This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 impugnes the judgments and decrees dated 17th March, 1988 and 14th of June, 1988 passed by Family Court, Mandi Bahaud Din and Additional District Judge, Gujrat respectively in a suit for maintenance filed by respondents Nos.1 and 2.
2.Mst. Zenab Bibi, respondent No.1 was married to the petitioner about 15 years ago and out of this wedlock a son, Muhammad Khalid Masood, respondent No.2 herein, was born in the year 1968. On 15-1-1987, respondents Nos.1 and 2 filed a suit for recovery of maintenance against the petitioner in the Family Court at Mandi Bahaud Din claiming past maintenance for 12 years as also future maintenance at the rate of Rs.2,000 per month. The suit was contested by the petitioner on various grounds. The Judge Family Court, Mandi Bahaud Din proceeded to decree the suit on 17-3-1988, Mst. Zcnab Bibi respondent No.1 was allowed maintenance at the rate of Rs.150 per month from 26- 1-1981 to 26-1-1987 i.e. The date on which marriage between her and the petitioner was dissolved.
Muhammad Khalid Masood, respondent No.2 was held entitled to maintenance at the rate of Rs.150 per month w.e.f. 13-2-1980. This decree was challenged by the petitioner by filing an appeal which was, however, dismissed by the, Additional District Judge, Gujrat.
3. Ch. Muhammad Abdus Salim, learned counsel for the petitioner mainly contended that the Family Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance for a period beyond three years of the filing of the suit. It was argued that as the suit in the present case was filed on 5-2-1987, the respondents Nos.1 and 2 could at the most have been allowed maintenance from 5-2-1984 and the claim for maintenance for the prior period was barred by limitation and, therefore, unenforceable in law. The learned counsel relied upon Abdul Latif v. Mst. Bakht Bhari and 2 others (1985 CLC 1184) and Mst.
Hajran Bibi v. Abdul Khaliq (PLD 1981 Lah. 761). Hamid Ali Shah Advocate, who has appeared on behalf of the respondents, however, strenuously contended that the limitation for filing a suit for maintenance was six years and not three years as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
4. There can be no cavil that the provisions of Limitation Act 1908 are applicable to proceedings before the Family Court and further that section 3 of the Limitation Act obliges a Court in no unmistakable term to reject the claim if it is beyond the time prescribed by the first Schedule to the.
Act. There is no specific Article in the Schedule providing limitation for filing suits for maintenance, with the result that the resort must be had to the residuary Article 120 of the Limitation Act which prescribes 6 years period as limitation. A Division Bench of this Court in Muhammad Nawaz v. Mst.
Khurshid Begum and others (VV.P. No. 835 of 1969) decided on 15th December, 1969 was called upon to consider the question as to whether the past maintenance could be granted by the Arbitration Council under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and if so, for what period. It was held: "...Itis conceded by the learned counsel that there is no Article in the Schedule to the 1'.Imitation Act dealing specifically with the question of the recovery of past maintenance, and for that reason the matter may be said to be governed by the residuary Article 120 which prescribes a period of six years. The past maintenance in the present case has been allowed by the Arbitration Council expressly for a period of five years and ten months which would, therefore, appear to be within the period of limitation as obtaining under Article 120 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act."
This judgment was affirmed in appeal by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case reported as Muhammad Nawaz v. Mst. Khurshid Begum and three others (P L -D 1972 SC 302). The above- quoted observations of the Division Bench were approved by the Supreme Court in the following terms:- "...Inthe present case, the High Court has considered the question of limitation and has come to the conclusion that Article 120 of the Limitation Act applies to the facts of the present case and the claim of the respondent was not barred by limitation. In this view of the matter, we are satisfied that the High Court has rightly held that the Arbitration Council was competent to award past maintenance."
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to cite any specific Article of the Limitation Act but contended that since past maintenance was a debt due, the limitation for filing such a suit would be three years. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court as also by the Division Bench of this Court this submission of the learned counsel cannot be given any weight.
The learned counsel attempted to distinguish the above-cited precedents by urging that in those cases the matter arose under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 while in the present case the proceedings have arisen out of a suit filed under the Punjab Muslim Family Courts Act, 1964. The distinction sought to be drawn by the learned counsel is more illusory than real. Both under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 as also the Punjab Muslim Family Courts Act, 1964 the Arbitration Council or the Family Court are called upon to 8 grant maintenance by enforcing the same substantive law namely Muslim Law which requires a husband/father to maintain the neglected were and children. It is interesting to point out that the learned counsel in support of the proposition that the limitation in matters of past maintenance is three years has himself relied upon Abdul Latif v. Mst. Bakht Bhari and two others (1985 CLC 1184) which arose out of proceedings under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961.
As regards the reliance of the learned counsel on Abdul Latif's case, it is to be noticed that the question of limitation was not discussed in detail and was not in issue before the Court as the dispute was as to whether the maintenance can be granted for children by the Arbitration Council under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. In these circumstances, there is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 has no applicability.
It was next contended that there was no justification for the two Courts below to have decreed the claim of respondents Nos. l and 2. However, there are concurrent findings of fact recorded against the petitioner by both the Courts which are not liable to be interfered with in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction of this Court especially when no misreading of evidence or no consideration of any material has been pointed out.
For the foregoing reasons, I find no merit in the writ petition. It is dismissed with no order as to costs.