' The respondent filed an application for ejectment against the appellants on grounds that they have defaulted in payment of rent from August 1984, impaired material value and utility of the premises by making unauthorised construction, causing nuisance to the tenants and that the premises is required in good faith for personal use. The appellants denied the allegations and pleaded that the premises was let out to previous tenants who were not paying rent to the respondent but were depositing the same in Court due to dispute between them. The respondent approached the appellants requesting that if they got the premises vacated the same will be let out to them. Accordingly the appellants got the premises vacated on payment of huge pugri and the respondent occupied the same. The tenancy was created by the respondent in favour of appellants on charging huge amount. The agreed rent was Rs, 1,000 per month for go downs Nos.1 to 5 and open space of compound. The appellants were allowed to construct two stores 25 feet high and to instal shutters on the gate ways. So far default is concerned it was denied and it was pleaded that as the respondent had failed to make payment of property tax, the Excise and Taxation Department; served notice under Rule 17 of the West Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Rules in Form P.T. 14 and called upon the appellants to pay the rent to them. The appellants accordingly deposited rent with them. The appellants also tendered rent to respondent which he refused to accept and therefore it was remitted by money order which was refused. The learned Controller by the impugned order allowed the ejectment application only on the ground that the appellants have committed default in payment of rent. On all other issues the finding was in the negative.
' Mr. Mushtaq Memon the learned counsel for the appellants has contended that although in application the allegation was that rent was not paid from August 1984 in his affidavit in evidence the respondent has stated that default was from August 1985. Therefore the question is whether any default, has been made from August 1985. So far payment position is concerned it is reflected from the statement submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants which has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent. The same is reproduced as follows which is based on the documents produced in Court:{{TABLE}} (1)
(2)
(3) 1- 2-1979 8-12-1979 28-5-1980 Feb.79 to Jan.80. Feb.80 to Jan.
81. Feb. 81 Rs,12,000 Rs,12,000 Rs, 1,000
(4) 31- 1-1981 Mar. 81 Rs, 1,000
(5) 11- 2-1981 April, 81 to Sept.81 Rs, 6,000
(6) 5-10-1981 Oct. 81 to March 82. Rs, 6,000
(7) 31- 3-1983 April, 82 to June, 82 Rs, 3,075
(8) 11- 8-1982 July, 82 to Dec. 82 Rs, 6,925
(9) 2- 2-1983 Jan. 83 to Mar. 83 Rs, 3,000
(10) 19- 3-1983 April, 83 to Sept. 83 Rs, 6,000
(11) 5-10-1983 Oct. 83 to Nov.83. Rs, 2,000
(12) 30-11-1983 Dec.83 to July,
84. Rs, 8,000
(13) 13- 6-1984 Aug. 84 to Jan.85. Rs, 6,000
(14) 6- 2-1985 Feb.85 to June, 86 Rs, 5,000
(15) 2- 8-1985 July.85 to Feb.86 Rs, 8,243
(16) 26- 8-1986 Mar. 86 to Part of Feb.87 Rs,11,701 ' The dispute seems to be in respect of items Nos.14 and 15. According to the learned counsel for the appellants these amounts were paid to the Excise and Taxation Department which were adjusted towards the arrears of tax. The learned counsel for the appellants has further contended that it has been a practice and the respondent had allowed the appellants to pay the amount of tax and adjusted it in rent. It is an admitted position that the amounts of Rs,6,000, Rs,5,000 and Rs,8,243 were paid to the Excise and Taxation Department but the appellants have not been able to produce any notice under section 14 of the West Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax. Act, 1958 calling upon the appellants to deposit the rent. The learned counsel for the respondent has contended that last payment of Rs,8,243.00 was paid on 26-8-1985 representing .The rent for the month of July 1985 to February, 1986. This amount was paid after the ejectment case had been filed on 22-8-1986. From the evidence on record the admitted position is that rent from February 1985 to February 1986 was not paid to the respondent but it was deposited with the Excise and Taxation Department. Although it has been alleged that the appellants deposited in pursuance of demand made by-the Department no notice to this effect has been produced by the appellants nor any witness has been examined from the department to produce the record to establish that notice of demand under section 14 was issued to the appellants and in pursuance thereof they have deposited the rent.
' Therefore the entire defence rests on interpretation of section 14 of Urban Immovable Property Tax Act. If the rent was deposited with the Department in pursuance of a notice issued under this section the appellants have a complete defence. Section 14 reads as follows: "S.14. Where the tax due from any person on account of any building or land is in arrears, it shall be lawful for the prescribed authority to serve upon any person paying rent in respect of that building or land, or any part thereof, to the person from whom the arrears are due, a notice stating the amount of such arrears of tax and requiring all future payments of rent (whether the same have already accrued due or not) by the person paying the rent to be made direct to the prescribed authority until such arrears shall have been duly paid, and such notice shall operate to transfer to the prescribed authority the right to recover, receive and give a discharge for such rent. If the person paying rent wilfully fails or neglects to comply with the notice aforementioned, the prescribed authority may, after giving him an opportunity of being heard, proceed against him as it would have proceeded under the provisions of this Act against the owner of the building or land in respect of which the tax is in arrears."
' According to this provision if any tax is due from any person on account of any building or land the prescribed officer may serve a notice upon a tenant of the said building or land stating the amount of arrears of taxes and calling upon him to make all future payment of rent whether accrued or not to the prescribed authority until the arrears of taxes are satisfied. Protection has been given to such tenants who make payment in pursuance of such notice and such notice confers on the Department the right to recover, receive and give discharge for such rent. It further imposes penalty in case of default in complying with the notice. Therefore service of notice is the initiating point for granting protection and discharge from liability. Unless a notice has been served by the Department on the tenant the prescribed authority cannot have any right to recover, receive or give discharge for rent paid to it. Consequently any tenant who pays the rent voluntarily and without any service of notice under 'section 14, will be doing so at his own risk without any protection 'afforded under section 14. The protection afforded to a tenant for payment of rent to the Department flows from service of notice which calls upon the tenant to deposit rent with the department till the satisfaction of the taxes. In the absence Of any notice under section 14 no tenant can claim protection. If a tenant is allowed to :deposit rent voluntarily then it is bound to create great hardship to the landlords as a dishonest tenant may merely to harass the landlords start depositing rent with the Excise and Taxation Department without any demand being made and claim adjustment in rent. The appellants had not paid the rent to the respondent from February 1985 to July 1986 on the plea that it was deposited with the Excise and Taxation Department. As the appellants deposited it with the Excise and Taxation Department without any service of notice under section 14 they are not entitled to any protection and have thus committed default in payment of rent. The appeal is therefore dismissed. The appellants are allowed six months time to vacate and hand over vacant possession to the respondent,