' The dispute between the parties pertains to a piece of land situate in village Rasulpur, Tashil Chunian District Kasur. It appears that an area of 109 kanals 10 marlas was originally owned by three brothers Chiragh Din, Roshan Din and Umar Din. On 2-2-19.62, Chiragh Din and Roshan Din mortgaged their 2/3 share in the land in favour of Hayat Muhammad, respondent No,3 herein for a sum of Rs, 20,000. After about 5 years, Chiragh Din one of the owners sold his 1/3 share in the land to Muhammad Ali and Bashir Ahmad, respondents No,1 and 2. On 8th of April, 1968 respondents No,1 and 2 filed an application under the West Pakistan Redemption and Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1964 for the redemption of the mortgage. This petition was being contested by Hayat Muhammad mortgagee but during its pendency on 31st December, 1970 he sold his mortgagee rights in favour of Sher Muhammad and others, the present appellants.
' It is stated by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Assistant Collector who was seized of the matter was informed of the sale of mortgagee rights by Hayat Muhammad but the appellants were neither impleaded as party nor allowed to defend the proceedings which continued against Hayat Muhammad. The application for redemption was allowed by the Assistant Collector on 2-2- 1971. The appeal filed by the appellants against the said order of the Assistant Commissioner was dismissed by the Addl. Commissioner on 4-6-1971.
' The appellants challenged the validity of these decisions of the Revenue Authorities by filing a suit for declaration in the civil Court on 10th of May, 1971. This suit was contested by the respondents and was dismissed by the trial Court on 10-12-1975. The appellants went in appeal but remained unsuccessful and their appeal was dismissed by the District Judge, Kasur on 10-4-1978. The appellants have now come in second appeal under section 100 C.P.C. Before this Court.
3. The contention raised on behalf of the appellants by their learned counsel Mr. Muhammad Hanif Khatana, is that since Hayat Muhammad had sold his mortgagee rights to the present appellants on 31st of December, 1970 they should have been impleaded as parties and allowed an opportunity to defend the proceedings and any order passed therein in the absence of the appellants was not binding on them and was of no legal effect. It was further submitted by the learned counsel that though Hayat Muhammad has already sold his mortgagee rights and has no interest left in the land but according to the order of the Revenue Authorities mortgage amount deposited by the mortgagors/respondent has been allowed to be deposited in the name and the appellants would be deprived of this amount also. This anomalous position, according to the learned counsel renders the orders of the Authorities to be illegal. Sardar Roshan Ali Sindhu, learned counsel for the respondents has defended the judgments of the two Courts below.
4. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that since Hayat Muhammad had sold the mortgagee rights the appellants should have been impleaded as parties and any order passed in their absence is not binding on them, it is to be noticed that the sale of mortgagee rights took place at the time when the petition for redemption was pending before the Authorities.
The sale being pendent lite, any decision taken therein was equally binding on the appellants. In this connection the law is well settled that the sale or transfer of the property during the pendency of the proceedings cannot affect the decree subsequently passed against the original parties.
Even otherwise it is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that no formal application was filed by them for being impleaded as parties. This being the position no valid exception can be taken by the appellants to the course adopted by the authorities concerned. It was observed by this Court in Nawabzada Shamsher Ali Khan v. Nawabzada Major-General Sher Ali Khan and 8 others PLD 1976 Lah. 650 that rule 10 of Order 22 CPC is permissive and enables the assignee to continue the suit but where the assignee does not or fails to bring himself on record tht decision against his assignor is binding on him. In Haider Ali and another v. Akbar Ali and another PLD 1973 Lah. 446 it was observed that:- "The Transfer of Property Act does not apply to the Province of Punjab. Since the section is only enactment of general principle of law, therefore, the general principles underlying the section have been made applicable to the province of Punjab. Reliance in this respect can be placed upon Moolchand and others v. Gangajal and other AIR 1930 Lah.
356. Since the alienation of land in question was made in favour of petitioner No, 2 by petitioner No,1 during the pendency of the proceedings of appeal before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Multan therefore, the said alienation cannot affect the order in appeal or revision. Petitioner No,2 steps into the shoes of petitioner No, 1 by purchasing the land in question during the pendency of the proceedings, therefore, he would be bound by the order made by the Settlement Authorities against petitioner No,1. He derives his title from the vendor, petitioner No,1 and whatever the order has been made in the appeal or revision in which the petitioner No,1 was a party would be applicable to him also. Since the right in respect of the property in dispute was created in favour of respondent No,2 during the pendency of the proceedings, therefore, the position of petitioner No, 2 would be that of pc' it ironer No,1 who was contesting the appeal and revision tiled by respondent No,1 before the Settlement Authorities as respondent. His position would be that of a party to the appeal and revision and according to law, he would be bound by the orders made therein."
Similar view was taken by this Court in Pir Abdullah Shah and 8 others v. Humayun and 5 others PLD 1957 Lah.
1054. I do not, therefore, find any force in the contention of the learned counsel that on account of failure to implead the appellants as party to the proceedings, the order of Assistant Commissioner was vitiated. In any case, as the appellants themselves did not file any application, they have themselves to blame.
5. As regards the contention of the learned counsel that the deposit should have been made in the name of the appellants and not Hayat Muhammad, it is to be noticed that the appellants were not party to the proceedings and, therefore, no order could be passed in their favour. If the amount in question has been deposited and the appellants are successors-in-interest of Hayat Muhammad, they can apply to the Revenue Authorities for permission to withdraw this amount. The validity of the redemption order, however, cannot be challenged on this ground.
' In view of what has been stated above, this appeal is without any force. It is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.