The applicants Khokhar Glass Works, situated at S. I. T. E., Karachi, have applied to this Court under section 45 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, for an order prohibiting the continuance of strike resorted to, by the respondent-Union in 'furtherance of the strike notice dated 1C-17- 1969, and existing as from 12-1'-1970. 'The application is based on two grounds that the strike is illegal and is contrary to the constitution of the respondent-Union..
2. Notice of this application was served on the respondent and we have heard Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani for the applicants and Mr. Wahid Bashir for the respondents. The facts are that the respondent-Union served a charter of demands on the applicants. The charter is dated 29-11-1969, and was received by the 'applicants on 7-12-1969. This latter fact is established by the post-mark on the envelope containing the charter of demands. They after the strike notice dated 10-12-1969 was served by the respondent-Union on the applicants having been received on 15-12-69.
In the context of these facts, which have not been denied and indeed, been admitted at 'the bar by the learned counsel of 'the respondents, Mr. Ghari has argued that on 'the established fact that the charter of demands dated 29-I1-69, was received by the applicants on 7-12-1969. Under the provisions of subsection (2)1 of section 26 of the Ordinance, the applicants were required t A consult the respondent-Union within a period of seven days from the receipt of the charter of demands. The respondent-Union is admittedly the only Union of workers of the applicants and there--fore the collective bargaining agent. It was therefore necessary that the party receiving the notice should in consultation with the representatives of the Union arrange a meeting with the representatives of the Union with a view to reaching an agreement through the procedure of a dialogue. It is contended therefore that it was necessary for a period of seven days, to elapse to which period the applicants were entitled within which to consult u the respondent-Union and arrange a meeting with them and if possible to reach an agreement through a dialogue. During this period which would normally be available to the applicants up to 14-12-1969, the respondent Union served a strike notice on 10-12-1969, was received by the applicants on 11-12-1969. It has been rightly urged in the context of these facts that within the period of seven days, after 7-12-1969 which was a period meant for conciliation and dialogue, the respondent had over-stepped, their right under the Ordinance and prematurely served the strike notice dated 10-12-1969, on the applicants, received by the later on I5-12-1969. It has beers further urged therefore that the right to serve- a strike notice to the respondent could only accrue after 14-12-1969, and in the context of section 28 of the Ordinance, that only when the collective bargaining proceedings under section 26 of the Ordinance have failed, the employees of the collective bargaining agent may serve on the other side to the dispute, a 2,1 days' notice to strike.
Consequently it is, urged and in our view quite rightly, that the respondents were debarred from raising an industrial dispute nor could it be set to exist unless it has been raised in the prescribed manner by the collective bargaining agent. The position to us is quite clear in the context of what has been already stated to the facts of the case.
3. It Lam, next been argued that under clause 13(g) of the constitution of the respondent-Union, it was necessary that one week's notice be given for the holding of an annual or ordinary general meeting. Further that under clause 16 (Strike) of the same constitution of the respondent-Union, it was necessary for the Union to comply with certain preliminaries before resorting to a strike and that the respondents have been unable to show that this procedure under-clauses 13 and i6 was in fact followed before the respondents gave the strike notice dated 10-12-1969, and resorted in fact to the strike as from 2-1-1970. Learned counsel for the respondents have been unable to rebuet any one of these contentions on first point on which this application has been made and on the details of the working of the respondent Union under their constitution before resorting to a strike. It has to be presumed that the respondent-Union are bound by the edicts of their own constitution anti they have been unable to satisfy us that they have proceeded in accordance with it.
4. We hold on both the points urged on behalf of the applicants, that the strike resorted to by the respondents is illegal. We declare accordingly and further order the discontinuance on the strike, both being in violation of the Ordinance and of the constitution of the respondent-Union: