' KARAM ELAHEE CHAUHAN, J.---Municipal Committee, Qila Didar Singh, District Gujranwala by means of a Notification dated 15-4-1976 published in the Punjab Gazette dated 23-7-1976, levied the various taxes (octroi and other taxes) at the rates mentioned therein, which rates it is a common ground, were prevalent prior thereto. The present petitioners who are 192 in number filed a Constitutional petition being W.P. No, 494/78 under Article 199 of the (1973) Constitution challenging the aforesaid levy on the various grounds to he presently noticed. The writ petition was dismissed (alongwith other writ petitions of the like nature) by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court by means of his judgment and order dated 12-5-1979. The petitioners have come up in a petition for leave to appeal against the same to this Court.
2. The first point argued by the learned counsel was that the Notification abovementioned was issued by the Administrator Municipal Committee, Oila Didar Singh whereas according to sections 138 and 139 of the Punjab Local Government Act XXXIV of 1975, power to levy taxes of the kind mentioned in Second Schedule thereto (which it is a common ground covers the present items) vested only in a "local council" as defined in section 2(25) read with section 10 of the aforesaid Act.
It was submitted that the notification was thus issued by an incompetent authority and was ultra vires the powers of the Administrator, who was not a "local council" as such (which term it may he mentioned included a municipal committee). The contention has no merit. The Municipal Committee aforesaid (alongwith other Municipal Committees of the Province) was dissolved by an Order/Notification published in the Punjab Gazette Extraordinary dated 23-6-1971 and issued by the Governor of the Punjab in exercise of the powers conferred on him by the Local Government Institutions (Dissolution) Order [Martial Law Order No, 21 as re-constituted by the Chief Martial Law Administrator Order No, 24 (See pages 530 to 537 of the "Punjab Local Government Laws (1979 Edition) by Ch.Hamid-ud-Din]. By the aforesaid Order/Notification the Governor of the Punjab appointed an Administrator of the Municipal Committee who was authorised to perform all the functions of the committee. The aforesaid Martial Law Orders, and notifications issued thereunder were saved from scrutiny of their validity for a period of two years from the "commencing day' namely 12-8-1973 under sub-clause (2) of Article 270 of 1973 Constitution. This period comes upto 12-8-1975. However, on 3-4-1975 was promulgated the Punjab Local Government Act XXXIV of 1975.
Sub-clause (2) of section 235 of that Act laid down that "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all authorities and all officers who immediately before the enforcement of this Act were exercising functions of Local Councils under the repealed enactments or any other law shall continue to exercise their respective function till the Local Councils are constituted under this Act, provided Government may withdraw all or any of the functions from such Authorities or officers as it may deem necessary". This will show that the Administrator appointed under artial Law Orders Nos. 21 and 24 and Notification issued thereunder on 23-6-1971 continued to function and was in fact functioning on the date when the taxation was imposed by him in this case. It is thus evident that in this respect there was no defect in the jurisdiction, authority and the powers of the Administrator and his action under sections 138, 139 and 235(2) of the Punjab Local Government Act XXXIV of 1975 suffered from no infirmity. It may further be pointed out that position in this respect is just the same which was of the West Pakistan Municipal Committees Imposition of Taxes Rules, 1960 on which the learned counsel was relying. If these rules continued and were in force at the time relevant in this case, the same was the position of the Administrator appointed o 23-6- 1971, who in the like manner continued to he vested with the relevant authority and powers on the subject in hand. Earlier the Administrator exercised the powers of the Committee as highlighted in the Municipal Administration Ordinance X of 1960, followed by the Punjab People's Local Government Ordinance VIII of 1972 (with effect from 13-4-1972) further followed by the Punjab Local Government Ordinance VI of 1975 with effect from 1-2-1975 and the Punjab Local Government Act XXXIV of 1975 (with effect from 3-4-1975). These days the law on the subject is the Punjab Local Government Ordinance VI of 1979. Looked at from whatever angle the position of the Administrator on the date relevant in the instant case did not suffer from any infirmity regarding the subject in hand and the point raised by the learned counsel. Therefore, has no substance.
3. The next point argued was that the imposition of such a levy as was involved in this case was regulated by, and the procedure for its imposition was contained in, the West Pakistan Municipal Committees (Imposition of Taxes) Rules, 1960. (See pages 293-297 of the Book above-mentioned).
It was argued that according to rules 4 and 5 of these Rules there has first to take place publication of preliminary taxation proposals showing the main features of the contemplated taxation together with a taxation programme for inviting objections and fixing periods for their hearing and disposal, etc. After the objections are decided the taxation proposals arc to he finalized under rule 6, and submitted to the Government whose powers to deal with them are contained in rule 7. It was argued that these formalities were not complied with and the procedure aforesaid was not followed in the instant case. The pleas raised are essentially of fact and the High Court after going through the relevant files and other material produced before it came to the conclusion that the above procedure was in fact duly followed. We have not been shown any error or misreading in the aforesaid finding of the High Court. The departmental representatives were present (as caveators) alongwith their learned counsel as well as the relevant record which was shown to us, and we must say, that we could find nothing therein to differ from the High Court on the subject in hand in any manner. Publication notice was duly issued and the objections of those persons who chose to file the same, were attended to and a special committee was duly set up and the proposal after its scrutiny by the said committee was then submitted to higher officers as requirq under the Rules.
The authorities/officers concerned then authorised the committee, i,e. The Administrator to go ahead with the same as he held that by section 139 of Act of 1975 now the committee had even independent powers of taxation. The contentions raised by the learned counsel are thus not supported by the record and the High Court finding in this respect calls for no interference.
4. It may be mentioned that while arguing the earlier point regarding violation of the specific procedure the learned counsel was submitting that whereas the Rules required the submission of the case to the Government which was not complied with, but in the same breath he submitted that the Government had on the matter coming to their notice issued certain instructions to the Minicipal Committee to make an increase only of 25% but the Administrator's proposals as finally published later on, purported to make rather 100% increase in the taxation. The departmental representatives explained that 25% increase was to be made in the overall revenues of the Committee though the same could be achieved by making 100% increase in certain limited spheres, keeping in view that the overall increase in the committee revenues did not exceed 25%.
They submitted that consequently there was no violation of any Government instructions on the subject. We have no intention to go into these statistics and would close this chapter by simply observing that if Government instructions have not been followed by the Administrator, the petitioners can move the Government and bring this fact to their notice for whatever worth it is.
Needless to say that under sections 140 and 207 of the Punjab Local Government Act XXXIV of 1975, as well as under Chapters XIII and XV of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance VI of 1979, the Government retains the powers to vary or reduce the taxes, etc. (These references should not be considered as exhaustive of the relevant remedies available to the petitioners are the powers vesting in the Provincial Government under the overall law for the time being in force). Similar was the view of the High Court on the subject and we find nothing wrong therein so as to warrant interference by this Court.
5. No other point was argued before us.
6. The result is that this petition has no merit and is dismissed.