1. This judgment will dispose of two Execution First Appeals (being E. F. A. Nos. 48 and 49 of 1964), directed against the orders of the executing Court refusing to permit' rateable distribution of the decretal amount deposited by the Federation of Pakistan in satisfaction of the decree obtained against it by The Multan District Multi-Purpose Society Ltd., the judgment-debtor of the two rival decree-holders, namely, Multan Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., the appellant, and Nawab Mushtaq Muhammad Khan, the respondent. The relevant dates stand as: The appellant obtained a decree for Rs. 2,33,872-7-6 on the 5th of April 1956. It filed an execution application on the 16th of April 1960 (the first having been filed as unsatisfied) and moved an application under section 72 of the Code of Civil Procedure for rateable distribution on the 14th of April 1961. The respondent obtained a decree against the same judgment-debtor for Rs. 25,572-8 on the 21st of December 1959. He filed an application on the 20th of July 1960, praying specifically for attachment of the decree in question in favour of the judgment-debtor and against the Federation of Pakistan for Rs.
2. 23,000.00. An order of attachment was passed by the executing Court under rule 53 of Order XXI, Code of Civil Procedure, because incidentally all the three decrees had been passed by the same Court. The judgment-debtor, namely, the Federation of Pakistan, is stated to have deposited the amount due from it to the credit of the common judgment-debtor on the 9th of September 1963.
3. The contention raised in these appeals is that all the essentials of section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure being present, the executing Court should have allowed rateable distribution as the provisions of rule 53 of Order XXI, C. P. C. Merely provide the mode of attachment of a decree and do not override section 73 of the Code.
2. Learned counsel for the respondent, the attaching creditor, has raised a preliminary objection as to the competence of the appeals. He argues that an order under section 73, C. P. C. Is not appealable as an order under the provisions of Order XLIII, rule 1, C. P. C. It will be appealable only as a decree if the conditions of section 47, C. P. C. Are satisfied and because the impugned order determines the question between rival decree-holders not affecting the common judgment- debtor, who is not at all interested in the disbursement of the amount deposited to its credit by the Federation of Pakistan, the ingredients of section 47, C. P. C. Are not available and the appeals are incompetent. In support of this conten--petition, he has referred to Aga M. Sherazee v. R. M. P. M.
4. Chettiar Firm and others (AIR 1937 Rang. 134) and Daulat Singh v. Rup Narain and others (AIR 1932 Lab. 96). Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to meet this objection. Faced with this situation, he, however, prays that the two appeals may be treated as revision petitions and relief given to the appellant. This prayer is also opposed by Malik Muhammad Sharif, Advocate, appearing for the contesting respondent. He contends that because the appellant has an alternate remedy by way of a separate suit as provided by subsection (2) of section 73, C. P. C., the prayer for the appeals being altered into revision petitions be not allowed. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, strongly relies on Hafiz Ziauddin v. Muhammad Ismail and another (PLD 1959 Kar. 52) and argues that the revision petition before the Karachi Bench of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan is an authority for the view that revisional jurisdiction maybe invoked in such circumstances. I have been taken through the judgment and I find that the question of competence of the revision petition before the learned Judge does not appear to have been raised or canvassed and is, therefore, of no help to the appellant. The only point for consideration is whether the order passed suffers from an error of jurisdiction, because `section 115, C. P. C. Is not directed against conclusions of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved' (T. A.
5. Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar (AIR 1917 P C 71). A Court has jurisdiction to decide a case wrongly as well as rightly and even if the executing Court in the instant case has decided wrongly, as argued, it has not exercised jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. (See Amir Hassan Shah v. Sheo Bakhsh Singh (11 I A 237). It is a well established rule that a High Court does not interfere under section 115, C. P. C. When the other remedy is open to the applicant. The appellant could have brought a separate suit to challenge the order sought to be revised, as provided by subsection (2) of section 73, C. P. C., which remedy it has not pressed. Ram Saran Das v. Amar .Math and others (AIR 1935 Lab. 791) is in point. On this view of the matter, I do not feel persuaded to allow prayer to treat the incompetent appeals as revision petitions. The appeals are dismissed with the observations above. However, there will be no order as to costs.