1. ' GUL ZARIN KIANI, J.---This first appeal by the plaintiff from the order dated 3-10-1989 of the learned trial Court rejecting the plaint under Order VII, rule 11, Civil P.C. For failing to disclose cause of action arises out of a civil suit for declaration that upon the basis of a relinquishment deed exectued on 7- 1-1986, Mst. Naheed Shagufta, defendant No,1 in the suit had surrendered her rights in the property particularised in the plaint, in his favour who thereupon became it owner alongwith defendants 2 to 4 and was in its possession as co-sharer.
2. ' Relevant facts bearing upon the points requiring determination in the appeal, briefly summarised are:- ' Late Yaqoob Ali Man owned agricultural land and urban immovable property of considerable value, in Districts of Lahore and Kasur. He was owner of 308 Kanals, 15 Marlas of land in village Wandala Dayal Shah of Tehsil Ferozewala and a house in Street No,49 of Mohallah Sant Nagar, a shop in Sabzi Mandi in Lahore City. He also owned land and residential property in village Man of Tchsil Kasur. He died on 19-12-1985 leaving Mst. Fatima Bibi, Mst. Raj Bibi widows, Mohammad Saeed Man son, Mst. Jameela Bcgum daughter, and, Mst. Naheed Shagufta (grand-daughter) daughter of a pre-deceased daughter, namely, Mst. Rashida. Upon his demise, land in village Wandala Dayal Shah was mutated in favour of his two widows, the son and the daughter, vide inheritance Mutation No,4111 sanctioned on 23-1-1986. Mst. Naheed Shagufta was excluded altogether from inheriting the property left by her grandfather. In regard to land at Mauza Man in Tehsil Kasur, she was distributed her share by the Revenue Officer. Mst. Naheed Shagufta applied to the District Collector for review of inheritance Mutation No,4111 relating to the estate in Wandala Dayal Shah, District Collector gave the permission for review on 30-1-1989.
3. ' On 26-2-1989, Mohammad Saeed Man as plaintiff instituted a civil suit claiming that Mst. Naheed Shagufta had relinquished her ownership rights in the land at Wandala Dayal Shah, the urban property at Lahore and also the house in village Man, in his favour by a relinquishment deed executed on 7-1-1986 for consideration already received, and, thereafter, was left with no rights in the above properties comprised in the relinquishment deed. To the above suit, in addition to Mst.
4. Naheed Shagufta, widows and daughters of the deceased Yaqqoob Man were impleaded as defendants Nos. 2 to 4. They supported the plaintiff in all respects but defendant No,1 gave real tough contest to him. She repudiated the relinquishment of rights by her and described the deed as a mere fabricated document intended solely to deprive her of the valuable property worth lacs of rupees. She also said that the relinquishment deed for want of payment of required stamp duty on it, and, absence of its registration neither divested her of her rights in the property in dispute nor created any, in favour of the plaintiff_ Upon these very defences, she separately applied for a compulsory rejection of the plaint under Order VII, rule 11, Civil P.C.
5. ' Upon consideration of the matter, the learned trial Court concluded that the deed in question was compulsorily registrable and its absence conferred no rights upon the claimant-plaintiff. Therefore, the plaint did not disclose a triable cause of action. In taking this view, the trial Court referred to rulings reported in AIR 1931 Oudh 288, AIR 1927 Lahore 907, 1986 M LD 2593 Lahore and 1987 CLC 2358.
6. Aggrieved of the summary rejection of the plaint, plaintiff came up in first appeal to this Court.
7. ' On his behalf, it is contended by Mr. Iqbal Ahmed Oureshi that upon the facts stated in the plaint, a cause of action for trial was mac out and, upon the averments in the plaint alone, it could not have been justifi bly said that it failed to disclose any cause of action. The contention put forth was that for applying Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C. For ordering summary rejection, contents in the plaint alone had to be looked into and any material foreign to its body could not be examined. When the rule of law is so interpreted, learned counsel argued the plaint did not deserve summary disposal. It was also argued that even if view of the trial Court on compulsory registration of relinquishment deed and its consequential legal effect are taken as correct that it did not confer ownership rights on the petitioner, yet it was admissible in evidence for a collateral purpose under section 49 of the amended Registration Act, 1908, for suing its specific performance. An oral request to amend the plaint to that effect was made at the bar.
8. ' Upon hearing the learned counsel at length, and examination of the original record, more particularly the relinquishment deed referred to, relied upon, and annexed to the plaint, we cannot agree with the contention that the plaint was not liable to summary rejection for failing to disclose a cause of action.
9. ' In our opinion, upon true and correct construction of the plaint, the suit appeared to be barred by law, and the plaint merited outright rejection on that score also. No doubt, there is bulk of case-law laying down that for ordering summary rejection of the plaint, the Court is obliged to travel only within the four corners of the plaint itself for discovering existence of a triable cause of action in it and the defence offered to it ought to be excluded from consideration. But there is also another equally weighty and commendable view meriting serious consideration which says that classes of cases in which the Court can reject the plaint under Order VII, rule 11 are not exhaustive of all the cases in which the Court can reject a plaint or limiting the inherent powers of the Court in respect therefor. Be that as it may, upon plain reading of the plaint itself which is solely based upon relinquishment deed for claiming ownership rights in the property comprised in it, we are of clear opinion that release, surrender or relinquishment, whatever name one may choose to give to the document in question, even if assumed to have been genuinely executed which the defendant denied and in absence of required evidence, we do not propose to express on it, undoubtedly required compulsory registration and its absence was fatal to the effective transfer of rights under it to the appellant. Relinquishment deed clearly fell within the purview of clause (b) of subsection
(1) of section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. Section 17, subsection (1) alongwith its clause (b) runs as follows:- "(17) Documents of which registration is compulsory.--(1) The following documents shall be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and it they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act No,XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act, 1871 or the Indian Registration Act, 1877 or this Act came or comes into force, namely:-
(a) .
(b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property."
10. ' Section 49 of the Registration Act provided for the effects of non-registration of documents which required compulsory registration in terms of section 17 of the Act. In its original form, before its amendment by the Registration (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962, it read:- "49. Effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered. No document required by section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to be registered shall--
(a) affect any immovable property comprised therein, or
(b) confer any power to adopt, or
(c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered: ' Provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act, or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, or as evidence of part performance of a contract for the purposes of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be affected by registered insturment."
11. ' In its amended form, section 49 ran as follows:- "49. Effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered.--No document required to be registered under this Act or under any earlier law providing for or relating to registration of documents shall--
(a) operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, to or in immovable property, or
(b) confer any power to adopt, unless it has been registered."
12. ' It is evident from the above that clause (a) of unamended section 49 of the Registration Act was substituted by a new clause which is worded differently and in its amended form was brought in line with the language already employed in clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 17 of the Act.
13. Clause (b) of section 49 was left untouched. Clause (c) alongwith its proviso was omitted altogether. The net effect of the above provision of law would be that where a release, relinquishnient or surrender is in writing and amounts to transfer of immovable property, it will require compulsory registration under section 17 (1), clause (b) if the interest created is of the value of Rs,100 or upwards. Premsukhdas v. Peerkhan and another AIR 1926 Nagpur 21, Wazira v. Bakshi and another AIR 1930 Lahore 45, Jadeja Versalji Abhesangji and others v. Shah Khimji and another AIR (36) 1949 Kutch 13 support this view. In the Nagpur case, it was observed that "A release, when in writing, in order to be operative in law must he registered under section 17, when the amount of the claim to interest in immovable property which is extinguished by the release is of the value of Rs,100 or upwards". In the Lahore case, similar view was expressed. In case of Jadeja Versalji Abhesangji (supra) in para. 9 of the judgment, the Court observed:- "A Farkati is a document creating or extinguishing a right in property (immovable in this case). This Farkati was worth more than 500 Koris. Its registration was compulsory. As it was not registered it created no legally enforceable rights and it could not be used in evidence."
14. ' Under the guise of use of the document for a collateral purpose, appellant could not use the unregistered document in legal proceedings to bring about indireclty the effect which it would have had if registered. The contention that the deed was a recorded memdorandum of an already complete oral release/relinquishment of rights preceding its execution does not commend for acceptance by us. Neither the deed lends support to this contention nor the case set up in the plaint .Was suggestive of such a construction of the document. Upon our enquiry, learned counsel was constrained to admit that the deed in question could not operate to confer any right in respect of properties comprised in it upon the appellant unless it was registered in accordance with the law of the land. Our view of the document is also to the same effect. Its plain language suggested that it intended to create rights in praesenti and was not a mere memoranda of an already orally complete transaction. Though it did not expressly state the value of the property sought to be relinquished by it, yet there is no manner of doubt that it was in respect of the interests exceeding Rs,100 in value. Appellant's learned counsel indicated the value of the property in dispute at several lacs whereas learned counsel for respondent No,1 who held a watching brief talked of crores of rupees. Therefore, in default of registration, relinquishment deed failed to affect the immovable property comprised in it. Upon this view of the matter, plaint in the suit for declaration of title to the immovable properties based upon written relinquishment deed was rightly rejected at its inception for failing to disclose a cause of action for the trial of the suit in accordance with the mode of trial laid down for it in the Civil Procedure Code. The document could not operate to create any right in respect of it as a relinquishment of rights by defendant No,1. Accordingly, we do not find any fault with the impugned order of the trial Court rejecting the plaint under Order VII, rule 11, Civil Procedure Code and would dismiss the appeal against its decision in limine. For what other purposes the deed can be admitted in evidence, we do not consider it necessary to express leaving it for the plaintiff-appellant to look for them in law. As for those, our order shall not be a bar.