' This petition under Article 98 of the late Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1962 calls in question order dated 25-4-1967 passed by respondent No, 1 in a revision before him under section 277 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") filed by respondent No, 2 herein against the present petitioner.
2. The summarised facts of the case are that the petitioner, State Bank of Pakistan owns a building in the Cantonment Area of Rawalpindi. The annual rental value of the said building before the assessm ent in dispute was made was Rs,24,000. The petitioner constructed/renovated the building in 1965 at a cost of about Rs,17 lacs. In view of the above position, the annual rental value of the building was raised by respondent No, 2 to Rs,5,04,000 by order dated 10-2-1966.
3. The petitioner filed an appeal under section 84 of the Act against the aforementioned assessm ent of the annual rental value before the learned District Magistrate.
4. The learned District Magistrate by his order dated 18-1-1967 accepted the appeal and reduced the assessm ent of the annual rental value from Rs,5,04,000 to Rs,1,70,000. Respondent No, 2 feeling aggrieved of the aforementioned order of the learned District Magistrate, Rawalpindi filed a revision before respondent No, 1 under section 277 of the Act. Learned respondent No, 1 by his order dated 25-4-1967 modified the order of the District Magistrate as also of the Cantonment Board and fixed the annual rental value of the building in question at Rs,2,20,000. The petitioner being dissatisfied with the aforementioned order of respondent No, 1 has come up to this Court in the present Constitutional petition.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following two contentions only:--
(1) That the order of the learned District Magistrate was final as provided for by section 88 of the Act and was not revisable by respondent No,1. Elaborating his contention, the learned counsel submitted that the revisional power vested in respondent No, 1 under section 277 of the Act having been placed in Chapter XV of the Act was exercisable in relation to orders passed in appeals provided for in the said Chapter and not to orders passed in appeals available under other provisions of the Act; and
(2) That by virtue of the proviso to section 88 ibid only a review was available within three months from the date of the original order and therefore no revision was competent.
6. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondents contended:-- ' First:--that under the whole of the Cantonments Act, 1924 only one order i.e, the order of assessm ent of annual rental value passed by the Cantonment Board is appealable before the District Magistrate and according to the very language used in section 277 of the Act such an order of the District Magistrate is clearly revisable under section 277 ibid. In the above context of the matter, the learned counsel submitted that the revision was competent before respondent No, 1 and that his order is not liable to be set aside on the ground taken by the petitioner; and ' Secondly:--that the general provisions of appeal and revision in the Cantonments Act as contained in sections 274 to 279 are not relatable to Chapter XV only but cover all appealable/revisable orders that may be passed under any provision of the enactment.
7. In reply the learned counsel for the petitioner only submitted that since no revision is available under Chapter V of the Act, the order of the learned District Magistrate passed in appeal becomes final by virtue of section 88 of the Act.
8. Having given consideration to the controversy involved, I am of the view that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner have no force. On a plain reading of section 277 of the Act it clearly emerges that an order passed by the District Magistrate whereby he disposes of an appeal against an order made by the Cantonment Board is subject to revision by the authority as the Central Government may appoint in this behalf. The maintainability of revision against such an order of the District Magistrate before respondent No, 1 whose competence to hear a revision under section 277 of the Act has not been disputed before me also stands established by the uncontroverted fact that there is no other order of the Cantonment Board which is appealable before the District Magistrate.
9. In order to deal with the argument of the learned counsel for petitioner that since finality is attached to the appellate order of the District Magistrate by virtue of section 88 of the Act, no revision under section 277 of the Act will be competent, reference may also have to be made to section 278 of the Act. For facility of reference, the said section of the Cantonments Act, is reproduced hereunder:-- "S. 278.--Save as otherwise provided in section 277, every order of an appellate authority shall be final."
' From a bare perusal of the aforementioned provision contained in section 278 of the Act, it manifestly appears that the finality attached to the order of the District Magistrate passed by him under section 84 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 by virtue of section 88 of the said Act would also not detract from the availability of the remedy of revision or maintainability thereof under section 277 of the Act inasmuch as every order of appellate authority attains finality with the qualification provided for by section 278 of the Act which in categorical terms lays down that the finality only attaches "save as otherwise provided in section 277".
' The above discussion and conjunctive perusal of the relevant provisions governing the subject viz. Sections 84, 88, 277 and 278 thus lead to the irresistible conclusion that an appellate order of the learned District Magistrate passed under section 84 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 is subject to revision provided for by section 277 of the said Act.
10. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that since a review is provided for by the proviso to section 88 of the Act in respect of the appellate order passed under section 84 thereof no revision would be available under section 277 of the Act, I suffice by observing that this is too wild and bald a proposition to be seriously considered inasmuch as the power of review by the same Authority which has passed the original order is quite distinct from the power of revision conferred upon a revising Authority and the two remedies are not mutually exclusive. If this proposition is accepted, this will negate the conferment of a specific remedy under a distinct provision without any justification whatsoever.
11. In the above context it may further be observed that if the submission made on behalf of the petitioner is given effect, it will render the provisions of section 277 of the Act redundant. There ought not be any cavil with the well-settled principle of interpratation that redundancy is not to be attributed to the Legislature unless there be compelling circumstances therefor. In the case in hand, there is no ground available whatsoever to pronounce the provisions of section 277 of the Act as redundant.
12. Needless to mention here that the contention under discussion raised on behalf of the petitioner would also stand repelled by yet another well-settle principle that the provisions of an enactment have to be read conjunctively an interpreted in a harmonious manner so as to give effect to each other and not to render one nugatory of the other especially when there is no conflict between the two provisions.
13. The only other proposition put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the revisional power of respondent No, 1 falls in a different chapter than the chapter under which the initial proceedings were commenced and as such the power conferred by a provision contained in the former chapter is not exercisable in relation to matters falling under the other chapter also appears to be devoid of any substance. This proposition had been canvassed before the learned respondent No, 1 also at the time of hearing of the revision but was repelled on a well based reason given in para. (9) of his order. It may be worth notice here that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is also against another firmly settled rule of construction of Statutes that the division of a Statute into parts or chapters is a mere matter of convenience. The object of such division is not that each part or chapter should be read independently of each other or as a complete Code by itself. The fundamental principle in this regard is that a Statute must be read and construed as a whole notwithstanding that every section in a Statute is a substantive enactment in itself.
14. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find no merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed.
However, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.