1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, C J.---This appeal through leave of the Court is directed; against the judgment dated 17-5-1980 of the Peshawar High Court; whereby appellants/defendants/vendees'
2. Civil Revision arising out of a decree granted in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs/pre-emptors was dismissed.
3. ' As a view on a point of law is sought to be re-examined and changed as reported in Ahmad Khan v. Sattar Din PLD 1981 SC 148, therefore, it is necessary to reproduce the leave grant order which is authored by the same learned Judge who later on rendered the decision in the case of Ahmad Khan (namely S. Anwarul Haq, the then Chief Justice).
4. ' The leave grant order reads as follows:-- "This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of a learned Judge of the Peshawar High Court dated the 17th of May, 1980, by which a revision petition filed by the vendees against a pre- emption decree obtained by respondent Ismail, was dismissed.
5. ' The land in suit was sold under the decree of a Civil Court, and the superior right of pre-emption was claimed by the plaintiff on the basis of contiguity of land comprised in Khasra No, 1324, which was contiguous to Khasra Nos. 1320, 1321, 1322 and 1323. This contiguity did not extend to other Khasra numbers, namely 1634 and 1635. The suit was decreed in respect of Khasra Nos. 1320 to 1323 at market value of the land amounting to Rs,23,546. In appeal the learned Additional District Judge remanded the case for a fresh decision. However, the trial Court once again decreed the suit in the same terms by its judgment dated the 12th of May, 1977.
6. ' The vendees thereupon preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Kohat, which partly succeeded as regards the market value of the land, but was otherwise dismissed in so far as the superior right of preemption was concerned in respect of Khasra- Nos. 1320 to 1323. As already stated, the revision petition of the vendees has also been dismissed by the order under appeal.
7. ' Leave to appeal is sought on the ground that the High Court was in error in thinking that the vendees could not take advantage of the fact that as a result of the litigation he had been left with Khasra No, 1634, with the result that he had become a co-sharer in the estate, and thus stood on equal footing with the pre-emptors. The learned counsel submits that the judgment of the Full Bench of the Peshawar High Court relied upon in the order under appeal, namely, Saadullah Khan v.
8. Mohabat PLD 1975 Peshawar 218, runs counter to the view taken by a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in the case reported as Phul Chand v. Metha Sundar Das and others AIR 1946 Lah. 345, and, therefore, it is a fit case which should be examined by this Court for an authoritative decision in the matter.
9. ' We consider that as there is a conflict of opinion between the Full Benches of the Peshawar and the Lahore High Courts on the question whether a vendee can take benefit from the incidents of the sale under dispute, the present petition does raise a question of law of substantial public importance. We would, accordingly, grant leave to appeal".
10. ' It is apparent from the decision in the case of Ahmad Khan that the same question which was noted for examination in the leave to appeal order passed in this case, was examined and a view, somewhat contrary to what was held by a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Phul Chand's case, was expressed. It similarly to an extent approved the view of a Full Bench of the Peshawar High Court in the case of Sadullah Khan.
11. ' Both these cases have been referred in the afore-quoted leave grant order.
12. ' If this alone would have been the controversy, the decision in the case of Ahmad Khan would have been straightaway followed by this Bench also in this case and admittedly on the said touchstone the appeal would have been straightaway dismissed; because, obviously the point of law on which leave to appeal was granted has already been decided by this Court against the appellants in another case.
13. ' However, the matter does not end here. This appeal came up for hearing earlier before another Bench of this Court of 3 learned Judges on 23-10-1989. The submissions made from both sides having been taken note of the following further order was passed:-- "Leave to appeal was granted with a view to resolving the difference of opinion existing between the Lahore High Court Phool Chand v. Sundra Das and others AIR 1046 Lah. 345 F.B. And the Peshawar High Court Sadullah Khan and others v. Mohabat PLD 1975 Peshawar 218 F.B.
14. ' Mr. Abdul Samad Khan A.O.R. Pointed out that the matter stands resolved in Ahmad Khan v. Sattar Ali PLD 1981 SC 148.
15. ' We observe that the said judgment has been delivered by two learned Judges and our opinion on this matter, where the difference of opinion exists between two Full Benches of two different High Courts, should be considered by a large Bench.
16. ' The case may be put up before H.C.J. For orders for placing it before a Bench of 5 Hon'ble Judges, if possible."
17. ' This order is dated 23-10-1989. It is unfortunate that the same question which the appellants' counsel sought to be referred to a larger Bench and that too "if possible" of 5 learned Judges, had already been examined and the appellants' plea rejected by a larger Bench of this Court in Bashir Hussain Shah v. Maskin 1988 SCMR 1251. This latter case was decided on 3-5-1988 and what is more important is that 2 Honourable Senior Judges passing the order of reference were amongst the 4 Honourable Judges who decided the case of Bashir Hussain Shah. Not only this one of the Honourable Judges making the reference was himself the author of the judgment in the said case of Bashir Hussain Shah. We are absolutely sure that if the said judgment in the case of Bashir Hussain Shah had been known to the learned counsel appearing before the Court on 23-10-1989 and seeking reference to a larger Bench, he would have certainly informed the Court about it and no reference would have been found necessary to be made to a larger Bench. The only so-called impediment that the said decision was by 4 Honourable Judges of this Court and the reference was sought for a decision by 5 Honourable Judges is of no consequence because in the order of reference this was not considered as an absolute necessity. Otherwise the words "if possible" as a closing expression in the said order of reference would not have been used.
18. ' This is not all. It is admitted by the learned counsel that for the last about 10 years the judgment in the case of Ahmad Khan has been followed by various Benches of this Court in innumerable cases.
19. He, however, seems obsessed by the idea that the reasoning of the Full Bench in the Lahore High Court case of Phul Chand is so perfect that the Supreme Court of Pakistan could not have held otherwise in the case of Bashir Hussain Shah and that is why he, of course with full respects, insisted on re-examination of all the judgments which followed the said judgment in the case of Ahmad Khan and also the judgment itself. Such exercise also has been done by a Bench of 4 Honourable Judges in Gulzada v. Muhammad Usman PLD 1990 SC 465 which was brought to the notice of the learned counsel. He was not aware of it about a couple of days ago when he appeared in Civil Review Petition No, 24-R of 1990 (Shad Muhammad v. Shah Poor) and sought the re-examination of the decision in the case of Ahmad Khan. It was held then that in the meanwhile the Supreme Court has dealt with the question of re-examination and reference also in a very recent judgment. Regarding this recent decision also, it is necessary to mention, the learned counsel does not feel satisfied about the reasoning and he kept on insisting that the view expressed in all these judgments which goes against his contentions must be changed.
20. ' We regret to say the insistence of the learned counsel, to say the least, is absolutely misplaced.
21. There is considerable authority to support the view that a decision by the Supreme Court on. a question of law which is subsequently followed in a chain of judgments, is not lightly changed.
22. Continuity and certainty A about the laws is essential for good judicial administration. It is not necessary further to analyse the attitude of the learned counsel.
23. ' We, accordingly without any further discussion, announced the order of dismissal of this appeal as the point of law for which leave to appeal was granted therein stood decided against the appellants. On this announcement the learned counsel said and may be rightly this time that this Bench consisting of the Chief Justice himself has now finally closed the matter. He might be thinking that the question of the constitution of another still larger Bench having been left to the Chief Justice by the law and also by the Bench making the said reference on 23-10-1989 the latter has refused it--to him it might have looked what is obvious.
24. ' But we having failed to agree with the learned counsel on the question of law as also regarding the need for the re-examination of the points involved, are in no way influenced by the fact that the Chief Justice has the power to refuse to constitute another Bench for hearing of the same question.
25. If there would have been a real need another Bench would definitely have been constituted.
26. ' With the foregoing remarks this appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.