DECISION This is an appeal filed by the appellant against an impugned order, dated 24-11-1985, passed by the Sindh Labour Court No,II at Karachi, who had dismissed the grievance petition of the appellant under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the appellant claimed to be an old and permanent employee and hold the post of General Secretary of the C.B.A. union at several occasions and on account of his trade union activities, he was so many times removed from the employment, but, subsequently used to be reinstated. He claimed that in view of a Medical Certificate, he was granted leave and from time to time, he used to seek extension of it which was always granted but, vide letter, dated 3-9-1984, his application for extension of leave, dated 22-9-1984 was rejected and subsequently his services were terminated. The appellant claimed that the termination of his services under Standing Orders 12(5) was illegal and unwarranted because when the respondent- establishment had refused to accept the medical certificate and had treated the leave of the appellant as absent without intimation, then it was incumbent upon it to proceed against him under Standing Order 15 which proceedings were not taken against him. Therefore, being dissatisfied, the appellant submitted his grievance petition under section 25-A I.R.O., 1969 before the learned Labour Court.
3. The respondent-establishment resisted the petition on the grounds that the termination of services of the appellant were not on account of his trade union activities, but, in the fact his services were terminated on account of his long absence of more than 120 days without either permission or intimation and for which a proper enquiry was also held resulting in his dismissal from service, therefore, he was not entitled to maintain his grievance petition under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969 which was liable to be dismissed.
4. The appellant filed his affidavit-in-evidence and he was duly cross examined by the respondent-establishment, while, the respondent-establishment did not adduce any evidence and had simply relied upon the evidence of the appellant. Thereafter, the learned Labour Court has passed the impugned order, hence, the present appeal.
5. I have heard Mr. M.L.Shahani, the learned Advocate for the appellant and Mr.Masood Ahmad Khan, the learned Advocate on behalf of the respondent-establishment and have also perused the record and proceedings of the case. It is an admitted position that on 28-5-1984, a letter was sent to the appellant by the respondent-establishment specially asking him to submit a medical certificate in support of his illness and in case if he would fail to do so, then, his absence from duty would be treated as unauthorised and he would be proceeded with according to law and admittedly, the appellant did not submit the requisite Medical Certificate. In view of this admitted position, I would hold that it would not be proper for the appellant to complain any illegality or irregularity, at this stage, on the part of the respondent-establishment. The appellant should suffer for the laches and should not accuse the respondent-establishment that disciplinary action against him should not have been under Standing Order 12(5) but, it should have been under Standing Order 15, Admittedly the appellant had remained on unauthorised absence for more than 120 days and it was not known to the respondent-management that for how many days more, he would remain absent. Therefore, the respondent-management could not keep the post vacant indefinitely for such type of a worker and suffer production as well as financial loss. The contention of Mr. M.L. Shahani, the learned Advocate for the appellant that it was the duty of the respondent- establishment to proceed against the appellant under Standing Order 15 and he could not have been dismissed in any other manner, is devoid of force. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the admitted position, I am of the view that the dismissal of the appellant by the respondent-establishment was quite right and cannot be interfered with. Hence I see nothing wrong in the impugned order which must be maintained.
6. For the reasons discussed by me above, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order and would maintain the same. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed.