DECISION This is an appeal filed by the appellant under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, against an impugned order, dated 24-11-1986, passed by the Commissioner Workmen's Compensation, Hyderabad, who had dismissed an application of the appellant under section 8(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.
2. Brief facts of the case were that the appellant while in the employment of Messrs Sole Pakistan Limited, Hyderabad, met with an accident on 10-2-1985, resulting in that his left hand/arm was seriously crushed thereby making him permanent disable, and as the provisions of Workmen's Compensation were applicable to the respondent establishment, he claimed a compensation of Rs,16,000 which was rejected, therefore, he had filed an application before the Commissioner Workmen's Compensation at Hyderabad. The respondent establishment had resisted the application on the ground that as the appellant, being a secured person under the provisions of Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965, therefore, he was not entitled to any compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, because he was receiving a pension of Rs,562.50 per month till life. Thereafter the learned Commissioner Workmen's Compensation, after hearing both the parties oh the legal objection of the respondent establishment regarding the maintainability of the application/claim of the appellant; had passed the impugned order, hence the present appeal.
3. I have heard the appellant, who is present in person. Though, at their own request a number of adjournments were granted to the respondents establishment, but, even today, nemo was present on behalf of the respondent establishment. At the very outset, I would observe here that both the parties before the learned Commissioner Workmen's Compensation had placed reliance in support of their respective cases on an authority of the Supreme Court, reported in PLD 1984 SC at page 241. Therefore, it was contended by the appellant that the learned Commissioner was not legally correct in interpreting this authority in favour of the respondents establishment while passing the impugned order. It was contended by the appellant that in the same authority of the Supreme Court, it was held that the benefits under both of the laws i,e, Social Security Ordinance and Workmen's Compensation Act were available to the aggrieved person, wherein, it was observed, as under:-- In the light of the foregoing discussion regarding language used, the reparability and interaction of the two parts of section 81 and their placement (as done in the earlier reproduction) its provisions become tangible besides being operative in each and every part thereof. Thus applied, the exercise made in the Karachi case of Mst. Lal Jan regarding inconsistencies in the sense of incomparability, would have to be made in every case of the present type. After doing the same it would be resolved whether or not the benefit and/or compensation available under any of the laws mentioned in the first part of section 81, would not be obtainable in addition to the benefits under the Social Security Ordinance. In this case proper comparison was made. by the special forums constituted in this behalf, on the lines as was done in the Karachi case of Mst. Lal Jan. The compensation available under the Workmen's Compensation Act to the appellant was not found inconsistent/ incompatible with the relevant benefits under the Social Security Ordinance.
Accordingly both the benefits under both the Laws could be obtained by the appellant. That being so this appeal merits acceptance."
4. In view of the above, I would hold that the learned Commissioner Workmen's Compensation was not correct in passing the impugned order. I would accordingly set aside and allow the present appeal. The result would be that the appellant is directed to be paid an amount of Rs,16,800 (Rupees sixteen thousand eight hundred only), also as a compensation for his permanent disablement, in addition to his monthly pension as already being given to him, by the respondents establishment within one month from the date of this decision.