SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.---These are two petitions for special leave to appeal from the judgments of the Lahore High Court whereby in writ jurisdiction it declared the judgments of the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal to be of no legal effect.
2. The facts in the two petitions are essentially the same. The petitioners were employed as Conductors by the Punjab Urban Transport Corporation. It was a part of their duty to collect fares from those travelling by the buses of the Corporation and issue tickets to them. The Inspectors appointed by the Corporation carried out random checks and found that many of the passengers who had duly paid fares to the petitioners were not issued any tickets. Consequently, disciplinary actions were taken against them and as a result thereof, they were dismissed from service. They challenged the orders of dismissal through applications under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance before the Labour Court at Lahore. The said Court accepted their applications and directed their reinstatement in service with back benefits. The Corporation preferred appeals before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal but these were dismissed. It then invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court accepted the writ petitions and declared orders of the Labour Court to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The petitioners seek leave to appeal from this Court.
3. In support of these petitions, it was contended that the Labour Court as well as the Appellate Tribunal had concurrently held that the charges of misconduct had not been established against the petitioners. These were findings of fact and in writ jurisdiction the High Court was not competent to interfere with them. In support of this contention, reliance was placed upon Noor Muhammad v. Sarwar Khan PLD 1985 SC 131.
4. It is no doubt true that in writ jurisdiction the High Court does not ordinarily interfere with findings of fact recorded by special tribunals but this rule does not apply to a case when a special tribunal overlooked material circumstances in recording its findings. In the petitions before us, the High Court found that the Labour Court as well as the Appellate Tribunal had on entirely untenable basis rejected the testimony of the Inspectors appointed by the Corporation to oversee the performance of conductors and had proceeded to direct the reinstatement of the petitioners by taking into account circumstances which did not have the effect of absolving them of the charges against them.
5. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners, we are satisfied that there was sufficient justification with the High Court to interfere with the findings and orders of the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal. The Inspectors who had no reasons whatsoever to lay false charges against the petitioners, had in the course of their duty, found that the petitioners had not issued any tickets to passengers who had paid their fares. The Inspectors prepared the report forms (TT40) immediately after the checkings and the petitioners had no explanation to offer except for bald denials. Later on, when they were served with charge-sheets (TT41), they came out with their own versions but those were quite obviously after-thoughts.
6. While setting aside the orders of dismissal, the learned Appellate Tribunal was mainly influenced by the consideration that the passengers to whom tickets had not been issued, were not examined as witnesses during the departmental proceedings and that the Inspector had not recorded statements of these passengers immediately after the surprise checks. They, however, overlooked the fact that Inspectors had on the spot confronted the petitioners with the passengers who were found without tickets and the petitioners were unable to controvert their assertion that they had paid their fares. In the circumstances, in the departmental proceedings, there was no reason why the statements of the Inspectors should not have been regarded as sufficient to establish the charges against the petitioners. The High Court had, therefore, sufficient justification for interfering with the orders of the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal. These petitions are without any merit and are hereby dismissed.