WAJIHUDDIN AHMED, J.--These Constitutional petitions, pertaining to three different employees of the petitioner Corporation, relate back to grievance petitions, filed under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, whereby the respondents-employees prayed for reinstatement in service and back benefits. Such grievance petitions were dismissed by the Sindh Labour Court No. 1, Karachi, on 19-9-1984. On appeals being preferred, the learned Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal passed orders of reversal. Since reinstatements were not made and back benefits were not disbursed, applications under section 51 of the I.R.O. were filed before the same Labour Court, as aforesaid. Per order dated 20-5-1989, purportedly a consent one, back benefits were ordered to be paid but counter-claims of adjustment, on account of alleged losses/shortages, were not allowed. Revisions under section 38(3-D) of the I.R.O. were taken before the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal but were dismissed vide orders dated 16-8-1989. In these petitions respective orders dated 20-5-1989 and 16-8-1989 of the Labour Court and the Chairman, Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, are questioned.
2. The contentions raised are that the Labour Court had no power to allow back benefits under section 51 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, that orders in that behalf are without jurisdiction and that no consent whatever was involved on which such orders could be founded.
The orders of the Appellate Tribunal are claimed to be equally bad, based, as the same, are on void and unlawful determinations. Hearing the petitioner's counsel on 2-104989 we had dismissed these petitions through a common order, reasons for which were to be recorded, separately. Such reasons are here recorded.
3. In the first place, section 51 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, is broad enough to include a power, vesting in a Labour Court, to direct the recovery of all moneys due from an employer under a settlement or under an award or decision of the Arbitrator, Labour Court or Tribunal.
Clearly, money due on orders passed by a Labour Court or Tribunal is recoverable and in the instant case such money became due on grant of the grievance petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. It matters little that such grant came about at the appellate level of the Tribunal, for the Tribunal had come to exercise the same powers as the Labour Court in exercise of the former's appellate jurisdiction. If this were not enough, an "Award", as defined in section 2(ii) of the I.R.O., means the determination by a Labour Court, Arbitrator or Appellate Tribunal or any Industrial dispute or any matter relating thereto. On either of such premises, back benefits were recoverable as claimed by the employee respondents and there was no lack of jurisdiction.
4. A further contention, emerging from the same ground, is that the Appellate Tribunal had merely allowed the appeals pertaining to dismissal of the grievance petitions under section 25-A of the I.R.O., and had not expressly granted any back benefits. In order to ascertain the factual details, we had required the petitioner's counsel to submit copies of the applications under section 25-A as well as of the memos. of appeal, occasioned on the dismissal of the applications. This having been done, we find that in the referred applications the employees had claimed reinstatement as well as back benefits. Likewise, in the memos. of appeal prayers were made for setting aside of the impugned orders and for allowing the applications under section 25-A ibid. All this, necessarily, involved seeking relief(s) for the grant of back benefits. It is correct that the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, on examination of the cases, has merely allowed the appeals but that incident implies allowing such appeals, as prayed. As a necessary corollary, grant of such appeals occasioned grant of back benefits as well. Our attention is drawn to Muhammad Abu Zafar v.
Secretary to Government of West Pakistan 1969 SCMR 298, where the High Court had allowed continuity in service to the petitioner together with rights, benefits and privileges of "the post", without specifically spelling out back benefits and only partial back benefits having been disbursed, an application for contempt was dismissed and later maintained by the Supreme Court.
This case does not advance the petitioner's position, at all. The grant of a Constitutional petition, in specific terms, cannot be equated with allowing an appeal as such, the latter of which, if it follows dismissal of the action at trial, tantamounts to grant of the prayer made in the Court of first instance. Further, Law of Contempt, being of a penal nature the elements of contempt must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt before visitation of any penalties.
5. At any event, we find that in the second round of litigation, while the application under section 51 of the I.R.O., was pending, a statement, dated 20-5-1989, was submitted by the Advocate for the petitioner Corporation, alongwith which were attached some sheets of accounts. Such statement spoke of net back benefits, as computed in terms of money, but a prayer was added that the learned Labour Court be pleased to determine the amounts payable by the petitioner Corporation to the respondent employees. In the attached account sheets, it would appear that the petitioner Corporation had also worked out the moneys, allegedly, due on account of losses/shortages claimed against the employees. On submission of the statement the employees agreed with the working of the back benefits but disputed the amounts recoverable from them. The learned Labour Court, on the same date, passed orders, purportedly on consent, as adverted to above, directing back benefits to be paid upto 31-5-1989, but as to the amounts, which were sought to be recovered, allegedly, on account of losses/shortages, it was observed that the same could not be adjusted on the application, which was being disposed of. Such order was upheld by the Chairman. It was urged before us that there was no consent whatever, as recorded. There may be something in what the petitioner Corporation says about the orders of the learned Labour Court not being on consent, in the conventional sense, and it may be correct that the consent, on the petitioner's part, was a conditional one, involving the payment of a corresponding claim as to losses/ shortages against the employees. However, the consent, spoken of in the order, could be a limited one with regard to computation of back benefits only, since such computation was made on behalf of the petitioner Corporation itself. In our view, even such limited consent was not material as the Labour Court was quite competent in itself to allow such back benefits, as already stood granted, in terms referred above. Thus, even if no consent was involved, though facts do not bear out the petitioner on this score, the broad proposition, as recently reiterated in Sultan Ali v.
Khushi Muhammad PLD 1983 SC 243 that no amount of consent can confer jurisdiction where none exists or that an illegality cannot be cured by consent, still does not apply to the petitioner's case.
6. We, lastly, pointed out to the learned counsel that these, essentially, are questions of fact inviting details, which we need not have gone into in our Constitutional jurisdiction. Still we have partly delved into the same. However, the learned counsel relying on Abdulla Khan v. Nisar Muhammad Khan PLD 1965 SC 690, Nazar Khan v. Additional Sessions Judge PLD 1986 Quetta 214 and Chagai Tribal Transport v. The Secretary Regional Transport Authority PLD 1986 Quetta 264 urged that what he was advancing was a question of law, which could be raised at any time and, besides, even question of fact of a disputed nature, if involving jurisdictional elements could freely, though on discretion, be gone into. No exception can be taken to these propositions on principle.
But the matter, really, does not arise here. We have ourselves analysed the facts. Law has been correctly applied and in competent jurisdiction no injustice is occasioned merely by referring the petitioner Corporation to due remedy, if need be. We, therefore, have not seen any reason or justification to interfere.
7. For the aforementioned reasons we had dismissed these petitions in limine, as indicated above, on 2-10-1989, reasons wherefore, we have recorded now.