1. ' By this common order I intend to dispose of the above two abashment proceedings as they are directed against identical orders passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Karachi (South) in private complaints Nos.589/88 and 590/88, declining the petitioner's application under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C. The brief facts leading to the filing of the above complaints are that the respondent which is a corporate authority filed a complaint under Section 245 read with section 476(4) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 for the default in filing of half yearly accounts for the year expiring March, 1984, the petitioner was charged to which he pleaded guilty and therefore he was convicted and sentenced till rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs,10,000 by an order dated 1-8-1988 or in default of payment of fine to further suffer S.I. For seven days. After the above order of conviction, the respondent filed similar two complaints in the year ending 31st March, 1985 and 31st March, 1986. In both the above complaints. The charges have been framed against the petitioner. The petitioner filed aforesaid application under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. In both the complaints. One of the grounds urged was that since the first complaint was disposed of on 1-8-1988 and since alleged two defaults which are the subject-matter of the two fresh complaints had occurred during the period when the above first complaint was pending, the above two fresh complaints were not competent particularly in view of the fact that under Section 245 they could have been fined per day during the pendency of complaint of the above default. However, the learned Sessions Judge declined the above applications in both the above complaints. The petitioner has, therefore, filed the above two abashment proceedings.
2. I have heard Mr.Hashmat Habib, learned counsel for the petitioner. He has vehemently contended that since the alleged two defaults have taken place when the first complaint was pending the fresh two complaints could not have been filed. I am unable to accept this contention as the default of' not filing statement of account for the period expiring on 31st March, 1984 is different from default for the financial years expiring on 31st March, 1985 and 31st March, 1986. Mere fact that under the relevant provisions of the Companies Act fine could have been imposed on the basis of per day till the rectification of default in my view does not make any difference as such fine would have been related to the default for the financial year expiring on 31st March, 1984.
3. Then it was contended that the mandatory requirement of serving show-cause notice was not complied with before initiating the above proceedings. In my view this requires recording of evidence and it will be open to the petitioner to urge above point before the learned trial Court.
4. With the above observations, the above two petitions are dismissed in limine. in limine.