (Assistant Commissioner, Dir be directed to make payment of the entire amount of royalty to the petitioners.A perusal of the judgment given by a learned Division Bench of this Court on 2nd March, 1980 reveals that while in the course of arguments the learned counsel, appearing for the petitioners therein, abandoned seeking his first relief, regarding the second it was observed by the Court as follows:-- "The petitioners should better go before the officers mentioned in the order of the Federal Land Commission dated 29th September, 1975 and if that Officer/authority has not been constituted then the doors of Civil Court will not be closed to them and they can establish their title through that forum where they may produce evidence and ,prove their Case. In the exercise of the extra- ordinary Constitutional jurisdiction, it will be too much to expect this Court to record evidence or get the case proved for the petitioners. It has only to see on satisfaction that no other adequate remedy is provided by law and that any act done or proceedings taken by a person performing functions has been done or taken without lawful authority and hence of no legal effect or that such authority is by law bound to take some action but it has not done so. In the instant case adequate remedy was available to the petitioners as provided by law.
' Taking it, as a direction of the Court, the appellants as is evident from memorandums of appeals (F.A.0s. Nos. 8 and 9 of 1983), instituted the present suits for the recovery of outstanding dues of royalty and issuance of a permanent injunction in that the defendant-respondents should not deny the rights of the plaintiff-appellants to receive the royalty. The suit was contested, particularly by the Ex-Nawab of Dir Muhammad Shah Khisro Khan and, as stated earlier, was dismissed by the learned trial Court on the point of jurisdiction. Hence the instant appeals.
5. We have heard.The learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record of the case with considerable degree of care.
6. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that the entire base of the appellants was misconceived by the learned trial Court in that their dispute was not of title between them and the former Ruler of Dir but it was a suit for the recovery of royalty due to the appellants as local right- holders in the area concerned. It was further contended that the learned trial Court had erred in law by holding that the dispute fell within the mischief of section 3(1) of the Regulation inasmuch as there was no such dispute as to have attracted the provisions thereof. It was, therefore, urged that the learned trial Court, having refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law to adjudicate upon their suits on merits, the impugned orders cannot be sustained and, as such, are liable to be set aside. Argued that resorting to file the civil suits, the appellants have misconceived the so-called direction of this Court, as contained in the judgment given in the earlier round of litigation, namely, Writ Petition No,579 of 1979 and more particularly Writ Petition No,806 of 1979. Elaborating the arguments, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that undisputedly the Forests of Dir, after due inquiry were found by the Dir and Swat Land Disputes Inquiry Commission as the private property of the Nawab, which, though, later on as a matter of policy were declared by the Government to be the State property subject, of course, on payment of the proportionate royalty to the local right-holders. In this context it is urged by the learned counsel that firstly the subject matter of the suits is a dispute which has not earlier enquired into by the Land Dispute Enquiry Commission and secondly that the appellants cannot claim, nor can be held as, the local right- holders in so far as the interest of the Nawab in the Forests in dispute is concerned inasmuch as by declaring the Forests as State property, Nawab's right to receive the royalty, on the basis of his earlier ownership, does not stand extinguished and, as such, he has still interest in, and is entitled to receive the royalty derived from the forests in question. According to the learned counsel, such being the situation the appellants have no locus standi to claim the share in, much less the whole of, the royalty, on the basis of their being so-called local right-holders. It is thus submitted that the learned trial Court was right in holding that the dispute, arising out of the plaint, since related to a right or interest in the immovable property (Forests) and has been between the claimants landlords and the Rulers of the former State; it falls within the purview of section 3(1) of the Regulation and the impugned orders, having rightly been passed, do not merit any interference.
8. We have given our serious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective pleas.
9. In the context of the submissions thus made the point that falls for determination, in all these appeals, is as to whether the dispute emanating from the plaints is, or is not, of such a nature as to attract the provisions of section 3(1) of the Regulation.
10. A reference to the relevant provisions of law as contained in the Regulation may be usefully made which runs as under: "3(1) All disputes relating to the ownership of or any right or interest in any, immovable property in the former States of Dir and Swat to which any of the following persons are parties; shall be decided by the Provincial Government or any Officer authorised by it in this behalf, namely;
(a) the Tenants and Ex-Ruler of the said former States or their respective heirs; or
(b) Claimant landlords and the Ex-Rulers the said former States or their respective heirs; or
(c) the landlords and tenants.
(2).............
(3) No Court or other authority shall entertain any proceedings in relation to any dispute referred to in sub-paragraph (1) nor shall any Court or other authority grant an injunction or make an interim order in relation to any such dispute.
(4) Provided "5-A--
(1) For determination of disputes of the nature mentioned in sub- paragraph (1) of paragraph 3 which have not been inquired into by the Commission for any reason whatsoever, the Provincial Government may appoint as many officers as it deems fit.
(2) An officer appointed under sub-paragraph (1) shall decide disputes after hearing the parties and taking such evidence as the parties may like to produce.
(3) Any person aggrieved by a decision under sub-paragraph(2) may, within sixty days of the decision excluding the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order, submit an appeal to the Provincial Government.
(4) The order of the Provincial Government, and subject to the order of the Provincial Government in appeal, the order of the officer appointed under sub-paragraph(1) shall be final.
6. (1) Save as provided in paragraphs 4 and 5, no Court or other authority shall call in question, or permit to be called in question, any action or decision taken or order passed under this Regulation.
(2) All suits, appeals and applications pending in any Court or before other authority immediately before the commencement of this Regulation in respect of any dispute of the nature referred to in sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 3 shall, in so far as they relate to such dispute, abate forthwith."
11. A bare reading of the aforequoted provisions of the Regulation indicates that firstly the dispute must relate to the ownership of or right or interest in an immovable property in Dir State and for any reason the same has not been enquired into by the Enquiry Commission; secondly the parties thereto should be from amongst the categories as mentioned in (a), (b) or (c) of section 3(1) (ibid) and thirdly the deciding agency of the dispute shall be the Provincial Government or its authorised officer in this behalf and the jurisdiction of any Court or other authority, to hear such disputes, is barred inasmuch as the Regulation contemplates its own mechanism of deciding such disputes.
12. This being so, we have no hesitation in holding that in point of jurisdiction, once a dispute is found to be falling within the purview of section 3(1) read with section 5-A(1) of the Regulation, there is complete ouster of jurisdiction of a Civil Court or, for that matter, any other authority to adjudicate upon such a dispute.
13. The expression 'local right-holders' has not been defined either in the Regulation or in the Notifications issued in pursuance thereof, or in connection therewith from time to time. From the pleadings of the parties, however, it transpires that the plaintiff-appellants have claimed the royalty on the assumption of their being local right-holders. Without entering into the controversy as to whether, for the purpose of claiming royalty, the appellants are the local right-holders, or not; it cannot be denied that their claim as such for receiving the royalty is based on their being land owners/landlords in the former State of Dir.
14. On the other hand, it needs to be examined as to whether the respondent Ex-Nawab of Dir, though divested of ownership of the Forests in question is still clothed with an interest therein, within the meanings of section 3(1) of the Regulation.
15. The term 'interest' is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (Fifth Edition 1979) as the most general terms that can be employed to denote a right, claim, title or legal share in something in its application to lands or things real. It is frequently used in connection with the terms "estate". "right" and "title". More particularly it means a right to have the advantage accruing from anything; any right in the nature of, property, but less than title". Again the word "interest" is used in the Re- statement of Property both generically to include varying aggregates of rights, privileges, powers and immunities and distributively to mean any one of them".
16. Such being the case, it can be said with certain amount of certainty that the respondent Ex- Nawab of Dir, having been initially held by the Commission as the owner of the Forests, can legitimately be presumed to have an interest in the Forests for the purpose of receiving the royalty from the income therefrom: having been divested of its ownership and declared as State property, notwithstanding. And it is also an admitted fact that the dispute was not enquired into by the Dir and Swat Land Disputes Enquiry Commission.
17. Viewed the matter in the perspective of foregoing factual and legal aspect of the case, we have arrived at an inescapable conclusion that the instant dispute between the appellants and the respondent Ex-Nawab of Dir falls within the mischief of section 3(1) read with section 3(1) (c) of the Regulation.
18. In this context of the matter the question as regards the forum for resolving the dispute will not detain us any more inasmuch as under section 5-A of the Regulation such disputes are required to be decided by the Officer appointed by the Provincial Government. We are informed that the Provincial Government of North-West Frontier has already appointed Deputy Commissioner Dir as per Notification No, RHS/Misc:/2/82 dated 11th October, 1982 for determination of all disputes falling within the purview of section 3(1) of the Regulation and is still in force. This being so, we are of the considered opinion that the appellants should have availed the forums available to them under the Regulation and should have gone before the Deputy Commissioner Dir initially for the settlement of their dispute and in such a situation the impugned orders of the learned lower Court can hardly be taken an exception to.
19. This finding of ours is also based upon, and supported from, the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No,806 of 1979, the relevant part whereof has been reproduced in earlier part of this judgment which clearly indicates that the "doors of the Civil Court will not be closed to them" was subject to the condition that the 'officer/authority' presumably under section 5-A of the Regulation "has not been constituted". We, therefore, feel that without availing the adequate remedy available under the law, the appellants have been ill-advised to have invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil Court notwithstanding the fact that under section 3(3) of the Regulation, no Court or other authority can entertain any proceedings in relation to any dispute referred to in sub-section (1) of section 3.
20. Resultantly we find all the four appeals without any merit and we hereby dismiss the same with no order as to costs.