JUDGMENTTANVIR AHMAD KHAN, J.--The petitioner was appointed as a Fire Officer in BPS-17 by the Lahore Municipal Corporation on the 24th of September, 1985. It is the case of the petitioner that one Munir Ahmad Khan Fireman, working under his control, was departmentally proceeded and a criminal case was also registered against him. As a counter-blast the aforesaid Munir Ahmad made a complaint before respondent -------- on the 14th of June, 1986 involving the petitioner in a fire incident at Railway Carriage Shop on 25.5.1986. The petitioner was suspended on 1.7.1987 under Rule 10(1) of the Punjab Local Councils Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1981 and remained so throughout the inquiry proceedings and ultimately was removed from service on the 12th of October, 1987. Dissatisfied with the removal order, the petitioner approached the appellate authority provided under the aforesaid rules, who set aside the removal order and remanded the case for fresh proceedings in strict adherence to the Punjab Local Councils Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1981 vide its order dated 13th of August, 1988.
2. The petitioner incessantly strived to get himself re-in-stated after the removal order was struck down by the appellate authority but no action was taken by the respondent. He even approached the appellate authority which also did not entertain his grievance respecting the non- implementation of its own order. Compelled by all these circumstances, the petitioner approached this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 for a direction to the respondent to act in accordance with law and implement the order of the authority dated 13.8.88.
3. Learned counsel has argued that the whole proceedings, taken against the petitioner, stand vitiated by the appellate order which has attained finality. The inaction, on the part of the respondent to implement this order is mala fide requiring issuance of direction to him to perform his duties strictly in accordance with law.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent did not controvert the stance of the petitioner seriously.
However, his only argument is that after the order of removal of the petitioner was set aside by the appellate authority, the earlier order of suspension, which was operative prior to the removal order,came into being. His stance is that the petitioner would be deemed under suspension so long as the fresh inquiry, as directed by the appellate authority, is not finalized.
5. This argument, on the face of it, is misconceived and fallacious. The petitioner was suspended as far back as on 1st of July, 1987. Rule 10(1) of the Punjab Local Councils Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1981, provides that, "In case where a servant of a local council is accused of subversion, corruption or misconduct, the authorised officer may require him to proceed on leave, if due, or, suspend him with the approval of the authority, provided that any continuation of such leave or suspension shall require approval of the authority after three months."
6. The requirement of the Rule is that the suspension order can only be passed by the authorised officer with the approval of the authority for a period of three months. Every time it shall require the fresh approval of the authority. In this case, during the currency of the suspension order, the petitioner was removed from service on 12th of October, 1987 by the respondent and, resultantly, the suspension order lost its independent existence and merged into the removal order. It would not automatically be resurrected after the setting aside of the removal order as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent. The respondent, in this case, could have passed the fresh order of suspension in accordance with the rules after the appellate order. But the same having not been passed,it is too late in the day to contend that the petitioner would be deemed under suspension after the setting aside of the removal order by the appellate authority. The law requires conscious application of mind before passing a suspension order. Resultantly, the writ petition is accepted and the respondent is scted to act strictly in accordance with, law and implement the order of the >ellate authority dated 13.8.1988. The parties are left to bear their own costs.