1. ABDUL KADIR SHAIKH, J.---The facts leading to this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan briefly stated are that the petitioners Mst. Fatima filed Declaration under paragraph 7 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 for approval of certain alienations made in respect of her landed property during the period from 1st March 1967 and 19th December 1971 in the prescribed form. On scrutiny the Land Commissioner, Sind approved all those alienations by the order dated 19th June 1972. However, by the subsequent order dated 2nd October 1972 he reviewed the earlier order and declared all the alterations as void and ineffective in view of the amendment made in paragraph 7(1)(b) of the Regulation, as a result of the effect of the Sind Ordinance No. XIV of 1972 promulgated on the 2nd September 1972.
2. The petitioner has challenged the order on several grounds. It was firstly urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that no notice as required under rule 10 of the Sind Land Reforms Rules, 1972 was issued to, the petitioner or to any other person in whose favour the alienation had been approved, and the impugned order having thus been passed in violation of the law as well as the principles of natural justice is liable to be quashed on, this short ground. The learned counsel then contended that no doubt that Mr. Abdullah D. Baloch who passed the impugned order, in his capacity of the Land Commissioner, Sind, Hyderabad was promoted to the rank of a Commissioner of a Division by virtue of Notification issued by the Provincial Government on 10th May 1972, but his appointment as Land Commissioner, Sind under the same Notification is invalid as it was made by the Provincial Government, and not the Sind Land Commission. In this behalf the learned counsel relied upon the provisions of the Paragraph 4(5) of the Regulation which authorises Land Commission to set up the Organization and appoint officers, authorities or persons and confer powers on and assign duty to them. It was urged that the only competent authority under the law for the appoint--ment of Mr. Abdullah D. Baluch as the Land Commissioner, Sind was the Land Commission itself, and not the Provincial Government. The learned counsel pointed out few Notifications by which certain officers, including Mr. Abdullah D. Baloch himself as the Secretary of the Land Commission, were appointed by the Land Commission, in terms of Paragraph 4(5) of the Regulation.
3. The next contention urged by the learned counsel was in regard to the challenge to the vires of the Martial Law Regulation No. 128. On this behalf it was pointed out that although this Martial Law Regulation was-- issued on 20-4-1972, yet it was not published in the Gazette of Pakistan until 22- 4-1972, and due to the promulgation of the Interim Constitution, 1972 in, the meanwhile it cannot have any legal value. Another challenge was made-- for the reasons of the withdrawal of Martial Law by the President of Pakistan: by his proclamation of the same day, whereby the offices of the Chief Martial Law etc. Were abolished, and the power to issue Martial Law Orders lapsed. On this argument was based the further contention that with the disappearance of the Martial Law Regulation No. 118 on account of the invalidity in law, the Order issued by the President of Pakistan on 2-4-1972, whereby the maximum ceiling of land of 15,000, P. I. Units permissible under para-- graph 8(1) of the Regulation was reduced to only 12,000 P. I. Units, must also disappear.
4. The learned counsel then challenged the vires of the Sind Land Reforms-- Regulation (Sind Amendment) Ordinance No. XIV of 1972 which brought about changes in Paragraph 7 of the Regulation, whereby all the alienations by way of gift to non-heirs have been declared not to be bona fide transaction with retrospective effect, on the ground that it was not promulgated in persuance of instructions of the President envisaged by Article 135 (A) of the Interim Constitution, 1972.
5. It was accordingly contended by the learned counsel that the order passed by the learned Land Commissioner, Sind dated 2-10-1972 in exercise of the purported powers vested in him under the aforesaid Amending Ordinance, invalidating the alienations made to non-heirs, in modification of his earlier order dated 19-6-1972, is therefore, illegal and devoid of any legal authority.
6. So far as the position in law in regard to Martial Law Regulation No. 115 is concerned, no challenge having been made against it, the result that must follow it is that the alienations made by the petitioner became void ab initio by virtue of the provisions made in Paragraph 7 of the Regulation, unless these were approved as bona fide transactions or otherwise served under the provisions of the same paragraph. The paragraph reads as follows :- "(b) save in cases where the Commission is satisfied that it was a bona fide transaction the transfer of any land and the creation of any right or interest in or encumbrance on any land, made in any manner whatsoever, by any person holding on first March 1967, an area equivalent to more than fifteen thousand produce index units (calculated on the basis of classification of soil as entered in the Revenue Records for Kharif 1966 and Rabi 1966-67), shall be and shall be deemed always to have been void, and the land so transferred or the land on which the right, interest or encumbrance was created shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been owned or possession, as the case may be, by the person by whom owned or possessed, as the case may be, by the person by whom it was owned or possessed immediately before that date Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to an alienation made by a person in favour of his heir.
7. Explanation I.-For the purpose of this sub-paragraph and paragraph 10, an heir shall mean the owner's wife or wives, sons, daughters, father, mother and sons and daughters of a deceased son or daughter.
8. Explanation II-Where any such transaction as is referred to in clause (b) of this sub-paragraph has resulted in the transfer of any land or the creation of any right or interest in or encumbrance on any land in favour of a member of the owner's family or the reversion of such land to such owner or member, whether through the intermediation of a third person or otherwise, such transaction shall b; deemed to be void, and the laud so transferred or encumbered shall be deemed to have been owned or possessed, as the case may be, by the person by whom it was owned or possessed immediately before such transfer or encum--brance.
9. Explanation III.-In determining whether a transaction referred to in clause (b) of paragraph (1) was bona fide or otherwise, the Commis--sioner shall, among other matters, take into consideration the following factors
(i) whether adequate consideration has been paid by or on behalf of the person in whose favour the transfer has been made or any right, interest or encumbrance has been created ;
(ii) under whose management the land has remained which is claimed to have been transferred or in respect of which any right, interest or encumbrance has been created ;
(iii) who has been paying the land revenue and other charges in respect of such land ;
(iv) who has been receiving the rent for or batai share from such land."
10. The petitioner disclosed four alienations made by her during the specified period, and succeeded in getting these approved by the order of the learned Land Commissioner, Sind dated 19-6-1972.
11. This order reads as follows: "The declarant Mst. Fatima has disclosed the alienations during the specified period as under Deh Name of person and relation Area Nindo 1 Nisar Ahmed nephew 96-7-Gift Stt. No. Dt. 23-5-70 Entry No. 109/dt. 16-11-1970 Nindo 2 Muhammad Hassan cousin 101-9 Gift 7-9-68 Entry No. 104/ 7-5-69.
12. Nindo 3 Khair Muhammad cousin 96-7 23-9-70 Entry No. 109/ 1-11-70 Nindo 4 Amir A.I nephew 96-7 23-9-70 Entry No. 109/ 1-11-70 The alienation as in favour of two cousins and two nephews who are relations of the declarant are by way of gift through statement dated 23-9-1970. The gifts are according to Muslim Law. The alienees are reported to be in effective possession of the land. They are managing it, appropriating the produce and paying the land revenue. The alienations have been made in record-of-rights dated 16-11-70 i.e. Before the crucial date 20-12-1971. I hold these alienations are bona fide and I declare it to be void under paragraph 7 of the Regulation "
13. The learned Land Commissioner afterwards recalled this order in exercise of suo motu review powers by the order dated 2-10-1972. It reads: --- "I had confirmed the following alienations made by way of Gift by this declarant to persons other than heirs under para. 7 of Regulation vide my order No. 10-6-LC/72, dated 19-6-1972 by promulgation of Sind Ordinance No. XIV of 1972, the MLR-115 stands amended. Hence this order in review.
14. Alienation by gift to persons other than heirs Sr.
15. No. Name of alienees Relationship Nature of alienation Area under alienation 1.
16. Nisar Ahmed Nephew Gift 96-7 2.
17. Muhammad Hassan Cousin Gift 101-9 3.
18. Khair Muhammad Cousin Gift 96-7 4.
19. Amir A.I Nephew Gift 96-7 I have seen the record. I find that the above alienations are void ab initio under proviso to para. 7
(1) (b) of the Regulation. I therefore recall my confirmation orders in this respect and declare the above alienations as void and ineffective. The area involved should be added to the holding of the declarant for order of resumption of excess land by the Deputy Land Commissioner: "In case, the D. L. C. Has already passed orders under para--graph 8 of the Regulation in this case, he is hereby authorised to review his own order or that of his predecessor and determine the case afresh."
20. We have already taken the view in several cases that the effect of para. 7 of the Regulation on the transactions covered by it is unfortunate. In Punhoon v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and others (Constitutional Petition No. 846 of 1973), we made the following observations: - "It may firstly be pointed out that an important effect of Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, was that the creation of any right or interest in or encumbrance on any land made in any manner whatever as from lst March 1967, in respect of any area held by a person who owned or possessed land beyond the prescribed limit, became void. It may well be that the gift made in petitioner's favour by his paternal niece Mst. Karima was valid under the Mohammadan Law, but this fact cannot take away the effect of the provisions of Martial Law Regulation 115, which wiped away petitioner's right in property, if any, the contention regarding violation of principles of natural justice is also misconceived since petitioner's alleged right in property was taken away by the Supra-Legislative measure. It does not lie in his mouth to complain that he should have been heard before the Martial Law Regulation No. 115, which adversely affects his rights in property was promul--gated.
21. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be said to have any right to the land. The alienation of the land made by Mst. Karima on 6th August 1969, was approved under provisions of paragraph 7 of the Regulation. Mst. Karima had indeed sought approval of the aliena--petition made by her in favour of the petitioner in the prescribed Declaration form but in the ultimate analysis the transaction was not approved as it is not provided for or envisaged by the provisions made in the Regulation. Under paragraph 7(b), the Regulation provides for recognition of the transfer of lands by way of gift in favour of an heir, who in Explanation I, mean the owner's wife or wives, sons, owner's husband, daughters, father, mother, sons and daughters of the deceased son or daughter. Admittedly the petitioner does not fall in this category. We, therefore, cannot see how fault can be found with the learned Land Commissioner, Sind, in refusing to confirm the alienation made by Mst. Karima in petitioner's favour."
22. It is therefore, clear that the effect of paragraph 7 of the Regulation was such that the alienations sought to be confirmed by the petitioner under this paragraph were totally void. This case, however, requires further examination m the light of the new contentions raised by the learned counsel.
23. The first challenge made by him was regarding the validity of the appointment of Mr. Abdullah D.
24. Baloch as the Land Commissioner, Sind, who passed the impugned order dated 2-10-1972 against the petitioner. We shay in this connection point out that the contention raised is hardly useful to the petitioner, for, what she seeks to achieve in this petition is the revival of the order dated 19-6-1972 which was also passed by the same official, namely, Mr. Abdullah D. Baloch, in his capacity as Land Commissioner, Sind. If the petitioner were to succeed in her challenge leveled against the appointment of Mr. Abdullah D. Baluch, the earlier order passed by him in her favour cannot be held as valid, and that order will have also to be set aside. However, as the question raised by the learned counsel is likely to be raised in many cases, it is only appropriate that we should settle this controversy.
25. It would be noticed from the various provisions of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 that the entire machinery for the purpose to be achieved by this Super-Legislative Instrument was entrusted to the Provinces, the reason obviously being that the Regulation related to the subject-matter on which the Provincial Legislature was competent to make the laws. A Land Commis--sion for each province was set up, consisting of the Governor of that province to be its Chairman, and not more than three members to be appointed by him. At a later stage, by an amendment made under the Land Reforms Regulation (Sind Amendment) Act XI of 1972, the Chief Minister was to be the Chairman of the Commission, and he was to appoint the members constituting the Commission.
26. We may now reproduce the relevant provisions of the regulation in order to appreciate the contentions raised in this case. Paragraphs 4 to 6 read as follows: --- "4. Constitution of Land Commissions and their powers.-(1) For carrying out the purposes of this regulation, there shall be constituted for each Province a Commission to be known as the Land Commission of the province concerned, consisting of the Governor of that Province, who shall be its Chairman, was not more that three members, to be appointment by the Governor.
(2) The Commission for the Province of the Punjab shall also be the Commission for the Islamabad Capital Territory.
(3) A Commission of a Province shall have all the powers necessary for the implementation of this Regulation within the Province.
(4) A Commission may nominate one of its members to the Chief Land Commissioner, who shall, subject to such directions as may from time to time be given by the Commission, be responsible for the implemen--tation of this Regulation.
(5) Each Commission may set up organizations and appoint officers, authorities and persons, and confer powers on, and assign duties to, them.
(6) Where any dispute arises in carrying into effect the provisions of this Regulation, it shall be referred to the Commission for the province within which such dispute arises, and the decision of the Commission thereon shall be final.
(7) Where any dispute or difference arises between two or more commis--sions with respect to any provision of, or any matter connected with this Regulation, it shall be referred to the President, whose decision thereon shall be final.
(8) Where any matter is not provided for in this Regulation, or any difficulty arises in giving effect to the purpose of this Regulation, a Commission may, in respect thereof as it thinks fit, or as may bs directed by the President, and such order shall be deemed to form a part of this Regulation and have effect accordingly.
5. Delegation of powers.-A Commission may, by notification in the official Gazette, direct that the powers exercise-able by it under this Regulation may, subject to such conditions, including provisions as to appeal, revision or review, if any, as may be specified in the notification, be exercised also by any of its members or officers or authorities subordinate to it Provided that a Commission shall not delegate its powers under sub--paragraph (2) of paragraph 7 to an officer below the rank of a Commissioner of a Division.
6. Power to make rules.-A Commission may make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Regulation including rules on matters relating to or connected with the presentation, hearing and determination of appeals from, and applications for the revision and review of orders made under this Regulation. It would be noticed that a Commission set up under Paragraph 4(1) is given all the powers necessary for the implementation of the Regulation, including setting up of the Organization, and to appoint officers, autho--rities and persons, and confer powers on, and assign duties to, them. The Land Commission is made the sole and exclusive arbiter of all the disputes that may arise in carrying into effect the provisions of the Regulation, and its decision is made final. The Land Com--mission has been authorised to nominate one of its members to be the Chief Land Commissioner, who, under Paragraph 4(4), is responsible for the implementation of the Regulation subject, however, to any direction that may be given to him by the Commission, from time to time.
27. It is authorised, under Paragraph 5, to delegate any of its powers to any of its members, or officers, by issuing a Notification in the official Gazette in that behalf, and the delegation of the powers may be made subject to such conditions, including provisions as to appeal, Revision or Review, as may be specified in the Notification. An exception has been however, made in the case of delegation of its powers under Sub --Paragraph (2) of Paragraph 7 to an Officer below the rank of the Commissioner of a Division. The Sind Land Commission in exercise of powers under paragraph 4 of the Regulation, issued the following Notifications on 25th March 1972, which were published in the Sind Government Gazette Extraordinary, Part I, dated 30th March 1972.
28. GOVERNMENT OF SIND, SIND LAND COMMISSION SECRETARIAT NOTIFICATIONS dated the 25th March 1972 No. SLC-1/72/3.-In exercise of the powers conferred on it under para--graph 4(4) of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (Martial Law Regulation 115) the Sind Land Commission is pleased to nominate Mr. Nusrat Hasan, C S. P., Senior Member, Board of Revenue and a Member of the Sind Land Commission as the Chief Land Commis--sioner, Sind with effect from ,11th March 1972.
29. No. SLC. 1/72/4.-In exercise of the powers conferred on it under paragraph 4(5) of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (Martial Law Regulation 115), the Sind Land Commission is pleased to appoint Mr. Abdullah D. Baloch, P. C. S. Secretary (Revenue), Board of Revenue as the Secretary, Sind Land Commission with effect from 11th March 1972 in addition to his own duties.
30. No. SLC-1/72/5.-In exercise of powers vesting in it, under para--graph 4(5) read with proviso to paragraph 5 of Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (Martial Law Regulation 115), the Sind Land Commission is pleased to sanction the following posts with immediate effect :- Serial No. Name of post No. Status Sphere of duty 1.
31. Land Commissioner
(One) Joint Secretary to Central Government For Sind Province.
32. 2.
33. Deputy Secretary
(Two) Junior Time Scale.
34. 3.
35. Assistant to Land Commissioner
(One) Junior Time Scale.
36. 4.
37. Inspecting Officers Land Reforms
(Two) Junior Time Scale.
38. 5.
39. Mukhtiarkars (Eleven) Mukh's grade One for each District in the Province.
40. 6.
41. Assistant Secretary
(One) Mukh's grade The Sind Land Commission is further pleased to authorise the Chief Land Commissioner to sanction necessary complementary staff for the above officers up to 31st December 1972. The Sind Land Commission is also pleased to authorise the Chief Land Commissioner to fill these posts.
42. No. SLC-1/72/6.-In exercise of the powers conferred on the Sind Land Commission under paragraph 4(5) of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. (Martial Law Regulation 115), the Commission is pleased to: -----
(i) Set-up an organization consisting of Land Commissioner, Deputy Land Commissioners, Assistant Land Commissioners and Sub-- Assistant Land Commissioners at the provincial, district, Sub-Divi--sional and Taluka levels ; and
(ii) Invest: -----
(a) The Land Commissioner, Sind with all the powers of the Land Commissioner;
(b) Deputy Commissioners of Districts with the powers of Deputy Land Commissioners within their respective jurisdictions;
(c) Assistant Commissioners of Sub-Divisions with the powers of Assistant Land Commissioners within their respective jurisdictions; and
(d) Mukhtiarkars of Talukas with the powers of Sub-Assistant Land Commissioners within their respective jurisdictions.
43. The Officers mentioned above will exercise these powers subject to the general control and superintendence of the Chief Land Commissioner. These orders will be effective from 11th March 1972.
44. No. SLC-1/72/7.-In exercise of the powers vested under paragraph 4(3) of Land Reforms Regulat on, 1972 (Martial Law Regulation 115), the Sind Land Commission is pleased to delegate to the following Officers, the powers mentioned against each :- Power Authority to whom delegated
1. Powers to decide whether Land Commissioner, Sind only. Vesting in the Sind Land Commission under paragraph 7 of Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (Martial Law Regulation 115).
45. Chief Land Commissioner, Sind and Land Commissioner, Sind only.
2. Powers to allow an existing owner required to file declarations under paragraph 12 of the Regulation, to retain the area permitted under paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Regulation and powers to pass orders under Paragraph 13 of the Regulation.
46. Deputy Land Commissioners (Deputy Commissioners) of the Districts.
3. Powers to decide in consequence of declaration under paragraphs 12(2) and 14 of the Regulation.
47. Deputy Land Commissioners (Deputy Commissioners) of the Districts.
4. Powers to resume all areas under stud or livestock Farms under paragraph 15 of the Regulation.
48. Deputy Land Commissioners (Deputy Commissioners) of the Districts.
5. Powers to resume all areas under Shikargahs under paragraph 16 of the Regulation.
49. Deputy Land Commissioners (Deputy Commissioners) of the Districts.
6. Power of demarcations and Assistant partition of land vesting in the Land Commission under paragraph 13(1) of the Regulation.
50. Land Commissioner (Assistant Commissioner) within his respective jurisdictions.
7. Powers of certifying under paragraph 8, Part III of Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972 whether or not the agricultural tractor owned by a person claiming retention of additional area up to 3000 P.
1. Us.
51. Was in good working order on 20 December 1971 (paragraph 8(2)(i) or there was installed on his land a tube-well of not less than ten horse-- power (paragraph 8(2)(ii).
52. Assistant Land Commissioners of the Sub-Divisions concerned.
53. It is noteworthy to point out that in the context of the Province of Sind that the posts of Divisional Commissioners under the administrative arrange--ment that obtained before the disintegration of the Province of West Pakistan, were later on abolished. It was stated by the learned Advocate- General that the Sind Land Commission wanted to appoint Mr. Abdullah D. Baloch as the Land Commissioner, he being conversant with the implementation machinery of the Land Reforms because of his association with the organiza--petition as the Secretary of the Commission. He, however, was to be upgraded to the rank of a Commissioner of a Division, in order to possess the requisite qualification for the exercise of the delegated powers under Sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 7 of the Regulation, and the Sind Land Commission therefore made a reference to the Provincial Governor that he may be upgraded accordingly. The learned Advocate-Generalth produced the Notification issued by the Provincial Government promoting Mr. Abdullah D. Baloch try the post of Commissioner of a Division. This Notification reads: --- "Government of Sind, Services, General Administration and Information Department, NOTIFICATION Karachi, dated the 10th May 1972.
54. No. SOI (S & GID)-1/2/72.-Consequent upon the approval by the Government of Pakistan (Establishment Division) the Governor of Sind is pleased to promote Mr. Abdullah D. Baloch, P. C. S., Secretary Board of Revenue, Sind, Hyderabad to the Grade of Commissioner of Division temporarily on ad hoc basis and to appoint him as Land Commissioner, Sind, with immediate effect.
55. The promotion is for the period he holds the post of Land Commissioner, Sind and when he ceases to hold that post he will revert to his original post and take chance alongwith others according to his seniority.
56. Since Mr. Abdullah D. Baloch was holding the rank of a Commissioner of a Division he could competently exercise the powers under para--graph 7 of the Regulation by virtue of Delegation made in this behalf under another Notification issued by the Sind Land Commission, being No. SLC- 1/72/7, dated 25th March 1912. There is, therefore, no force in the last contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner indeed realizing this position he did not even press this point."
57. The learned Advocate-General produced before us yet another Notifica--petition wbicb is to the following effect: "SIND LAND COMMISSION NOTIFICATION Hyderabad, the 30th January 1973 No. SLC-840/72/435-A.-Consequent upon his promotion to the grade of Commissioner of Division and appointment as Lard Commissioner: Sind, vide Government of Sind, Services, General Administration and Information Department Notification No. SOT (SGA&ID)-1/2/72, dated 10th May 1972, Mr. Abdullah D. Baloch, P. C. S., resumed the charge of the post of Land Commissioner, Sind, Hyderabad, in the Forenoon of 11th May 1972.
58. NUSRAT HASAN, Chief Land Commission.
59. Sind, Hyderabad.
60. The learned Advocate-General further pointed oil, that in, view of the requirement of the proviso to paragraph 5 of the Regulation that the relegation of powers under Sub-Paragraph (2) of Paragraph 7 could not be trade by the Sind Land Commission to an officer below the rank of a Commissioner of a Division, and further that the post of Land Commissioner created in the Organizational set-up by the Sind Land Commission carried the status of Joint Secretary to the Central Government, reference was made by the Provincial Governor to the Federal Government in that behalf and subsequently the post with the designation of Land Commissioner, Sind was created for the Province of Sind and added to the Schedule of Cadre Strength of the Civil Services of Pakistan. In this connection the learned Advocate-General produced Notification No. F. 25,112/51- S.D. 1 issued by the Establishment Division of the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Pakistan on Ist July 1954. Toe reference was made in this behalf to show that a new post with the designation of hand Commissioner, Sind and carrying the status of a Commissioner of a Division was created for the Province of Sind and made available to tile Sind Land Commission. The Learned Advocate- General urged that it was the Provincial Governor alone, who could make the appointment of the person to fill up such a post, and not the Sind Land Commission ; and it was in these circumstances that the Notification for the appointment of Mr. Abdullah D. Baloch was issued by him, and not by the Sind Land Commission.
61. The position pointed out by the learned Advocate-General is correct in law, for it is the requirement of the Regulation itself that the person who is to be delegated the powers under sub-paragraph 2 of paragraph 7 must not to be an officer below the rank of a Commissioner of a Division, An officer of that status is to be appointed by the Governor of Sind, and, in fact, the Sind Land Commission could not even competently appoint Mr. Abdullah D. i4aloch in that capacity. The position pointed out by the learned Advocate-General is also correct that in the Organizational set-up created by the Commission under Notification No. SLC-1/72/6, dated 25-3-1972, the invest--ment of powers oft the officers or the authorities was made on "ex officio" basis by virtue of their appointments in the Provincial Governments, and not by their individual names, e.g. The Land Commissioner, Sind was invested with ail the powers of the Land Commissioner, and the Deputy Commissioners of all the Districts in Sind were invested with the powers of Deputy Land Commissioners within their respective jurisdictions. The Assistant Commissioners of the Sub-Divisions and the Mukhtiarkars of Talukas were respectively invested with the powers of Assistant Land Commissioners and Sub- Assistant Land Commissioners within their respective jurisdictions. This position is correctly reflected from the Notifications referred to above, It was stated by the learned Advocate-General that this mode was adopted in order to streamline the Organization, as far as possible. Accordingly, it is clear that the post of Land Commissioner, Sind carrying the status of a Joint `Secretary to the Central Government, and the holder thereof to rang` as commissioner of a Division, was created by the Federal Government, and appointment of the person against this post had necessarily to he mark by the Governor of Sind. Since the powers under paragraph 7 of the Regulation had already been invested by virtue of delegation made by the Sind [,and Commission under Notification No. SLC-1/72/7, dated 25th March t 972, the holder of the post could validly exercise those powers. On these bear facts, no exception can be taken against the appointment of Mr. Abdullah D. Baloch, under the Notification No. SOI (S &GID) 1/12/72, dated 10-5-1972, and also to the exercise of the powers by him, under paragraph 7 of the Regulation.
62. There is also force in the alternate contention raised by the learned Advocate-General that the Governor of Sind was, after all, not such a stranger as he could not validly appoint Mr. Abdullah D.
63. Baloch as the Land Commissioner, Sind, for he was also the Chairman of the Sind Land Commission. He was the only person who could validly notify his promotion to the post of a Commissioner of a Division, so that he may be able to possess the requisite qualification for the exercise of powers under para--graph 7. It would also be seen from above, that after the issue of Notification No. SOL (S & GID)1/2/72, dated 10th May 1972 Mr. Abdullah D. Baloch was allowed by the Chef Land Commissioner, Sind to resume the charge of the post of the Land Commissioner, Sind, in the afternoon of 11th May, 1972. The Sind Land Commission had already authorised the Chief Land Commissioner, under Notification No. SLC-1/72/5, dated 25th March 1972, to fill the posts created under the said Notification, including that of Land Commissioner. It can very well be said that by allowing Mr. Abdullah D. Baloch to resume the charge of the post of Land Commissioner, Sind, the learned Chief Land Commissioner filled that post, in exercise of the powers delegated to him under paragraph 4(5) of the Regulation. For all these reasons, we find no substance m the contention that the impugned order was passed by a person who was incompetently appointed to the post of Land Commissioner, Sind.
64. So far as the challenge made to the vires of the Martial Law Regulation No. 128 is concerned, the learned Advocate-General relied upon the judgment of the Lahore High Court in Mehreenzebunnisa v. The Land Commissioner, Multan (Writ Petition No. 1790 of 1972), decided on 19th February 1974 in which the identical question has been examined in an extensive and detailed manner. The following passages from that judgment may be usefully reproduced: "4. Taking up Martial Law Regulation 128 whereby paragraph 29-A was added in Martial Law Regulation 115, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that Martial Law came to an end on 20- 4-1972 as per proclamation of withdrawal of Martial Lave. According to them this proclamation terminated Martial Law and abolished all Martial Law Officers with effect from zero-hour on the night between 19/20-4-1972. This fixation of time is incorrect as will be indicated later on, but for the present to continue with the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners, they submitted that Martial Law Regulation 128 was published in the Gazette of 22-4-1972 and apparently came into force with effect from the date i.e. 22-4-1972. As Martial Law had (according to the aforesaid assumption of the learned counsel) ceased with effect from beginning of 20-4-1972, therefore, promulgation of Martial Law Regulation 128 on 22-4-1972, it was argued, was without lawful authority with the result that it never came into existence at all and was a still-born-law. The argument is not correct on factual plane both as regards the time, of cessation of Martial Law as will be indicated later as well as the date of making of Martial Law Regulation 128. The date of making, Martial Law Regulation No. 128 is 20-4-1972 as is shown in that Regulation itself though it was gazetted on 22-4-1972. In the Gazette aforesaid, the date of 20-4-1972 is clearly shown. For the purpose of finding as to when does a law come into operation, one should see the intention of the law-maker as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax East, Karachi v. Ifessrs Reyaz-O-Khalld Co., Karachi PLD 197-1 SC 98. In the instant case, apart from what has been written above, the Law-maker himself stated on another occasion as well in the form recitals in P. O. 1 of 1972 that he had before the commencing day amended Martial Law Regulation No. 115 by Martial Law Regulation No. 128. The commencing day of the Interim Constitution being 21-4-1972 the day before that would be 20-4-1972. In the face of this intrinsic evidence on the record, the plea that Martial Law Regulation 128 came into force on 22-4-1972 (and not 20-4-1972) is not correct. When confronted with this situation, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that for the purpose of promulgation of Martial Law Regulations, it had been laid down in/ paragraph 1 of the "proclamation of Martial Law", dated 25-3-196 t9 that "Martial Law Regulations and Orders shall be made by the Chief Martial Law Administrator or any officer or Authority J empowered by him and shall be published in such manner as is convenient." They argued with the help of certain observations in Commissioner of Income-tax East, Karachi v. Messrs Reyaz-O-Khalld Co., Karachi that if publication was necessary to give a legal effect to a Statute, then it would come into operation from the day of its publication. Their argument was that since in the "proclamation of 25-3-1969 there as a mandate of publishing Martial Law Regulations, therefore, obviously, they were to come into force from the time of their publication. There is no quarrel with the first portion of the argument on principle that where publication is necessary to give a legal effect to a statute, then it would come into operation from the date of its publication but we would add that apart from the fact that there is a distinction between the date when a law is made and the date when it is to come into operation, each case even otherwise is to depend on its own facts and circumstances. As already held by us, one has to see the intention of the law- maker himself, as to when does he wish to enforce any particular law made by him. In the instant case, the intention is quite clear that the law-maker intended to enforce Martial Law Regulation 128 with effect from 20-4-1972, and, therefore, by the mere fact that it was gazetted on 22-4-1972, it cannot mean that it was not intended to be enforced on 20-4-72. The direction in para. 1 of "Proclamation" of 25-3-1969, that the Martial Law Regulations shall be published in such manner as is convenient, also does not advance the case of the petitioners, inasmuch as, it does not lay down any particular form of publication and even otherwise leaves this matter to the convenience of the relevant law-maker. The said paragraph did not say that a Martial Law Regulation has come into force from the date of its publication. The result is that the date of its enforce--ment has to be seen from the intention of law-maker which in the instant case would be 20-4-1972 and not any other date.
5. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners advanced another plea. They submitted that assuming, without conceding, that Martial Law Regulation 128 came into force with effect from 20- 4-1972, then its very coming into force is illegal because the Martial Law itself ceased to be operative with effect from zero-hour of the night between, 19th and 20th of April 1972, as laid down in the proclamation of withdrawal of Martial Law hereinbefore quoted. This is not correct. If the proclamation of withdrawal of Martial Law reproduced in para. 2(b) earlier is carefully perused, it shows, as it recites, that the Chief Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan promised to withdraw the Martial haw on the enforcement of the Interim Constitution". The date of enforcement of the Interim Constitution being the night between 20/21-4-1972 (spoken generally as 21-4-1972) the Martial Law came to an end at zero-hour on the night between 20/21-4-1972. Learned counsel for the petitioners laid emphasis on the words "hereby withdrawn" as occurring in proclamation of withdrawal of Martial Law and submitted that it meant withdrawn on and with effect from 20-4- 1972. This plea has no force. The word "hereby" has reference to date, time and terminus quoted in para. 2 of the preamble and connotes only fulfilment of the promise recited therein. In other words it means "hereby withdrawn" in accordance with the promise made that is with effect from the commencing day. At this stage, it is further to point out that date 20-4-1972 of proclamation of withdrawal of Martial Law has been corrected by a Corrigenda published in Extraordinary Gazette of Pakistan, dated 21-5-1973 so as to read 21-4-1972 at the most was, if at all, a printing and clerical mistake. This is also clear from Article 280(2) of the Interim Con--stitution as well, where it is written that, "the proclamation made on the twenty-fifth day of March 1969, is revoked with effect as from the commencing day". Any argument on any other assumption is based on simple miscalculation and cannot be accepted for the simple reason that it will lead to holding that for one day there was a complete vacuum and the country was without any lawful order, system or Constitutional pattern. Obviously we cannot endorse such a destructive approach. Our other answer to the precise objection of the petitioners regarding validity of Martial Law Regulation 128 is that in Article 269(1) of the Constitution of 1973, it is laid down that:- `269(1) All Proclamations, President's Orders, Martial Law Regulations, Martial Law Orders and all other Laws made between the twentieth day of December, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-one and the twentieth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-two (both days inclusive) are hereby declared notwithstanding any judgment of any Court, to have been validly made by competent authority and shall not be called in question in any Court on any ground whatsoever.'
65. It appears that the Constitution-makers were aware of the various objections regarding the validity of Martial Law Regulations etc. Promulgated between 20-12-1971 to 20-4-1972 (both days inclusive) therefore, to avoid any controversy, they validated all Martial Law Regulations which may have been made even on 20-4-1972. In the face of this Constitutional Provision, it is not possible for us to find fault with the competency of maker of the Martial Law Regulation 128 and the same be called in question in this Court. It is further to be noticed that in Article 269(1) of the 1973 Constitution, the language employed is, to excuse repetition, "all Proclamations, President's Orders, Martial I aw Regulations, Martial Law Orders and all other laws made between 20th day of December 1971 and 20th day of April 1972-(both days inclusive). We want to draw attention to and lay emphasis on the word "made" so as to distinguish the same from the words like "gazetted" or "notified etc." In re : Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 AIR 1941 FC 72 it was laid down that an Act can be considered to have been made on the day when assent to it of the Governor-General (We would say in the instant case of the President) was given, and the dates when it was drafted or introduced in various Houses of Parliament are not material. Similarly in Muhammad Afzal v. The Commissioner, Lahore Division it was held that a law may be an existing law without being in operation, and its competency is to be seen on the day on which it was made, though its enforcement may have taken place later. Also see Khalid M. Ishaque, Ex-Advocate General, Lahore v. The Hon'ble Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Court of West Pakistan PLD 1966 SC 628.
66. There being no doubt about the date of making of the impugned Regulation, any argument, with reference to a terminology different from or not contained in Article 269(1), is out of context and cannot be accepted, because it is well-known that it is not possible for anybody to substitute his own words in place of those used by the draftsman of the Constitution."
67. We respectfully agree these conclusions, and just to reiterate we may mention that by virtue of the provisions made under Article 269 of the Interim Constitution, 1972 there can hardly be scope for a legitimate argument that the Martial Law Regulation No. 118 is invalid. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon paragraph I of the Proclamation of Martial Law issued on 25th March 1969, which is to the effect that "Martial Law Regula--tions and Orders shall be made by the Chief Martial Law Administrator or any officer or authority empowered by him and shall be published in such manner as is convenient." Obviously, this provision does not make the publication a requisite ingredient for the making of a Martial Law Regulation, or Order, or the enforcement thereof. On the contrary, it is categorically stated that the Chief Martial Law Administrator is the Maker of these Supra-Legislative Instruments, and the publication of a Martial Law Regulation, or an Order is left to the choice of the Maker thereof ; he may do it in such manner as is convenient to him.
68. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in regard to the challenge made to the vires of Land Reforms (Sind Amendment) Ordinance No. XIV of 1972 was also examined in Meerunzebunissa v. The Land Commissioner, Multan. The legislation under challenge was almost parallel, and we may, therefore, usefully quote the following passage from that judgment :- "(c) The next argument advanced was that Land Reforms (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance XV of 1972 in its very nature being a temporary Statute, could not amend a permanent law, namely, Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972 as laid down in The Sargodha-Bhera Bus ,Service Limited and others v. The Province of West Pakistan and another PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 127 and even otherwise lapsed after the expiry of six months and its further extension by means of Punjab Ordinance Temporary Enactments Act VI of 1973 was invalid.
10. The aforesaid arguments were being advanced for the purpose of showing that the changes brought about in the category of gifts which list of donees who were protected under para. 7 of Martial Law Regulation 11.5 were ultra vires with the result that the gifts of such types or which were in favour of such set of heirs or persons as were mentioned in original Regulation should be allowed to hold good. Even here the position of the learned counsel was not uniform in--asmuch as some of them were benefiting by the aforesaid changes while others were not. However, we have taken the various pleas advanced by the petitioners into consideration and our answer to the point at (a) above is that the law with regard to interpretation of entries in various `lists' has repeatedly been laid down by superior Courts in the famous cases like Megh Raj and another v. Allah Rakhia and others AIR 1947 Lab. 177, Megh Raj and others v. Allah Rakhia and others PLD 1947 P C 25 ; Megh Raj and another v. Allah Rakhfa and others AIR 1947 P C 72; Mada Nagaratnam v. Pavada Sashayya and another AIR 1930 Mad. 361, Reference under section 12, Sind Courts' Act, 1926 PLD 1966 Kar. 178 and Syed Ghulam A.I Shah v. The State through A. D. M. And Tribunal, Sanghar PLD 1972 SC 253. In these cases it was held that "where a Constitution Act distributes legislative powers between different law-making bodies, a statute enacted by any such body should be examined to ascertain its `pith and substance', or its `true nature and character' for the purpose of determining the real field of legislation within which the subject-matter of the statute lies. Sir Maurice Owyer, C. J., stated the rule in Subrahmanyan v. Muttuswami Goundan 1940 F J R 183 : "It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation, though purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches also on a subject in another list, and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely interwined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the Legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee whereby the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its `pith and substance', or its `true nature and character' for the purpose of determining whether it is Legislation with respect to matters in this list or in that". Applying the test aforesaid we are of the view that Reforms about `land' is a subject which is well connected with `land' and under this head laws about Land Reforms could be made by a Provincial Assembly. From this point of view, there can be no dispute about the competency of the Provincial Governor in enacting the Land Reforms (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance XV of 1972 on the subject of Land Reforms. As regards the points at (b) and (c) in para. 9 above, our view is that the "proviso" contained in Clause (3) of Article 280 of the Interim Constitution had no intention to curtail the Ordinance-making powers of a Governor-(which are always co--extensive with that of a Provincial Legislature) and the mere use of the word "bail" did not mean that a Governor could not make amend--ments by an Ordinance in any existing (continuing) law and according to us, the only condition which he has to fulfil is to take the previous consent of the President. At this stage it is further to be pointed out that the amendments brought about by an Ordinance will only be of a temporary nature and will automatically lapse after the expiry of the statutory period generally allowed to Ordinance, unless to make them permanent, a regular Act of the appropriate Legislature is passed with the same condition precedent i.e. After obtaining previous consent of the President.
69. Land Reforms (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance XV of 1972 on the` principles hereinbefore enunciated was as such quite in order made as it is (as its preamble recites) after obtaining the consent of the President. It had to lapse after a period of six months but its life was extended by the Punjab Ordinances Temporary Enactments Act VI of 1973 by the Provincial Assembly. It is not necessary to $o into the validity or vires of this Act because the latest Act which is in the field is Land Reforms (Punjab Amendment) Act XI of 1973. This Act has been passed by obtaining the previous sanction of the President, as required under clause (3) of Article 280 of the Interim Constitution. The changes brought about are of retrospective nature and section 12 of the aforesaid Act, which deals with the repeal and validations, reads as follows: "Repeal and validation.-(1) The Punjab Ordinances Temporary Enactment Act, 1972 in so far as it enacts the provisions of the Land Reforms (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance (Punjab Ordinance No. XV of 1972) is hereby repealed.
(2) Everything done, action taken or order made under the Land Reforms (Punjab Ordinance No. XV of 1972) and its provisions as enacted by the Punjab Ordinances Temporary Enactments Act, 1973, on or after the 8th August 1972 and before the commencement of this Act, shall be deemed to have been validly done, taken or made.
70. That such a law which may have a retrospective effect and which may validate earlier Acts could be made, was laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sh. Amin Ullah v. Pannuram PLD 1967 SC 289. It is pertinent to mention that the subject of `land' originally stood in the Provincial list in the Interim Constitution but later on due to promulgation of Presidential Order 16 of 1973 and Presidential Order 19 of 1973, the subject of Land Reforms was placed in the concurrent list from retrospective date. There being nothing wrong in the Land Reforms (Punjab Amendment) Act XI of 1973, any argument regarding the changes brought about in the list of the donees by the aforesaid Act or its predecessor enactments, consequently, loses all force."
71. We are in respectful agreement with the views expressed above. We may, however, mention the stand taken before us by the learned Advocate---General which forecloses the entire challenge levelled by the learned counsel for the petitioner against the vires of the Land Reforms Regulation (Sind Amendment) Ordinance XIV of 1972. The learned Advocate-General stated that, in point of fact, the Ordinance was promulgated in pursuance of Instructions from the President, and in support of this assertion he produced the relevant departmental file. It will be useful to produce the letter No. 1462/72-Law dated 18th August 1972, received from the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs (Law Division) Government of Pakistan, addressed to the Provincial Governments. It reads as follows: --- Secret Top Priority "No. 1462/72-Law Government of Pakistan Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs (Law Division)
72. Islamabad, the 18th August, 1972.
73. From: Mr. Z. A. Channa, T. Pk., Joint Secretary to the Government of Pakistan.
74. To:
(1) The Chief Secretary, Government of Sind, Karachi.
(2) The Chief Secretary, Government of the N.W. F. P., Pe4iawar.
(3) The Chief Secretary, Government of Baluchistan, Quetta.
(4) The Chief Land Commissioner, Government of Sind, Hyderabad.
(5) The Chief Land Commissioner, Government of the N.W. F. P., Peshawar.
(6) The Chief Land Commissioner, Government of Baluchistan, Quetta.
75. Sir, I am directed to state that the President has been pleased to approve, under clause (3) of Article 280 of the Interim Constitution, for promulgation by the Provincial Governors of an Ordinance to amend the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (Martial Law Regulation No. 115). A copy of the said draft Ordinance is enclosed.
(2) It is requested that urgent action may kindly be taken for the promulgation of the proposed Ordinance. The Governor of Punjab has already promulgated the Amending Ordinance. A copy of the Punjab Ordinance is also enclosed.
76. Your obedient servant, (Sd.) Z. A. Channa, T. Pk.
77. Joint Secretary to the Government of Pakistan."
78. This letter and the Draft Ordinance enclosed with it, and also the depart. Mental file clearly show that the President had issued the Instructions, on his own initiative, to all the Provincial Governors to promulgate the Ordinance to amend the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. It would be seen that the Presidential Orders Nos 16 and 19 of 1973, whereby the subject of Land Reforms was inserted in the Concurrent List of the Interim Constitution, 1972 with retrospective effect as from 11-3-1972 were issued much later on. At the relevant time the only Constitutional embargo placed on the Ordinance Making Power of the Governor was contained in Article 280(3), and it provided that no bill to amend or to repeal any of the Martial Law Orders shall be introduced or moved without the previous sanction of the President. It was due to this reason that the letter from the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Law Division, dated 18th August 1972, addressed to the Provincial Governments made the mention of Clause 3 of Article 280 of the Interim Constitution. It is amply clear from the Departmental file produced before us that the Governor of Sind had not requested the President for the grant of sanction for the promulgation of the Ordinance. On these facts, the position is crystal clear that the Law Reforms (Sind Amendment) Ordinance No. XIV of 1972 was issued in pursuance to Instructions from the President as contemplated by the Proviso to Clause 4 of Article 135.
79. Now, the provisions regarding the legislative powers of the Governor contained in Articles 135 and 143 of the Interim Constitution may be reproduced here. These are as follows: "135.-(1) If at any time when the Provincial Assembly stands dissolved or is not in session, the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may make and promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require: Provided that the Governor shall not, without instructions from the President, promulgate any such Ordinance if an Act of the Provincial Legislature containing the same provisions would, under this Constitu--petition, have been invalid unless, having been reserved for the considera--petition of the President, it had received assent of the President.
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this Article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Provincial Legislature assented to by the Governor but every such Ordinance-
(a) shall be laid before the Provincial Assembly and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly thereof, or if before the expiration that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Provincial Assembly upon the passing of that resolution ;
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor.
(3) In Clauses (t) and (2), references to the time when the Provincial Assembly is not in session and to the reassembly thereof shall be deemed to include references respectively-
(a) to the time following immediately upon the dissolution I of the Assembly ; and
(b) to the first assembly of the next.
(4) If and so far as an Ordinance under this Article makes any provision which would not be valid if enacted in an Act of the Provincial Legislature assented to by the Governor, it shall be void: Provided that, for the purposes of the provisions of this Constitution relating to the effect of an Act of a Provincial Legislature which is repugnant to an Act of the Federal Legislature or an existing law with respect to a matter enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List, an Ordinance promulgated under this Article in pursuance of instructions from the President shall be deemed to be an Act of the Provincial Legislature which has been reserved for the consideration of the President and assented to by him.
80. 143.-(1) If any provision of a Provincial law is repugnant to any provision of a Federal law which the Federal Legislature is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List, then, subject to the provisions of this Article, the Federal law, whether passed before or after the Provincial Law, or, as the case may be, the existing law shall prevail, and the Provincial law shall, to the extent of the repugnancy be void.
(2) Where a Provincial law with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier Federal law or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, if the Provincial law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received the assent of the President, the Provincial law shall in that province prevail, but nevertheless the Federal Legislature may at any time enact further legislation with respect to the same matter: Provided that no bill or amendment for making any provision repugnant to any provincial law, which, having been so reserved, has received the assent of the President, shall be introduced or moved in the National Assembly without the previous sanction of the President.
81. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that on the promulgation of Presidential Orders 16 and 19 of 1973, the subject of Land Reforms was placed in the Concurrent List with retrospective effect as from 11th March 1972, it would be noticed that no challenge to vires of the Ordinance is available on the ground of anything contained in the Articles referred to above. Since the Ordinance was promulgated in pursuance of the Instructions from the President, it is deemed to be an Act of the Provincial Legislature, which has been reserved for the consideration of the President and assented to by him by virtue of the special provision made in the proviso to clause 4 of E Article 135. This Ordinance was subsequently laid before the Provincial Assembly, and it became a Provincial law and can validly prevail in the Province of Sind, by virtue of Article 143(2) in spite of any provision contained in it which is repugnant to the provisions of the Martial Law Regulation No. 115, as amended by Martial Law Regulations Nos. 121, 126 and 128.
82. On this view of the case, the Land Reforms Regulation (Sind Second Amendment) Act, 1972, which was passed by the Provincial Legislature on F 28-12-1972 is a valid piece of legislation. The basis for taking exception to the impugned order passed under the Land Regulation, 1972 is, therefore, not available as it is well settled that the retrospective addition or alteration in a Statute will have effect in the whole of the Statute. In Tofazzal Hossain v. Province of East Pakistan (PLD 1963 SC 251), it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that if amended provision is given retrospective effect from the date of the enforcement of the Act, it applies with full force, not only to references to such provision in the Act itself, but also to the rules, by-laws and notifica--tions issued under the Act.
83. Reference in this connection may also be made to the case reported as Begum G. H. Syed v. Afzal Jehan Begun (PLD 1971 SC 205).
84. For these reasons no exception can be taken with the view that prevailed with the learned Land Commissioner, Sind that the alienations made by the petitioner could riot be confirmed as bona fide transactions due to the bar placed under the proviso to paragraph 7(1)(3) of the Regulation.
85. The learned counsel for the petitioner himself conceded that if the Land Reforms Regulation (Sind Ordinance) No. XIV of 1972 is held to be a valid piece of legislation, the relief to the petitioner could not be available. In the circumstances, no useful purpose would be served to examine the plea whether or not the petitioner was served a notice admittedly issued to her in connection with the review proceedings, culminating in the impugned order passed against her.
86. For these reasons, this petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.
87. KHUDA BAKHSH MARRI, J.-----I agree.
88. K. B. A.