' This was a suit under section 77 of the Registration Act, 1908. It was brought by Muhammad Sadiq, plaintiff, respondent herein, who claimed to be the vendee under a sale-deed said to have been executed by Muhammad Din, defendant, now petitioner, on 7-1-1977. The suit was decreed by the judgment of the learned Civil Judge, Lahore, dated 8-2-1983, and the petitioner's appeal was dismissed by the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, dated 15-6-1983.
2. Shortly stated the facts are that a sale-deed in respect of the property in dispute was written on 7-1-1977; by it, Muhammad Din petitioner, had purportedly sold the property in dispute to Muhammad Sadiq, Respondent, for Rs,20,000. Rs,3,000 had been received by the petitioner as earnest money and the remaining sale price was to be paid before the Registering Officer. It was the petitioner's case that he had agreed to mortgage the property; that he had signed the deed dated 7-1-1977, thinking that it was a mortgage deed and that he had refused to have it registered when the deed was read over to him and he learnt to his surprise that it was not a mortgage deed but a sale-deed.
3. The deed was presented for registration before the Registering Officer on 4-5-1977. The Registering Officer refused to register it by his order dated 29-6-1977. The plaintiff preferred an appeal before the District Registrar under section 73 of the Registration Act (hereinafter to be called the Act) on 6-8-1977 and the District Registrar dismissed the appeal by his order dated 26- 5-1980 on the ground that the appeal, so preferred, was time-barred.
4. This suit was instituted on 21-6-1980, that is within 30 days of the District Registrar's order dated 26-5-1980.
5. Section 71 of the Act provides that every Sub-Registrar refusing to register a document "shall make an order of refusal and record his reasons for such order in his Book No,2, and endorse the word 'registration refused' on the document; and, on application made by any person executing or claiming under the document, shall, without payment and unnecessary delay, give him a copy of the reasons so recorded." By section 72, "except where the refusal is made on the ground of denial of execution, an appeal shall lie against an order of a Sub-Registrar refusing to admit a document to registration (whether the registration of such a documents is compulsory or optional) to the Registrar to whom such Sub-registrar is subordinate, if presented to such Registrar within thirty days from the date of the order; and the Registrar may reverse or alter such order." Section 73 of the Act, by its subsection (1) enacts that "when a Sub-Registrar has refused to register a document on the ground that any person by whom it purports to be executed, or his representative or assign, denies its execution, any person claiming under such document, or his representative, assign or agent authorized as aforesaid, may, within thirty days after the making of the order of refusal, apply to the Registrar to whom such Sub-Registrar is subordinate in order to establish his right to have the document registered." "In such case," so provides Section 74 of the Act, "the Registrar shall, as soon as conveniently may be, enquire--
(a) whether the document has been executed;
(b) whether the requirements of the law for the time being in force have been complied with on the part of the applicant or ' 'person presenting the document for registration, as the case may be, so as to entitle the document to registration."
' If the Registrar finds that the document has been executed and that the said requirements have been complied with, he shall, under section 75 of the Act, order the document to be registered.
Section 76, by its subsection (1) of the Act, says that every Registrar refusing-- "(a) to register a document except on the ground that the property which it relates is not situate within district or that the document ought to be registered in the office of a Sub-Registrar, or
(b) to direct the registration of a document under section 72 or section 75, shall make an order of refusal and record the reasons for such order in his Book No,2, and, on application made by any person executing or claiming under the document, shall, without unnecessary delay, give him a copy of the reasons so recorded".
6. Section 77, by its subsection (1) of the Act, enacts: "Where the Registrar refuses to order the document to be registered, under section 72 or section 76, any person claiming under such document, or his representative, assign or agent, may, within thirty days after the making of the order of refusal, institute in the civil Court, within the local limits of whose original jurisdiction is situate the office in which the document is sought to be registered, a suit for a decree directing the document to be registered in such office if it be duly presented for registration within thirty days after the passing of such decree."
7. It is evident that as this wag' a case in which the Sub-Registrar had refused to register a document on the ground of denial of execution, no appeal under section 72 of the Act lay and that it was a case falling to be dealt with under section 73 of the Act. In other words, this was a case in which the Sub-Registrar had refused to register a document on the ground of denial of execution by the petitioner and, therefore, the remedy of the respondent was to apply to the Registrar "within thirty days after the making of the order of refusal" in order to establish his-right to have the document registered.
8. For the petitioner, the contention before the Courts below as also before me was that as the plaintiff had not applied to the Registrar within thirty days after the making of the order of refusal dated 29-6-1977, the provisions of section 73 of the Act were not complied with and the Registrar had not enquired, and had not the jurisdiction to enquire, whether the document had been executed and, therefore, the plaintiff had no right to institute a suit under section 73 of the Act.
Before the learned Courts below, reliance was placed upon Gangadara Mudali v. Sambasiva Mudali ((1917) 40 I.C. 192) and it was assumed, and if I may say so assumed wrongly, that the case was an authority for the view that even if the application under section 73 of the Act was not made within thirty days after the making of the order of refusal, the order of the Registrar, dismissing the application under section 73 of the Act, amounted to refusal to register the document within the meaning of section 77 of the Act and entitled the aggrieved party to sue for the enforcement of registration under that section. The facts of that case are not clear from the report; it, however, appears that that was a case falling under section 72 of the Act and the Registrar had dismissed the appeal not on the ground that the appeal before him was presented out of time but on the ground that there was a prior order refusing to extend time. In point of fact, when the case, namely, Kunhimmu v. Viyyathamma ((1884) 7 Madras 535), was cited before the learned Judges, they distinguished it on the ground that "the appeal to the Registrar in that case having been presented after the expiry of the prescribed period, it was considered as if there was no appeal and admittedly where there has been no appeal to the Registrar, no suit will lie under section 77".
9. There is respectable authority directly on the point, which unfortunately, was cited neither before the Courts below nor before me. I refer to Edun v. Mohammad Siddik and another 1 L R 9 Cal. 150), a Full. Bench case of the Allahabad High Court, namely,Bhagwan, Singh v. Maula Bakhsh I L R 3 All.
397) and Kunhimmu v. Viyyathamma ((1884) 7 M. 535). In the cases of Edun v. Mohammad Siddik and Kunhimmu v. Viyyathamma both being cases under section 73 of the Act, the application under that section had not been made till after the expiry of 30 days; it was held in the first case that "the plaintiffs cannot succeed undo- section 77 of the Act, because they did not comply with the conditions precedent to the maintenance of a suit under that section" and in the Kunhimmu case,-it was held that "it is only when an application has been made to the Registrar in time and, after inquiry, registration has been, again refused that a Civil. Court is competent under section 77 to order registration." In Bhagwan Singh case, the plaintiff did not make any application to the Registrar under section 73 of the Act but instituted a suit to compel registration without taking any steps under that section. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, "while regretting to find themselves constrained by the plain language of the law to admit the validity of the objection raised to the maintenance of the suit," observed that "unfortunately for the plaintiff, 'he has failed to satisfy all the conditions precedent to the bringing of such a suit by omitting to make the application to the Registrar provided by section 73", that "the suit mentioned in section 77 may be instituted where the Registrar refuses to order the document to be registered", and that in having failed to fulfil all the necessary preliminaries the plaintiff has put it out of the power of the Civil Court to give him the relief he asks. To decree the prayer of this plaint in terms would be to direct a public officer to do that which he is specifically and plainly told not to do."
10. The same question fell for consideration in Udit Upadhia and another v. Imam Bandi Bibi (I L R 24 All. 402), a case under section 73 of the Act. An application under that section before the Registrar was formally made two days after the time limited by that section and the Registrar had summarily rejected it and the question was whether the suit under section 77 of the Act was competent. The question was considered by a Division Bench consisting of Sir John Stanley, Knight, C.J. And Mr. Justice Burkitt. Mr. Justice Burkitt was of the opinion that the right of suit given by section 77 of Act arises only when the Registrar, "on an application complying with all the provisions of the second and third paragraphs of section 73 of the Act having been presented to him, has upheld the order of the Sub-Registrar, and has refused to direct the document to be registered.
One of the conditions precedent to the presentation and admission of an application under section 73 of the Act, as laid down in the second paragraph of that section, is that the application must be made within thirty days from the day of the order of refusal by the Sub-Registrar It is a provision which, ...., the Legislature intended to be obeyed, and not to be disregarded When then an application purporting to be an application under section 73 of the Act is presented to the Registrar after the expiration of the thirty days...., such an application is not....An application which could be entertained under that section and the summary rejection of such an application, on the ground that it was put in beyond time.... Cannot be considered to be a refusal under section 76 of the Act to order the document to be registered within the meaning of the opening words of section 77 of the Act, so as to give a right of suit under section 77". The words "in such case" in section 74 of the Act, it apeared to Burkitt J, are most important; "they govern section 74 and the following sections, and....
Imply into section 74 all the provisions of section 73, and clearly imply that it is only when an application, purporting to have been presented under section 73, complies with all the conditions required by that section, that action is to be taken under section 74 and the two following sections".
It was clear to Burkitt, J. That when an application was summarily rejected as being in violation of the conditions required by section 73 "that rejection cannot be considered a refusal to direct registration under section 76 so as to give a right of suit under section 77 of the Act". He held, therefore, that it such a case, there is no refusal to direct registration under section 76, "the Registrar not having applied his mind to the question as to whether the document ought to be registered, but having simply thrown out (as he was bound to do) a petition which purported to be an application under section 73, but which, being presented after the prescribed period had expired, was not an application complying with the requirements of that section and could not be entertained".
11. There being a difference of opinion between the Chief Justice and Burkitt, J. The question was referred to a Full Bench consisting of the CJ., Burkitt, J. And Aikman, J. Aikman, J. Speaking for the Full Bench endordsed the view of Burkitt J. And held that "in the absence of such an application, i,e, of an application presented within the time, the Registrar has, in a case like the present, no jurisdiction to make any inquiry whatever; he must reject the application in limine." He adopted the interpretation of the words "in such case" (in section 74 of the Act) of Burkitt, J. And held that "the refusal of the Registrar C referred to in section 76 is a refusal upon an inquiry which presupposes the presentation of an application within time". From the opening words of section 73, he further held, the conclusion necessarily followed that "to create a right of D suit in the Civil Court there must have been a refusal to order registration following upon an inquiry held upon an application presented within time." Sir John Stanley, Knight, C.J. Could not but accept the force of these reasons and agree both with Aikman, J and Burkitt, J that in such a case, a suit under section 77 of the Act is not competent.
12. These are, if I may say so, powerful rea,sons and I will respectfully adopt them. If I may venture to supplement those reasons, I shall add that the right to have a deed registered is not a common law right; it has no existence apart from section 77 of the Act. Similarly, the right of an appeal under section 72 and the F right to apply under section 73 of the Act also being creations of the Act, it follows as inexorable logic that the District Registrar cannot but exercise his powers subject to the conditions and qualifications prescribed by those sections. As a general rule, it was held in Atta Muhammad. Oureshi v. The Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore and 2 others (PLD 1971 Supreme Court 61), statutes, which enable persons to take legal proceedings under certain specified circumstances must be accurately obeyed and when a statute confers jurisdiction upon a tribunal of limited authority and statutory origin, the G conditions and qualifications annexed to the grant must be strictly applied. The District Registrar cannot, therefore, ignore the period of limitation prescribed by the Act, to which Act he owes his creation, on any ground. Thus, if an appeal under section 72 or an application under section 73 of the Act has not been made timeously and the District Registrar has proceeded to inquire whether the H document has been executed, he will have acted without jurisdiction, for the presentation of the appeal under section 72 and the making of the application under section 73 of the Act within 30 days, is a necessary condition precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction of the District Registrar to- inquire into that question.
13. For these reasons, the revision petition is accepted, 'the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside and the suit is dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.