' WAJIHUDDIN AHMED, J.--Through this Constitutional petition, petitioner Mills calls into question the imposition and levy of Octroi and other taxes by the Union Council Jhoke Sharif, District Thatta.
2. On facts, it is urged that per notification dated 22-7-1980, issued by above-said Union Council, Octroi and other taxes were levied as from 1-7-1980. The description of articles charged appears in the Octroi Schedule appended-to such notification, which was gazetted on 31-7-1980. Such schedule included, inter alia, sugar-cane, industrial machinery and all tools, appliances and apparatus to be used for mechanical purposes not specified elsewhere. It is pointed out that a public notice was issued, apparently, on 8-5-1980 whereunder the area for imposing Octroi and Market tax was sought to be extended from village Jhoke Sharif to Dch Jhoke Sharif and it was proposed to recover the said levy from the entire Deh Jhoke Sharif (Dch comprising of more than one Tappa and Tappa including more than one village). Objections were invited by 20-5-1980, report of the sub-committee was to be made on 27-5-1980 and report to the Government was to be submitted on 6-6-1980. Pursuant to the foregoing, Resolution dated 27-5-1980 was passed. It is urged that in introducing the above levy the relevant rules and law were not adhered to, making the case fall within the purview of and covered by the declaration as to invalidity contained in the decision of this Court reported as Kotri Cotton Association 1982 CLC 1252 to which one of us namely, Mr. Justice Saleem Akhtar was a party. Mr. Rasheed Akhund argues that the validating Ordinances viz. The Sindh Local Government (Amendment) Ordinance VII of 1982 and the Sindh Councils (Validation of Tax) Ordinance VII of 1982, which sought to cure the defects, pointed out in the referred decisions of this Court, did not in any way validate the imposition called in question in the present petition making such levy susceptible to due declaration sought in the instant petition.
3. Now, it would he seen that the Sindh Local Government (Amendment) Ordinance VII of 1982 amends Section 60 of Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 1979 and envisages that the previous sanction of Government under Section 60 of such Ordinance shall no longer be necessary but that "where a council levies a tax, rate, toll or fees it shall specify the date on which such tax, rate, toll or fees shall clothe into force." As to the Sindh Councils (Validation of Tax) Ordinance VIII of 1982,.Such Ordinance, which operates "notwithstanding anything contained in the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 1979, the Sindh Councils (Imposition of Taxes) Rules, 1979 or any judgment, order or decree of any Court", envisages that any tax, rate, toll or fees levied, charged, collected or realised by a Council on or after 3-6-1980 shall be deemed to have been validly levied, charged or collected or realised, as the case may be, and where any such imposition has not been paid or realised before 5-7-1982 the same shall be recoverable in accordance with the said Ordinance and the rules. It would, therefore, apparently follow that if the action by way of levy or imposition etc. Made on or after 3-6-1980 was defective, the defect, if any, in relation thereto should stand cured, on removal of the defect following from the enactment of such Ordinance.
4. The grounds of attack boil down to the contention that since the extension in the area of imposition was initiated on 8-5-1980, without, which extension the levy would not cover the petitioner Mills, the curative Ordinance would have no effect. Such contention begs the question that the extension in area was to be, finally proposed by way of a report to the Government on 6-6- 1980, as per notice inviting objections, issued on 8-5-1980 and, therefore, the effective date of extension falls within the time limit covered by Ordinance VIII of 1982 namely, 3-6-1980. As a result, it seems to us that the validating Ordinance applies squarely to the case projected by the petitioner. Where the law validates a particular act or transaction, it validates the act or transaction as a whole and not merely the various ingredients thereof, which may be spread over a period of time. It is the completed act or transaction which is validated and the date of completion therefore, unless a contrary intention appears, should be taken to be the date of the relevant act, action or transaction. This ground of attack, therefore, fails.
5. The next contention advanced by Mr. Rasheed Akhund is that no validating statute can validate acts without jurisdiction, coram non judice or mala fide. Reliance is placed in such context on the decisions of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Miss Bena7ir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416) and Federation of Pakistan v. Ghulam Mustafa Khar (PLD 1989 SC 26). This contention is also without force. It is no doubt, on principle, true that acts without jurisdiction, coram non judice or tainted with mala fides cannot he presumed to be validated, and ouster of jurisdiction of the superior Courts in such matters is to be strictly construed. However, such postulation is not helpful to the petitioner. No mala fides are alleged or proved. Likewise there is no lack of jurisdiction. At best, there could be some procedural errors or non-compliance with technical requirements of law, without affecting the substance, which are sought to be validated by the aforementioned legislation. Such measures could be duly validated and have been so validated even, if there was any requirement to validate, on facts. This ground also therefore, is of no help to the petitioner.
6. In the ultimate analysis, it was argued that the effect of the decision in Kotri Association of Trade and Industry (1982 CLC 122) could not, in law, be nullified and, therefore, the validating law is bad. It has consistently been held that, unless a validating statute transgresses a constitutional limit or provision its vires cannot be questioned solely because it tends to render a declaration of law made by a superior Court to be ineffective. Latest view on the subject is to be found in M/s. Yaseen Sons v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1989 Kar. 361).
7. No other ground, except the actual cover under the Octroi Schedule, notified on 31-7-1980, was questioned but, as observed above, such Schedule covers the items to which this petition relates.
8. As a result the above petition failed and with costs on 21-8-1989. The foregoing, are our reasons for the dismissal.