This Constitutional petition is directed against the orders dated 17-1-1988 and 20-6-1987 passed by respondents Nos.1 and 2, respectively, allowing maintenance to respondent No.3.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner and respondent No.3 were married on 11-4-1980.
They lived together as husband and were for some time and then litigation started between them.
At one stage, the parties arrived at the compromise and the suits for maintenance, dissolution of marriage and recovery of dower were withdrawn. However, the parties again separated which led to the institution of an application for grant of maintenance on behalf of respondent No-3 before the Chairman, Conciliation Court. No.13, Multan City. In the application, the petitioner was clearly shown to be a resident of Layyah and notices were sent to him at his Layyah address. The petitioner was said to have refused to receive the notice sent to him, whereupon the notice was published in daily "Aftab" on 4-3-1987. The petitioner was supposed to appear in the Court on 16-3- 1987, but he failed to do so, whereupon, ex parte proceedings were taken against him. Respondent No.3 was required to nominate her two representatives. She accordingly nominated Muhammad Ayub and Syed Mushtaq Hussain Rizvi as her representatives. Thus, the Conciliation Court was constituted without any nomination of members by the petitioner. The Conciliation Court recorded statements of Abdul Hameed and Munshi Abdul Aziz on behalf of respondent No.3 on 15-6-1987 and allowed the application vide the order dated 20-6-1987. Maintenance allowance was allowed to respondent No.3 at the rate of Rs.300 per month. The petitioner was ordered to pay arrears of maintenance amounting to Rs.12,600 (from January 1983 to 30th of June, 1987). The petitioner filed a revision petition before the learned Additional District Judge, Multan, who was pleased to modify the order as regards the arrears but dismissed the revision petition vide his order dated 17-1-1988.
Hence, this petition.
3.I have heard the learned counsel for the contesting parties. Respondent No.3 did not file any written statement. Hence, the factual averments contained in the writ petition, supported by an affidavit shall be deemed to be correct for the purpose of disposal of this petition.
4. The main ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was resident of Layyah. Hence, the Chairman, Conciliation Court No.13, Multan City, had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. In this connection, he referred to the provisions of section 6 of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961 and urged that the jurisdiction of respondent No.2 was confined to Multan City alone. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondent No.3 argued that by virtue of the provisions of rule 7 of the Conciliation Courts Rules, 190,2, the Conciliation Court, Multan, had the jurisdiction in the matter.
5. Admittedly, the petitioner was residing at Layyah when the petition for grant of maintenance was filed on 9-12-1986 before the Chairman, Conciliation Court at Multan. The jurisdiction of the Conciliation Court is governed by the provisions of section 6 of the Ordinance. The said section was amended by virtue of the Conciliation Courts (Amendmnt) Order, 1982. Now, it reads as under:- "S.6. Jurisdiction of Conciliation Courts etc.---(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection(2), a Conciliation Court shall be constituted and shall have jurisdiction to try a case only when the parties to dispute ordinarily reside within the jurisdiction of the same Union Council in which the offence has been committed or the cause of action has arisen.
(2)Where one of the parties to a dispute ordinarily resides and the offence has been committed or the cause of action has arisen, in one ward of a city, municipality or cantonment, and the other party ordinarily resides in another ward of the same city, municipality or cantonment, then a Conciliation Court may be constituted in the Ward in which the offence has been committed or, as the case may be, the .Cause of action has arisen:"
Ordinarily, a Conciliation Court has jurisdiction to try a case only if the parties to the dispute reside within the limits of the Union Council. In case where one party to a dispute ordinarily resides in one ward of a city, Municipality or Cantonment and the other party in another ward of the same city, Municipality or Cantonment, then the Conciliation Court may be constituted in the ward in which the cause of action has arisen. Admittedly, the petitioner was residing in another I city to which the jurisdiction of the Conciliation Court Multan, did not extend. Hence, the impugned order passed by the Conciliation Court was without jurisdiction and hence, a nullity. Moreover, the matter pertaining to the grant of maintenance falls within the jurisdiction of a Family Court or an Arbitration Council, constituted under section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. While dealing with a question regarding grant of maintenance to a Muslim were by Conciliation Court, it was held in the case of Mubarak Ali v. The Chairman Union Council and 2 others (1987 CLC 1661) that the grant of maintenance fell within the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Council and not the Conciliation Court.
The relevant portion is reproduced as under:- "Section A of Part I of the Schedule provides the extent of jurisdiction of the Conciliation Court vis-a- vis criminal matters; whereas section B, confines itself in exclusionary terms to civil matters. A bare reading of these three items pregnantly manifests that it does not bring within the scope of Conciliation Courts, the jurisdiction conferred on the Arbitration Council, as contemplated by section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961."
Moreover, it is also evident that in the present case, the matter exceeded the pecuniary limit of Rs.10,000 mentioned in Part II section B of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961. It was not open to the Revisional Court to abridge the claim so as to bring it within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the Conciliation Court.
6. For the foregoing reasons, I allow this petition and set aside the orders dated 17-1-1988 and 20-6- 1987 passed by respondents Nos.1 and 2, respectively leaving the parties to bear their own costs.