1. ' NASIM HASAN SHAH,J.-- This is a petition for leave to appeal against the order dated 20-9-1988 passed in R.S.A. No, 11 of 1987. The above-mentioned appeal was heard alongwith several other matters and all of them were disposed of by a consolidated judgment passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court with the following observations:-- "In all these matters the pre-emptors/plaintiffs have remained unsuccessful till date as their respective suits for pre-emption were dismissed by the trial Courts and the first appeals filed by them were dismissed by the first appellate Courts. It is not denied that in view of the law laid down in Sardar All and others v. Muhammad All and others (PLD 1988 SC 287), no decree can now be passed in favour of the appellants/petitioners."
2. ' The judgment in the above-mentioned case of Sardar Ali and others v. Muhammad Ali and others( PLD 1988 SC 287) was rendered to resolve the conflict in the differing interpretations placed on the findings recorded in the case of Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360). It was observed (in the case of Sardar Ali) that the effect of the judgment in Said Kamal Shah's case was that the proceedings in which decrees were obtained by the parties from any Court i.e, either original or appellate or provisional prior to the above target date of 31-7-1986 were saved, but all proceedings in the other cases had become infructuous and stood abated.
3. ' However, despite the above enunciation of the law, difference of opinion again arose, while disposing of the pending cases as to the true effect and scope of the judgment in Said Kamal Shah's case in regard to some aspects, not fully dealt with in the case of Sardar Ali and others v.
4. Muhammad Ali and others (PLD 1988 SC 297). This necessitated the constitution of an even a Fuller Bench. Accordingly, a Full Bench of 7 Judges was constituted to resolve the controversy. These matters were eventually heard on 30-5-1989 and the judgment was reserved which was ultimately announced on 4-9-1989 and is reported as Ahmad v. Abdul Aziz and others (PLD 1989 SC 771).
5. Herein it was found that the true effect and scope of the judgment in Said Kamal Shah's case is that it is only those parts of section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act have become ineffective which were expressly declared to be repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam namely those parts where ownership in the estate or the Patti was not coupled with contiguity and co-sharership.
6. Accordingly, the said parts of section 15 where this condition was satisfied were still operative and remain preserved.
7. ' However before the judgment in the abovementioned case (Ahmad v. Aziz Ahmad) was announced, the Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court had itself taken up this very matter in suo motu review and on 5-7-1989 passed the following order:-- "In deciding the case of Said Kamal Shah a direction was given for enacting/enforcing pre- emption law in accordance with the Injunctions of Islam as from 1-8-1986. However, no such law has been enacted by the Province of Punjab till now. Difficulties have arisen in interpreting/implementing the said decision. We, therefore, consider it just and expedient to examine various questions connected therewith and/or arising out of it."
8. ' On 26-5-1990, judgment was delivered in the aforementioned review and the following findings, inter alia, were recorded:--
(1) The Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court is empowered to explain, clarify or review its own orders.
(2) The Shariat Appellate Bench in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 S.C. 360) found that all clauses of section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emtpion Act, 1913, were against the Injunctions of Islam Accordingly, the effect of the said judgment was that after 31-7-1986 no part of it (section 15) continued to have any legal effect.
(3) ..................................................
(4) Sections 15 and 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, having ceased to have legal effect from 31-7-1986 in their entirety no suit, therefore, can be continued on the basis of the said provisions after the said date except those pre-emption suits wherein decrees had been passed before' 31-7- 1986."
9. ' In the light of this clear and authoritative exposition of the relevant law, there is hardly anything which can be urged in support of this petition, because the view expressed by the learned Judge in the High Court in the impugned judgment stands fully endorsed by the Shariat Appellate Bench in its judgment, dated 26-5-1990 passed in the suo motu Review Petition (PLD 1990 SC 865).
10. ' However, despite the above findings, Dr.A.Basit presented an elaborate argument in support of this petition for leave.
11. ' In the first place he submitted that the judgment of this Court in Ahmad v. Abdul Aziz and others (PLD 1989 SC 771) delivered by a Bench of 7 Judges still holds the field as the said judgment has not so far been reviewed and, therefore, the present case falls to be decided in accordance with the findings recorded therein.
12. ' This submission is misconceived. The constitution of a very large Bench of this Court was necessitated and decided, inter alia, the case of Ahmad v. Abdul Aziz and others (PLD 1989 SC 771) in order to resolve the conflict of opinion which had arisen in connection with the interpretation placed on the findings recorded by the Shariat Appellate Bench in Said Kamal Shah's case (PLD 1986 SC 360) by different Benches of this Court. But after the Shariat Appellate Bench has itself clarified and explained its findings in the suo motu review undertaken by it (reported as PLD 1990 SC 865) there is no need to refer to any other judgment and it is now the judgment dated 26-5- 1990 passed in suo motu review which holds the field and not any other judgment which has sought to interpret the said judgment. Hence, it is the judgment of the Shariat Appellate Bench, which was delivered on 26-5-1990, that must govern the case.
13. ' It was, however, contended that the aforesaid judgment passed in suo motu review dated 26-5- 1990 is itself without any effect Firstly because the Shariat Appellate Bench, being a Bench of the Supreme Court, the matter of review was governed by the provisions of Chapter XXVI (Part IV) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 and, according to Rule 1 of Order XXVI this Court can only review its judgments on grounds similar to those mentioned Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
14. The submission is that in this case the order passed in review simply explains its previous judgment but such an exercise is not within the purview of a review under Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C. According to the learned counsel, a review envisages the substitution of the earlier finding with a fresh finding and is competent only to correct an erroneous finding but not merely for explaining what it meant or what its purport was.
15. ' We do not agree. In our opinion the scope of review jurisdiction canvassed by DrA.Basit is too restrictive of the powers vested in this Court for exercise of its review jurisdiction. Indeed this Court in the well-known case Federation of Pakistan v. Haji Muhammad Saifullah Khan (PLD 1989 SC 166) clarified the effect of its earlier judgment and held that the press note issued by E the Federal Government did not clearly reflect the view taken in the aforesaid judgment as to the effect on the appointments of the High Court Judges in the absence of the Prime Minister between the period from 29th May, 1988 to 2nd December, 1988 and ordered the deletion of the offending portion of the press note.
16. ' In the second place it was submitted that the suo mote review undertaken by the Shariat Appellate Bench was in fact the second review in the case of Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360). In this connection, attention was invited to the observations of this Court in Mst. Safia Begum v.
17. Ibrahim and others (PLD 1989 SC 314) wherein the effect of Said Kamal Shah's case (PLD 1986 SC 360) was being considered and it was observed:-- "It may also be mentioned here that the review by the Shariat Appellate Bench can be made only by that Bench and one review application having been filed has since been disposed of."
18. (underlining is ours)
19. ' According to Dr.Basit one review is competent under the Supreme Court Rules and one review having already been attempted, the second review carried out by the Shariat Appellate Bench vide order, dated 26-5-1990 was of no legal effect. In support of this submission attention was invited to Rule 9 of Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules, which provides:- "After the final disposal of the first application for review no subsequent application for review shall lie to the Court and consequently shall not be entertained by the Registry."
20. ' Unfortunately for Dr. A. Basit the abovementioned rule applies to applications for review which are referred to in Rule 2 and subsequent Rules in Order XXVI V of the Supreme Court Rules. Rule 2 provides:-- "Application for review shall be filed in the Registry within thirty days after pronouncement of the judgment......... and the relevant Rules 3 to 8 deal with the application for review so filed and ultimately Rule 9 lays down that after the final disposal of the first application of review no subsequent application of review shall lie to the Court. However, in the present case the order dated 26-5-1990 has been passed by the Shariat Appellate Bench on the motion of the Court itself i.e, suo motu and such a review is governed by Rule 1 of Order XXVI which provides:-- "Subject to the law and the practice of the Court, the Court may review its judgment or order in a civil proceeding on grounds similar to those mentioned in Order XLVII, rule 1 of the Code and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record."
21. ' The review undertaken under this rule is not controlled by the provisions of Rule 9 aforementioned.
22. Thus, both the grounds on which it is submitted that the order passed in suo motu review dated 26-5-1990 is of no legal effect, are without force.
23. ' It was lastly urged that the effect of the order passed in suo motu review dated 26-5-1990 was to spell out a blue-print of a new law, which the relevant legislatures were required to enact, under the Constitution. According to the learned counsel, the jurisdiction of the Court under Chapter 3-A of Part VI of the Constitution dealing with the 'Islamization of laws' is contained in clause (2) of Aritcle 203-D of the Constitution. This provides that-- "(2) If the Court decides that any law or provision of law is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam it shall set out in its decision--
(a) the reasons for its holding that opinion; and
(b) the extent to which such law or provision is so repugnant; and specify the day on which the decision shall take effect".
24. ' This Court, according to the learned counsel, cannot adumbrate the law which has to be framed after holding an existing law to be against the injunctions of Islam. This function has been vested in the Council of Islamic Ideology and the learned counsel referred the provisions of Articles 227 and 230 of the Constitution in this connection, especially Article 230 dealing with the function of the Islamic Ideology Council.
25. ' This contention too does not have much force. It is true that in the course of the judgment some observations have been made as to the manner in which a new law of pre-emption which is consistent with the Injunctions of Islam should be framed. However, the ultimate findings given in the main judgment delivered by the Shariat Appellate Bench in Said Kamal Shah's case (PLD 1986 SC 360) and now finally explained in the suo motu Shariat Review Petition No,1-R of 1989 decided on 26-5-1990 (reported as PLD 1990 SC 865) are strictly in accordance with the terms of clause (2) of Article 203-D of the Constitution.
26. ' The upshot is that none of the contentions raised in support of the plea that the judgment of Shariat Appellate Bench in Suo Motu Shariat Review Petition No,1-R of 1989 is not a valid and enforceable judgment have force and, accordingly, this petition must fail.
27. ' It may further be observed that this petition for leave is barred by time and the explanation given in excuse of the delay suffers from vagueness and imprecision. The petition is, therefore, liable to dismissal also on the ground of limitation.
28. ' The result is that this petition fails on all counts and is dismissed hereby.