' This revision petition arises out of a suit for possession through preemption filed by respondents Nos.1 to 4 on 21-3-1982 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Muzaffargarh. The land forming subject- matter of the dispute measuring 16 kanals situated at Basti Sandhila Tehsil and District Muzzaffargarh, was purchased by Mst. Phaphan, respondent, from Hussain son of Eisa on 14-12-1981.
The petitioner claiming to be a tenant had also filed a suit for possession against Mst. Phaphan, respondent No,5. However, the parties arrived at a compromise and the Collector, Muzaffargarh, decreed the suit in favour of the petitioner to the extent of 8 kanals on the basis of the compromise on 10-11-1987.
2. In the present suit, the learned Civil Judge passed a decree in favour of respondents Nos.1 to 4 on 28th July, 1987. The petitioner mentioned in the revision petition that an appeal was filed by him, which was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Muzaffargarh, on 8-2-1988. However, this assertion has turned out to be factually incorrect. In fact, the revision petition was directly filed in the High Court, challenging the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 28-7-1987.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the judgment and decree of the trial Court passed after 31-7-1986, the target date fixed by the Supreme Court in the case of Government of N.-W.F.P. Through Secretary Law Department v.Malik Said Kamal Shah PLD 1986 SC 360, the decree is a nullity in the eyes of law. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents urged that no case for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction was made out, because the petitioner had a remedy by way of an appeal, which he did not avail of. According to the lcarned counsel, the revisional jurisdiction could not be exercised in the circumstances of the present case. He placed reliance on Taj Din v. M.B.R. (Consolidation) and another NLR 1980 UC 252 Lah., Faizul Haque and others v. Jam ila Begum and others 1983 CLC 454, Sardar Ashiq Muhammad Khan Mazari and 3 others v. Chairman, Federal Land Commission, Islamabad and 4 others PLD 1977 Lah. 461, The Punjab Association Club, Lahore v.Ajor Ejaz Ahmad Khan and another PLD 1980 Lah. 675 and Gul Zada v. Haji Muhammad Umar and 7 others PLD 1978 Pesh.
170.
4. Admittedly, in the present case, the decree was passed on 28-7-1987, about a year after the target date fixed by the Supreme Court in Government of N.-W.F.P. Through Secretary, Law Department v. Malik Said Kamal Shah PLD 1986 SC 360. Obviously, the same is a nullity in the eyes of law and cannot be maintained. No doubt, ordinarily, the revisional jurisdiction is not exercised, if the remedy by way of an appeal is not availed of. However, in a case like the present one in which the decree is without jurisdiction, this Court will not hesitate to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction to declare that the decree is a nullity in the eye of law. In case of Manager, Jammu & Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and others PLD 1975 SC 678, it was held that mere technicalities were not to be allowed to defeat the ends of justice. It was further held, "although ordinarily Courts have declined to exercise the revisional jurisdiction where an alternative remedy is available yet this is not an inflexible rule to be rigidly followed and departure could justifiably be made if required by the circumstances of the case". In the case of the Board of Control for Cricket in Pakistan v. Messrs Sindh Cricket Association, Hyderabad 1986 CLC 83, the contention that High Court should not interfere where an alternate remedy by way of an appeal had not been availed of was repelled. It was held that in case of complete lack of jurisdiction in Court and also lack of bona fides, the High Court could interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. In the case of Malik Muhammad alias Malkoo and others v. Jan Muhammad 1989 CLC 776, the preemption decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff on 28-3-1988 and was confirmed in appeal on the basis of a compromise between the parties. The said decree was set aside by the High Court in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction holding it to be totally without jurisdiction in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Said Kamal's case PLD 1986 SC 360.
5. Now coming to the judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents. The case of Taj Din v. M.B.R. (Consolidation) and another NLR 1980 UC 252 is not relevant because it relates to the revisional jurisdiction of Board of Revenue: It was held that the Board of Revenue could not entertain a direct revision where the party had failed to file an appeal before the Additional Commissioner. The case pertained to a Consolidation Scheme which was confirmed on 25-3-1961 and possession of land was exchanged between the parties as agreed by them. Instead of filing an appeal against the confirmation of the scheme, respondent No,2 in the said case filed a miscellaneous application before the Additional Commissioner on 27-10-1965 which was dismissed on 10-8-1966. Thereafter, he filed a revision petition before the Board of Revenue, which was accepted eight years after the possession had been delivered on the basis of an agreed scheme.
Under these circumstances, it was held that the Board of Revenue could not directly entertain the revision petition after a delay of several years, although the revision petition could have been filed within 90 days of the date of the impugned order. No argument was raised in this Court that the original order passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer was without jurisdiction. The case of Faizul Hassan and others v. Jamila Begum and others 1983 CLC 454 proceeds on its own peculiar facts. A revision was filed against a preliminary decree, although an appeal was competent. It was noticed by the Court that a court-fee of Rs,15,000 was payable on the appeal and for that reason, the said remedy was resorted to. Moreover, if a preliminary decree is not challenged in appeal, it becomes final and cannot be set aside in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, the revision was held to be incompetent. In the case of Sardar Ashiq Muhammad Khan Mazari and 3 others v. The Chairman, Federal Land Commission, Islamabad and 4 others PLD 1977 Lah. 461, the question related to the exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction by the Federal Government under paragraph 29 of the Land Reforms Regulations, 1972. It has no bearing on the interpretation of section 115 of the C.P.C. In the case of Punjab Association Club, Lahore v. Major Ijaz Ahmad Khan and another PLD 1980 Lah. 675, an order passed under section 47 of the C.P.C. Was challenged in revision without filing the appeal and the Court declined to exercise the revisional jurisdiction. The High Court had refused to interfere because the petitioner had been using dilatory tactics to keep in abeyance delivery of possession of property in dispute. It was noted that he had come to the Court with unclean hands. In the case of Gulzada v. Haji Muhammad Umar and 7 others PLD 1978 Peshawar 170 the second revision was held to be incompetent against the revisional order passed by the District Judge.
6. No doubt, ordinarily, a revision petition is not directly entertained by the High Court. But, as held by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Manager, Jammu & Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and others PLD 1975 SC 678, mere technicalities are not to be to allowed to defeat the ends of justice and a departure could justifiably be made if required by the circumstances of the case. In the present case, the decree passed by the trial Court after the target date, fixed by the Supreme Court in the case of Government of N.-W.F.P. Through Secretary, Law Department v. Malik Said Kamal Shah PLD 1986 SC 360 was totally without jurisdiction. Even the learned counsel appearing for the respondents frankly conceded that the impugned decree was without jurisdiction. That being so, there could be no hurdle in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the decree. I, therefore, allow this petition and set aside the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge, Muzaffargarh, leaving the parties to hear their own costs.